LEARN AIRBUS CRASH FROM METROJET-/EGYPTAIR-EVENT
Sohei Matsuno, Prof. (ret.)
of freelance, Dr. (Eng.) without boundaries
Advisor on technical affairs,
Jamilla Restaurant, Palembang, Indonesia
Kimora Matsuno (Proofreader), Student, Singapore International School
ABSTRACT
The writer (He) studied six Airbus
events (1st~5th: crashes, extra: emergency-landing), viz.
Air France (2009), AirAsia (2014), Lufthansa (2015), Metrojet (2015), EgyptAir
(2016) and Daallo (2016) respectively. He’s presented eight papers. The 1st
paper for the 2nd event concludes: (i) its cause is Cockpit fuselage fatigue rupture; (ii) it was preceded by the 1st
event, and (iii) the same
events of the same cause occur several times.
Really, it occurred
5 times. If the cause is the same, the consequences must have points of
analogy. Reversely, would events have points of analogy; a common cause could
be, much more, if each point is of rare occurrence.
Investigation
teams have given each event each cause. None of them becomes any analogous
point. Following a premise, flawless plane and system, they’ve no way
other than attributing causes to human conducts, i.e., if the plane was being
controlled by a pilot, then attribute to the pilot’s, else if by an autopilot,
to terrorist’s. 1st~3rd events are of the former category.
The causes have been attributed to pilots. 4th-5th events
pertain to the latter. For the 4th, the states concerned have
reached consensus, terrorist’s bomb. For the 5th, the official
investigation team of Egypt concluded a bomb hypothesis. BEA team opposes
it. It insists a semi-bomb hypothesis.
This study visualizes
Metrojet event’s last-moment swerve with facts. The swerve is the most
convincing point of analogy. Based on it, the study is extremely ended with the
theory of ‘Cockpit fuselage fatigue rupture’.
Keywords: Airbus crash, material fatigue, human factor
INTRODUCTION
Abbreviations and Definitions
Abbreviations used in this paper
are to be read as follows:
UN:
The United Nations, EU: The European
Union, PRC: The People’s Republic of
China, US: The United States, IS: The Islamic State, BEA: Bureau d'Enquêtes Accident
(Accident Enquiry Bureau), Paris, CAA:
Civil Aviation Authority, He: The writer of this paper,
ACARS: Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System,
CVR: Cockpit Voice Recorder, FDR: Flight Data Recorder, Gspeed: Ground speed, Vspeed: Vertical speed, HS: Horizontal Stabilizer, VS: Vertical Stabilizer, APU: Auxiliary Power Unit, RPB: Rear Pressure
Bulkhead, GPS:
Global Positioning System, GL:
Ground Level, DL: Datum Line, MSWL: Mean Sea Water Level, DP: Datum Plane, YP: Yield Point, nc: number of cycles, IED: Improvised Explosive Device,
F-event: Air France event, A-event: AirAsia event, L-event: Lufthansa Germanwings event, M-event: Metrojet event, E-event: EgyptAir event, D-event: Daallo Airline event, ABIDS: Acquired Basic intelligence
Deficiency Syndrome,
Definitions
of technical terms, e.g., Cause, Determinant, Fatigue, cf. [1] ~ [6], [14] ~ [16]. Logical terms, e.g., Induction,
Deduction, Boolean, cf. [2].
Backdrop
of this Study
This is a causal study on Airbus crashes.
The study’s society has a 2-fold backdrop of program control and oligopoly
dominance, against which studies are badly affected. cf. [5] & [11]. As the backdrop has been overhanging the society for a long
time, people in the society have lost their ability to manage problems happened
or to-happen beyond programs. The society has no system to counter the weakness.
Under this setting, a causal study is apt to begin studying with a dogmatic
(often false) premise, and seek an easygoing-temporizing hypothesis that
minimizes economic-reputational losses to the society. Majority of experts
concerned believe, “It’s the best way to serve the society.” cf. [1] ~ [6]. It may be so in a short run,
but never in a long run. In order to get rid of the backdrop, there’s no way
other than showing a true cause.
Reasons
to focus on M- and E- events
Reason 1
The M-event
crash site supplies the richest data among all the 5 crash sites. It’s because
of the geologic-topographic conditions at its crash site. cf. [2].
F-, A- &
E-event’s crash sites are sea waters. In a sea-waters crash, plane’s severed
parts and debris on seabed hardly express their positions, directions and
carriage when the plane hit the sea surface, because parts and debris move with
sea currents one-by-one in a different manner due to their weight/bulk &
surface/bulk ratios. In addition, the parts and debris aren’t fully accounted
for. The deeper the sea is, the greater the above stated effects are. In this
context, the debris of A-event on the seabed (depth < 30 m) can be
referred to for learning the status of the plane when it hit the sea. But in F-
& E-event (sea depth > 3000 m) it can’t.
L- &
M-event's crash sites are land (mountainous terrain). In L-event, the terrain against
which the plane collided is a steep-stiff-rocky ridge and was covered by snow
at the time of crash. Hence, plane’s fuselage smashed into small pieces slid
and rolled down slippery-steep surfaces of both sides of the ridge, some of
them scattered on the ridge slopes, and most of them accumulated at less
inclined lower-streams. In this case, unlike a crash in waters, all the parts
and debris of the plane can be collected if diligent. But the parts and debris
aren’t at the same positions and in the same statuses (in shape, direction, carriage
etc) as they were when the plane hit the land. M-event’s crash site is flat. It
wasn’t covered by snow but by a layer of weathered rocks (pebbles, sands & clay).
Having been subjected to weathering for a geologically long time, there's no
rock crop. The flat land didn’t allow the parts and debris to have moved far on
the ground (to be computed later). Further, the surface layer played a role of
a shock absorber; hence, the parts and debris maintain their original status at
a better degree. cf. [2], [4] and [7].
Reason 2
1st~5th
events have 10 points of analogy (cf. the 2nd last SECT.) They’re all unique. The end swerve
with steep decent is particularly of rare occurrence. cf. quotation below.
“Nearby radar show
804 cruising at 37,000 feet for several minutes after the initial indication [of irregularity]. It then turns
left, then reverses course and begins a spiral descent that ends with
impact with the water. This highly unusual flight path is another piece
of evidence that remains unexplained, ([...] added, underlined
by him).
cf. [22]
This paper explains
the swerve to fulfill the need pointed out by the above quotation.
The five
events are divided into two groups as per the condition ‘if the plane was being
controlled by a pilot or an autopilot.’ Among the two groups, the one that
solves the swerve effectively is an M- & E-event group. It’s because of 3 reasons,
viz. (i) L-event had no swerve. (ii) F- & A-event had the swerve,
but it’s been attributed to pilots’ error, as the planes were being controlled
by pilots. (iii) In M- & E-event,
the planes were being controlled by autopilots. Hence, the swerve can’t be
attributed to pilots. An alternative object, to which the swerve is attributed,
is a bomb or a bomber. To deny it in M- & E-event is easier than to deny
pilots’ error in F- & A-event. Further, the denial of the former makes the
denial of the latter be easier.
Role of D-event
In this event,
the plane was being controlled by a pilot. As far as this point is concerned,
it pertains to the 1st~3rd event group. But because of the
following reasons, it shall belong to neither group. It’s an Extra-event.
That is, a fatigue crack didn’t happen in a cockpit but in a cabin. Hence, the
plane could come back to the airport of departure. Pilots didn’t die. If a pilot
is alive, it’s uneasy to attribute the cause of crash to the pilot, cf. [12]. There was a dead passenger in D-event.
It’s no wonder even if the investigations would attribute the crash to the dead
man as an easy way. It’s really not.
D-event has played
an extra role in this study, i.e., a full-scale / in-situ test to prove the
reality of fuselage-fatigue-rupture and unreality of terrorist bomb attack.
cf. [1] & [3].
Purposes
of this Study
A primary (tactical) purpose of
this study is to identify the most convincing point of analogy ‘Presence of
Swerve’ in M-event.
A secondary (strategic)
purpose is, based on the identified swerve, to make the Hypothesis, Cockpit
fuselage fatigue rupture, be a Theory.
PRESENCE
OF SWERVE IN CRASH
General
Sensibly
speaking, a present object is materially detected, numerically measured and data-wise
recorded, using suitable tools such as detector, sensor, meter, gauge, CVR, FDR,
radar etc. Reversely, an absent object is not, even if sophisticated tools are
used. However, in secular studies, to find absent objects or not to
find present objects is rather commonplace. The topic in this SECT. is one of the examples. Two main players
in this farce are a tool and a human. Readers are requested to learn this
reality first from the following two Sub-Sects.
Character of Tool and Human
Every tool to detect or to measure
an object has a function only for one kind of object or value such as sound, smoke
or speed, temperature. But a tool is to be subjected to other inputs such as
shock, pressure, strain, temperature etc that are not its own object. The
matter is that a tool responds to these inputs within its capacity. In object detection,
for instance, a smoke detector installed on planes indicates other inputs such as
fog, dust, aerosol, colored gas
etc, as smoke. In value measurement, a Pitot tube to measure
fluid velocity expresses a fluid temperature change as a velocity change. A tape
measure expresses a temperature change as a distance change. This nature, to
indicate other inputs within its capacity, is common for all detectors and
measures. The feint data are adjusted in usual practices. However, there’s no
specified method of adjustment for the errors due to accidental inputs. Hence, the
absent object or value is detected or measured as if it were. A factor that
makes the matter be worse is humans. One aspect in this concern is that humans
have the same nature as tools. That is, experts, professionals or scholars used
to learn a variety of subjects within their narrow capacity of each specialty.
They’re rather willing to use the false data given by the tools, if the data
suit their convenience in their studies.
In this regard, it’s worthy to forward
the following episode before readers.
It was 2010s when he was on board
AirAsia Airbus en route from Kuala Lumpur to Tokyo. It was midnight when he
used a rear lavatory to ease himself. After having flushed, he was about to go
out. Then, the door was unlocked and opened from outside. He found a man with a
blanched face. The man yelled “You smoked!”
He responded “No! Why yes?” The man didn’t reply. Having
pushed him aside, the man entered the lavatory and shut the door. He left the spot
but kept observing what the man did. After a few min., he heard a sound of flushing. The man came out from the
lavatory. After having had a short chat with a stewardess in front of the
lavatory, the man left there, and, having passed his side without words, went
back to the man’s position. He knew neither man’s position nor conclusion,
since didn’t ask, as the man’s face was still blanched as it had been.
His analysis on the episode is as
follows: (i) At that time, the temperature in the cabin was cool 21 (˚C) according to his wrist thermometer.
His temperature is usually 36.6 (˚C).
(ii)
When urinated, warm urine steamed up. It rose to smoke-detector’s elevation. (iii)
The detector caught it and transmitted the data to the man (maybe purser)’s monitor.
(iv)
The purser came to the lavatory at a jump. (v) The purser inspected,
but couldn’t smell smoke but might smell urine. (vi) Then, the purser
flushed. (vii) The purser’s conclusion was, “It was smoke. No evidence only.”
The
point in this issue is, ‘the detected steam was transmitted as smoke.’ Having
been obsessed by the feint data, the purser disposed the case as per
regulations set up.
It didn’t matter as it was urine steam.
But it did matter if it was fog. Now, he’s facing the problem in this
study. But it isn’t an isolated matter only in this study. It’s universal throughout
the world.
Universality of Tool - Human Character
He’d experienced a lot of the same
in Japan while he was in Niigata University, having been engaged in a variety
of techno-legal consultations with Prefecture Police HQs, District Prosecutors
offices, District Courts, Municipal Parliament etc, as an appraiser. In each
case, his opinion was met by a plural counter opinion. To convince readers of
the matter’s universality, he shall herewith introduce five examples from
multi-tens to readers.
(1) Nagara
River Levee Collapse Case (Gifu Prefecture, 1976)
The Nagara
River is the 15th longest river in Japan. Its right-bank levee collapsed
under a strong rainfall of the Typhoon No. 5. His opinion was, “The bank at the
site had been constructed on a pond by reclamation without removal of slippery
bed sediment. The remained half of the pound (50-m long) was left
without fill at the toe of the failed levee slope.
His opinion
was, “The levee slid because of lack in slide resistance due to the method
of construction. The fact that the levee collapsed exactly at the pond
location with the full width of the pond explicitly proves it.”
Counter
opinions of metrology experts were, “Unprecedented strong rainfall due to
the Typhoon No. 5 is the cause. The levee collapse could have happened at any
point along the River. The River levee collapsed at the point by chance. It
prevented the levee from collapsing at any point else.” It ignored the
existence of the pond.
(2) Matsuyama
Hillside Landslide Case (Yamagata Prefecture, 1980s)
The landslide
happened on a hillside under which peat mining had been active.
His opinion
was “The ground have had cracks and then been weakened by the ground
settlement due to the mining. It slid having had snow thawing water. ”
Counter
opinions of geology experts were “The site is of geologically unstable
ground that has a lot of faults. It’s a kind of geological phenomena that are
originally actualized by Plate Tectonics. It happened by chance at the site.”
It didn’t see the existence of mining tunnels just under the site ground.
(3) Nagaoka
Rice Center Hopper Beam Disconnection Case (Niigata Prefecture, 1970s)
This was a
disconnection of a beam that was one of the supporting beams of an unhulled
rice hopper. It killed the master of the Center. The victim’s corpse was found
next day beside the fallen beam.
His opinion
was, “An inappropriately designed beam’s supporting joint was disconnected.
The victim was hit by the falling beam.”
A counter
opinion was of a doctor of a specialist of heart disease (the victim was his
long-time patient). The doctor replied, when asked to inquire into the cause of
the victim’s death, “He died of natural death of a heart attack,” having
turned a blind eye to an obvious trace of bruise on the victim’s head.
(4) Highway
Hillside-Wall Collapse Case (Fukushima Prefecture, 1970s)
It was the
collapse of twin masonry walls built in two stairs on an upper hillside of the
road. They fell down onto a minibus that was timely traveling the walls
section. A driver and passengers on board were killed in the incident.
His opinion
was, “The upper-side wall was built with a too short setback from the top of
the lower-side wall. Hence, the dead weight of the upper-side wall worked as a
surcharge on the back-fill of the lower-side wall, having added excess soil
pressure to the lower-side wall. It overturned the lower-side wall. The upper-side
wall followed it by sliding down the slope.”
A counter
opinion of soil engineering experts was, “It was caused by sandy soil’s
liquefaction* ignited by traveling cars’ dynamic effect.” Adding, “It
increased the pour water pressure of soil, having resulted in excess soil
pressure that overturned the twin walls.” It didn’t become aware of the
phenomena at the site, i.e., the lower wall overturned and the upper one
didn’t but slid down after the overturned lower one.
* A
phenomenon that happens in not enough compacted wet sandy soil when subjected
to a dynamic load, as sand particles become a floating condition in a moment,
changing the soil’s nature to a liquid phase. It often happens at a seismic
time.
(5) Ojiya
Road-cutting-Slope Failure Case (Niigata Prefecture, late 1970s)
The site is a
hillside of quarterly tuff that has vertical fissures and strata that dip to
the same direction as topography but with lesser angle. The slide happened
after the cutting had been completed its design height of 20 (m). The
tuff slid down on the strata, block-by-block, having been separated by
fissures. Finally the slid section reached the total cut section of 300-m
long, killing several workers.
His opinion
was, “The Quarterly tuff lost its surface layer with vegetation by cutting
and exposed to multiple dry-wet effects. Then, it underwent 1st stage
weathering and changed its phase from rock to bentonite. This effect affected
not only its surface but penetrated into the fissures. By nature, bentonite
expands its volume when being wet, and shrink when dry. If it happens in the
fissures, it causes swelling pressure; the tuff was pushed down on the stratum
by this force.”
A counter
opinion of geology experts was, “It’s a block movement* of land. It
can happen along faults anywhere in quarterly areas by chance. But its
foreknowledge is difficult. ” It didn’t see the present fissures, but
saw absent faults.
* Usually
slow (occasionally quick) geological movement of a land block along fault
surfaces due to plate tectonics.
Readers may
have realized a mono-pattern of the specialists’ opinions. Their causes are all
universal or global facts. Note! When Isaac Newton said, “The cause of an
apple falling down from a tree is gravitational force,” this physicist was
worthy of people’s admiration as a genus. But if an expert says, “The cause
of a plane falling down from the sky is gravitational force,” the expert is
worthy of people’s ridicule as a nerd. Remember, any universal (global) fact
may have a chance to be a cause only when the matter can’t happen
without it and it hasn’t yet had universal validity among the contemporaries. Any
universal fact may have a meaning when the object possesses a particular weak
point to the universal fact. Would it be found, it’d be the cause. The
universal fact isn’t. A cause is, in general, a fact that’s particular (local) at
the place and/or (synchronous) at the time of the event.
Now consider human error. A pilot error is a
universal fact, as ‘To err is human.’ The bomb attack is also a
global fact. Not only Jihadists but all the powerful states in all the
continents are committing it. ‘To bomb is human.’ Find any weak point on
the object against the universal fact, and it’s the cause.
An unprecedented gigantic example is the UN adopted study theme. It sees, ‘the global warming’ as the cause of every disaster. It doesn’t see a true cause, ‘drainage of hot cooling water from nuclear power plants into the sea’. The cause is big, but not global. Really, the disasters are local, i.e., in the zones of the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean side of EU, PRC and US where the nuclear power plant development is particularly remarkable. The UN-promoted project may appease people who’ve been fed up with social strain due to ongoing endless wars for a while. It’ll give nerds lucrative themes for a long time. But never bring about solutions to the facing problems forever. cf. [17] and [2] (Epilogue).
Mechanism
of Swerve
General aspect of control system paralysis
Explanations in this Sub-Sect. are done with data of not
only M- and E- but also F-, A- and L- events. The name of the event is
mentioned in each explanation and illustration. As concluded in this paper, the
five events have a common cause. Hence, their essential aspects must be
analogically the same too at least in the currently discussing points, though
there’re differences in detail aspects and digital values. Hence, any explanation
and illus. of any event should be accepted commonly for all the events in the very
point of discussion. Keep this in mind, and readers are better convinced of the
following explanations.
A- & E- events have a plural swerve
though others have a singular one. In the following explanations, they’re
called collectively ‘(the) swerve’. cf.
Fig. 1.
Origin:
Greek Defense Minister Kammenos (BBC) Origin: BEA Final Report
(a) E-event swerves (detected) (b) F- event swerve (recorded)
Fig.
1 last swerve(s)
with steep descent (s & (s) are to be omitted)
The swerve that accompanies steep descent happened as an end
aspect of a series of the control system paralysis. Therefore, the discussions
on the swerve in this Sub-Sect.
shall start with the general aspect of the control system paralysis. It
consists of four Acts. They’re explained Act-by-Act as follows.
Act 1 is a decade-long development of a fatigue crack. It was a prelude of
the control system paralysis proceeding. That is, the control system paralysis
had a latent phenomenon, a fatigue crack.
It used to start at the bottom of the cockpit’s avionic bay. It grew along both
sides of a cockpit fuselage, slowly, symmetrically. The fatigue crack had needed
about 2*104-times cn of alternating stress (= the flight
number of times = the number of atmospheric pressure changes) until the crack reached
a critical condition to rupture (M-event).
As the fatigue-crack width is small (< μm),
usually there’s no heraldic symptoms, e.g., an irregularity in a control system,
decompression or fog due to decompression etc until the fatigue crack development
nears the fatigue rupture.
In
L-event, a herald appeared in a form of sluggish responses in elevator
control in its on-bound flight one day before the doomed returning flight, [4], [7] & [13].
In D-event, flight crew reported pressurization problem and asked the
captain to return. Then, the captain requested to
return, without emergency declaration (the official notification of the Somalia authorities). ---- His comment: It means that the fuselage rip
was preceded by the decompression in the same day.
In
E-event, it was actualized in its 6-rotation flights one
day before the fatal one.
According to media reports, smoke (fog) was detected at each flight. The plane
underwent a technical audit at each landing, but every time the plane was
allowed to continue a flight till the fatal one, [1].
These were the 1st
and the last
heraldic symptoms of the
respective events.
Act 2 began at [04: 12: 56.6] (hr. min. sec., UTC) when the FDR of the Metrojet plane showed irregularities.
It’s the Time 0 of the event. It lasted 5 (sec) during which the control
system had been totally paralysed. cf. Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 Altitude and speed charts vs. time (min. sec.). Speed axis legend on right
Actural phmarenomena corresponding to the FDR data irregularity are as follows:
According to BEA’s investigation, E-event’s last flight
had smoke (fog) in cockpit areas several min.
before the Time 0. Pilots
might have thought that it was feint information as the ones in the previous 6-rotation flights. But
it wasn’t. The fatigue crack that caused the fog had been already at a critical
condition. The rupture started with the loss of cockpit’s right windows. It
developed to a next-door lavatory and down to the avionics
bay, having been destroying every control device on the way. The speed of the fatigue-rupture development
is much faster than the one of the fatigue-crack development. The pilots in the
cockpit were kiled at the 1st stage of the rupture instantly. The plane became an
uncontrolled drone at [04: 13: 01.6].
Act 3 is consequential midair disintegration of the plane.
It took 21 (sec) until the big parts had severed
from the plane. It happened in a order of 1st
~ 4th
separations. Intermittent separations of fuselages and small
parts continued until the end of the event.
The 1st separation
was of a tail cone which houses APU. It happened by inertia force of the tail cone due to plane’s acute vibration, most probably at [04: 13: 01.6]. The separation
owed its easy occurrence to the presence
of a fatigue crack along the perimeter of a firewall. As the firewall provides
the closure of plane’s whole fuselage, it’d been subjected to alternating
stress at every flight. It caused the fatigue crack. It’s evidenced by a knife-cut-like
edge. cf. Photo 1 (a), (b) and (c)
mark.
It’s said, “RUAG Aerostructures manufactured this section per design requirements defined by RUAG
engineering [...].” He wants to know, ‘How
the requirements specifies the firewall-fuselage joint, especially as for the weld,’ as he thinks, ‘The weld might have had effects on the
fatigue crack.’ cf. [2], [4] ~ [6], Can he?
(a) view from hatch side (b) Near View from upper side (c) Cut edge at firewall
Photo 1 Tail cone’s
knife-cut-like edge
The loss of the APU made elevators and a rudder be powerless. They’d no
constraint at their pivots anymore. It
allowed them to rotate
about each pivot axis freely by external force (wind). Thus, after the tail
cone separation, a flutter* had been ready to occur at the elevators and the rudder. It played a key role
in plane’s subsequent midair
disintegration.
*A flutter is a sort of oscillation by a wind. It occures in a thin structure parpendicularly to a wind
direction. If the structure is too thin vs. its span, a flutter happens in the
span as well. The most familiar example is a hoisted flag fluttering by a wind.
The frequency of a flutter is different from a natural frequency of a
flattering structure. But the flutter is quite a tricky phenomenon. When some of its frequencies happen to near the natural frequency of the structure, resonance takes place. It
results in a big amplitude. The Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse (1940, USA) was
caused by the flutter with resonance in its too thin stiffner girder vs. its
span.
Flutter rupture is a
sort of fatigue rupture. In fatigue rupture, the cn of alternating stress
depends on the magnitude of the applied
alternating stress. The greater the stress is, the less the cn is. If the stress is less than a fatigue limit, cn →
∞, i.e., no rupture happens. In the airbus
crash events, alternating stress was more than EP. It’s proven by the residual angular displacement
and curvature radius at the cut edges. The flutter-cut edge is strait, but not knife-cut-like. It’s
slightly zigzag, because of flutter’s greater, rougher and more irregular nature of alternating stress than the ordinary vibration’s lesser, finer and more regular nature. It’s the reason why
the flutter rupture didn’t need 104 order stress-alternation cn as the cases of cockpit, RPB and
firewall needed. It needed only more or less than 101 times cn.
Timewise, it also didn’t need yrs long time but less than 21 (sec) in
M-event. The strait-zigzag-cut edge can be seen in the Photos of debris.
The flutter can be tested qualitatively by a simple model. Prepair a
sheet of thick A4 size paper. Roll it into a cylinder in either side by paste.
Press it at its one perimeter line so as to mold a wing-like model. Close both
open sides by a stapler. Insert a chopstick into the model to pivot it. Hang the
model in front of an enough strong fan, 30-cm distant from and palarel to the fan
blades. It flutters.
The wind speed, i.e., plane
speed, when the disintegration happened was average 200 (m/sec). On the other hand, fan’s wind speed may be at most 3 (m/sec). It doesn’t matter, because the
purpose of this test is to know the wing-shaped model’s flutter qualitatively.
The model’s behavior is the same analogically as the real one. If a
quantitative analysis is the case, it needs wind-tunnel tests whose wind speed
must be so controlled as to realize the same similitude as the real structure.
The 2nd
separation was of HSs with the fuselage between the RPB and the firewall.
As the tail cone had already
severed, this side had been open ended. The RPB side had also developed a
fatigue crack along RPB’s perimeter. But it had yet to be fully done. The portion above the deck in the starboard was still being
fixed with the rear body. The fuselage between RPB and firewall, to which HSs were
fixed, was unstable especially in portside. They were subjected to vibration of
HSs and VS, excited by flutters of elevators and a rudder. The portside HS
severed from the main body by flutter at the top where it was jointed. In the starboard, HS severed from
the fuselage. The starboard fuselage was cut off by combined effects of
flutters and wind-pressure along a lateral line from the endpoint of fatigue
crack on the RPB perimeter to the ex-firewall perimeter. RPB and FDR didn’t
follow the 2nd separation. They followed the 4th
separation. The 2nd separation proceeded from [04: 13: 13.091] to [04:
13: 13.872]. The above stated separation aspect is proven by (i) linear-zigzag,
knife-cut-like and irregular cut edges in Photo
1 (c) & 3 (marked by,
,
and
) and (ii) the time when flight data
became unreliable.
The 3rd separation
was of VS. After having missed the tail cone and the inter firewall-RPB fuselage, the VS was a 1-side mounted, 1-side partially mounted and 2-side
open thin structure that’s vulunerable to the flutter. Hence, on the top of the forced bibration excited by rudder’s flutter, the VS itself had a flutter. VS’ cut edge due to flutter is seen on the remained VS’ vertical shaft broken by collision shock in Photo 1 (c), (marked by
), It’s seen in Photo 2 in which the broken VS shaft is put back to its original position. Its mounted line along the upper part of the rear body didn’t cut by flutters. VS was finally pulled away by wind
pressure along this line. It left an irregular cut edge. cf. Photo 2 (
). These linear-zigzag and the irregular cut edges prove the mechanism & aspect of the 3rd
seperation.
The 4th
separation was plane’s rear body with RPB and FRD. The separation happened at a cross-section between the rearmost cabin windows
and the rear exit doors. It ended at [04: 13: 22.6]. The linear upper half of the cut section didn’t resist the separation.
It’d already had a fatigue crack. The lower part of the cut section resisted
the separation. It was subjected to various kinds of force, viz.(lateral, longitudinal) - (shear, moment) & tork’ due to ‘plane’s (lateral / longitudinal) - (sway / pitching) & rolling. They created
inertia force of the rear body. Among them, the terminator was the lateral-shear that pushed the rear body to starboard relative to the main body. It’s proven
by the facts given in Photo 4. It’s elaborated
in the 2nd last SECT.
Besides the short-period sway, pitching etc, plane had the long-piriod
stall. It may have contributed to the separation but to a lesser extent,
because it gave the rear body lesser acceleration (inertia force). The
applicable track record data shows no eligible stall that realizes such shear
force to sever the rear body. One more
mechanism that might be responsible for the seperation is the fact, ‘The rear body was pulled towards starboard as the 3rd separation was biased to
starboard.’ It did little. The phenomenon was too lateral to have been done by the starboard biased pull in 3rd seperation.
Comment: The 4th separation is
particular in M-event only.
In this way, the main separations extremely
ended at [04: 13: 22.6] It took 21 (sec). It accompanied separations of various sizes of
open-ended fuselages by flutters and the wind pressure any time intermittently
until the collision. The chlonogical order shown above may not necessarily conform to the spacial distribution of the respective parts and debris on the ground. The severed fuselages flew off by natural winds
much farther than the parts did. The lighter parts, e.g., HSs and VS flew farther than the
heavier parts, e.g., the tail cone and the rear body did.
Photo 2 Sequence of separation (1st~4th) Photo
3 Severed rear body (3 kinds of cut edges:
and status
of fatigue cracks (red) irregular,
Knife-cut-like & Strait zigzag)
(a) Rear body portside view (b) ditto Starboard view
Photo 4 Cut section of Metrojet’s rear body
Act 4 is the end performance, swerve. It began at [04: 13: 39.384] and lasted 78 (sec)*.
A pair of ailerons functions for a plane to roll (to move around plane's longitudinal axis), which results in a swerve in flight path due to the tilting of the lift
vector. That is, if a plane rolles
left (right), it swerves left (right).
In M-event, however, it went opposit to the
above, i.e., the plane rolled left and swerved to right. It’s because that
after having lost the rear body, the plane’s gravity center moved forward,
having passed the centroid of wings (where the lift force acts) by about 3 (m).
A pair of ailerons are pivoted at its one side. Unlike the elevators and the
rudder, the ailerons’ power unit was still constraining the ailerons. Further,
their motion is so synchronized as to move to opposit angular directions each other hardware-wise. It
means the lesser flutter and greater rotational resistace moment about the
pivot axisis. These are the reasons why (i) wings
didn’t sever from the plane until collision, and (ii) the pair of ailerons (or one of them) were (was) jamed at a certain
position at last. The latter (ii)
must have occured due to some mechanical failure in their power unit and/or
synchronizing hardware. It can be confirmed by observing the wing debris. When
it happened, the aileron(s) flutter waned but its (their) wind pressure waxed. It caused the plane
to have rolled left and swerved to right. When the roll neared the upsidedown
carriage, the swerve became insignificant. Having kept a linear alignment in
its extreme end path, the plane
hit the ground at [04: 14: 57.384] (hr., min. sec., UTC)*.
* Calculated in the next Sub-Sect.
As the events have 10
similarities, it’s highly possible there’s a common cause. Reversely, if
there’s a common cause in the events, there’d be the same-pattern consequences
(aspects) due to the same failure mechanism. Readers can compose the crash
aspect as per only the following 3 criteria. Do it yourself, if you will, by a process
of trial and error.
(1) There’re 3 kinds of
cut edges in severed debris, viz. (i)
knife-cut-like strait ones, (ii)
strait but slightly zigzag ones and (iii)
irregular-shaped ones. They’re shown in Photos of debris. The presences of
the 3 kinds of cut edge are undeniable facts.
(2) A
knife-cut-like edge is by low-speed fatigue rupture. A strait-zigzag edge is by
flutter rupture (high-speed fatigue rupture). An irregular-shaped edge is by
wind pressure or inertia force without a fatigue crack. These are the known facts
through breaking tests, studies and experiences.
(3) A severed
segment doesn’t sever again unless otherwise loaded. It’s a common sense.
Visualization of M-event’s Swerve
Data Collection
Mobilizing his utmost effort, he’s got eight applicable data. They’re
shown in Fig. 3 and 4.
Fig. 3’s four
illus. are compositions of the last flight paths or
the last rader contact position (FR24) and
satelite images of crash and main
debris sites (Fig. 5). There’s no
explanation on the discrepancy between the flight paths and the crash site.
Fig. 4s join the two realities, the crash site & the flight
path. Fig. 4 (a)’s crash site is on the protracted flight path with no swerve. Fig. 4 (b) assumes a vertical descent also with no swerve too. It’s difficult
for him to interpret these Figs. Do
the Fig. 3s assume a natural wind that carried the plane’s main body from the
flight path to the crash site? All the applicable data (altitude, location,
time, Vspeed, Gspeed etc) disagree to it. Do the Fig. 4s mean the crash site location given by RIA is faulty? It’s also imaginary. They are under correction..
(a) Origin: Reuters, Russian
Emergence s Ministry, FR24 (b) Origin: Graphics: AVH/Google Earth
(c) Origin: washingtonpost.com (d) Origin: Crick on the Fig. It
automatically shown
Fig. 3 Debris field and probable flight route of M-event
Origin: ditto Origin:
Shown in Fig.
(a) Dip descent on protoracted line of
flight path (b) Vertical descent under last point
Fig. 4 Trajectory of
M-event
Origin: Photo/Graphics: AFP/RIA
Fig. 5
Satelite image of crash site (L) and main debris site (R)
Data Correction
From among six data in Fig. 3 & 4, he adopted Fig. 3 (d) and Fig. 4
(b) in the following analyses. The reasons are: The adopted
two have digital data. Fig. 4
(a) is only a data that gives the time of collision. But he
doesn’t adopted it, because it doesn’t show ‘with what base it was defined,’ and the vital digital data, ‘the collision time’ itself is at odd
with the reality. The collision time is defined in the next Sub-Sect.
Fig. 3 (d) has multi-matters, i.e.; (i) As FR24 itself admits, data after
the plane lost FDR are unreliable. Take note, every tool, e.g., sensor, detector,
has been more
or less affected by accidental inputs. The GPS itself doesn’t give prcise
values for vertical conponents (altitude &, Vspeed), though they may be
referred to. But the data of horizontal components (location, Gspeed) are
applicable with corrections if
needed. (ii) The direction of the plane when
it hit the ground shown in Fig. 3 (d) doesn’t coincide to the reality. Based on the plane’s status at
the crash site given by the satelite image in a red frame of Fig. 5, plane’s direction of motion
when it hit the ground is measured at S 60˚W (Ɵ = 60˚). cf. Fig. 6. (iii) The last portion of the recorded flight path, expressed by
a chain of yellow circles in Fig. 3
(d) is too far. Would it be true, the plane’s Gspeed had to
be 1700 (m/sec). It was really about
90 (m/sec). It’d be corrected reasonably.
The matters with Fig. 4 (b) are: (i) the last vertical ordinate. It’s
the result of illustrators’ will to emphasise almost vertical descent of the
plane. But in a time-altitude ordinate, it can’t be vertical so far as the
Vspeed is finite, (ii) the digital
data given in Fig. 4 (b), viz. altitude, Vspeed, Gspeed, and distance between last recorded
point & crash site in Fig. 3 (d), contradict each other. This matter will be discussed again in the
next Sub-Sect.
Composition of swerve alignment
Fig. 7 is a corrected figure of Fig. 3 (d). The swerve is a composite
alignment of: (i) a circular curved section that contacts tangentially both
the recorded last truck and the identified direction of plane’s motion when it
hit the ground, and (ii) a linear section after the curved section to the crash
point. It yields Fig. 8.
The related calcurations to Fig. 8 were done as follows:
Based on the scale shown in Fig. 5, the lengths of swerve’s
circular and linear sections are calcurated. They’re 1800 and 700 (m) respectively.
Fig. 6
Plane’s direction of
motion Fig. 7 Correction of flight’s last path
(yellow
when it crashed circle chain) & plane’s direction
when crashed
The Gspeed of the
plane when it hit the ground is computed.
Assume the energy of Vspeed is consumed by smashing the plane, and has no relation to energy dissipation of Gspeed by friction. Then, the Gspeed at the time of collision (v)
is given by
the Expression (a):
v
= √(2*g*μ*s) ............. (a),
where;
g:
Gravitational acceleration = 9.8 (m/sec2),
μ:
Coulomb’s coefficient of friction
between metal and soil (0.6),
s: Sliding displacement of plane;s body
after collision* = 12 (m)
(photographic jugement),
Substituting
these values into Expression (a), v = 12 (m/sec).
*
The wings slid by 2 (m). Its motion
was blocked by obstacles in front of wings. The front-body elements of rigidly
fixed with the wings by I-beams followed the wings. The elements of not (or
loosely) fixed with the I-beams slid freely from the wing block by 10 (m) relative to the wing-block. The
calculations are done for the freely moved block, as it slid better faithfully
to the Coulomb’s Friction Law than the wing-block did.
The
sliding status must have been surveyed by site investigations. Given the
data, he shall revise his photographic
jugement, though there’d be insignificant differences between them.
When the plane started swerving at [04: 13: 39,384], its Gspeed was 272 / (39.384 – 34.163) = 52 (m/sec).
Assume a constant Gspeed decrease, and an average Gspeed in
this path was
(52+12)/2 = 32 (m/sec).
FR24’s
Gspeed at [04: 14: 39,384] is 47 (kt)
= 24 (m/sec). Fig. 4 (b) shows altitude and Vspeed at [04: 13: 39.384]. They’re
28375 (ft) and 26432 (ft/min) respectively. Then, the plane
hit the ground in 28375 / 26432*60 = 64.41 (sec).
Meanwhile, the plane moves horizontally 24*64.41=1546 (m). The linear distance between the [04: 13: 39.384] point and the
crash site is 1776 (m). That is, the
plane can’t reach the crash site on time. The Gspeed at [04: 13: 39.384] isn’t
47 (kt). If it’s 100 (kt), there’s no contradiction in calculations
as follows.
The
travelling time from the beginning point to the crash site = 2500 / 32 = 78 (sec). The crash time = [04: 13: 39. 384] + [00: 00:. 78.000] = [04: 14: 57.384] (hr, min. sec., UTC).
Thus, the
crash aspect has been explained. Now, ask
questions! “Did a bomber produce the planes’ end swerve?” Answer: “No, unless the plane
would have been hijucked.” Then, “Did
a bomb do it?” Answer: “No, a
bomb had no relation to the swerve.” Then, what did it? The answer to this
question has been already given. ‘Aileron / the flutter’ did it.
REVIEW OF STUDIES ON AIRBUS CRASH EVENTS
General
Importance of Analogy
in Event Study
Analogy is
generally an effective means in a study. In an event study other analgous
events give valuable hints to the study on the event.
This study is a typicaL example.
The 10 points of analogy between the
5 Airbus crash events are as follows:
(01) Events of Airbus A320 family (except F-event, it was -A330),
(02) Events at cruising altitudes,
(03) Initiated by an irregularity in the elevator
control system,
(04) Resulted in a total control-system paralysis
(except L-event),
(05) Sequent steep ascent / stall / descent (except L-event),
(06) Ending
up in anomalous swerve with a rapid
descent to a crash (except L-event),
(07) Planes’ 3-part division ‘cockpit, tail & main body’ after
crash (unclear in F-
& E-event),
(08) Cockpit’s and tail’s different destruction manners from main body’s
(ditto),
(09) No flight-balance recovery by either pilots or autopilot,
(10) No distress call from pilots, after emergency happened (except F-event).
It’s to be noticed that
the analogy covers a wide range of items as (01): type of plane, (02): altitude
where trouble happened, (03) ~ (06): aspect of events, (07) & (08): feature
of plan e wreckage, (09) & (10): pilots’ / autopilots’ responses during the
events.
Be aware, all the items
are of rare occurence in general crash events. For instance, happening at cruising altitude is
7.5 % per all plane accidents. Possibility of occurence of 5 continuius events
of such is 2.37*10- 4 (%). It happened in the 5 events. The other Items have the same character
as this. In this context, it’s ultra-highly probable that the 5 events have a
common cause. As seen, to make analogy needs a wide range of sense in which the
nerds are lacking.
Origin:
BEA Final Report Origin: Ministry of Transportation (ATC radar
data)
(a) F-event’s last swerve (recorded) (b) A-event’s last swerve (recorded)
(c) M-event’s last swerve (visualised) (d) E-event’s last swerve (detected)
Fig. 9 Last swerve in four events
Among the 10 points of
analogy, the most convincing one is Item (06). It’s shown in Fig. 9. Every illus. in the
Fig. expresses the analogy concretely & analogously, hence, Fig. 9 convinces people of the
presence of the analogy better than the other ones (rather abstract & digital) do. He recommends everyone to review each study by analogy
between the 5 events
especially with the swerve.
Comment: L-event didn’t
swerve, because the copilot descended the plane immediately after he’d realized
irregularity. It retarded the due development of system paralysis. Would the copilot haven’t done
it, the plane did swerve without fail.
Investigation
Process as usual
When an
aviation accident happenes, an official investigation team is set-up in a state
where the event has taken place. The team consists of investigators from the
host and guest states concerned, i.e., a producer of the plane, an
operator of the flight, and a controller of the departure airport. Besides the official team, plural investigation team from the states
concerned also independently participate
in the investigations.
In M-event, Egypt, Russia and France are in positions
respectively. Germany and Ireland also participate. They’re the states of the plane
manufacture and registration. There’s an outsider Islamic
State in M-event. It deposes the way of bombing. In E-event, the states concerned are Egypt and France (+ states of
expertise). There’s no group who claimes a terror act. The states (investigation
teams) participating in the events are called the states (parties) concerned.
Investigation Teams’ Study Results (as of date)
General
The cause of bomb meets the convenience of all the states concerned but the one, a controller of the departure airport. This political setting has
characterized the investigations into M- & E-event so much. The official investigation teams finished the
studies on the two events. But there’re still potential and actualized discord between teams in certain states. He considers the
investigations are not to be ends themselves.
Focusing on the two keypoints, bomb (or its alternative) & swerve,
and based on media reports, the investigation teams’ study results are
summerized in the next Sub-Sect.
M-event
The studies’ development is chlonogically as follows:
(1)
After Oct. 2015: Egypt (as a state) initially denied widely held
suspicions that a bomb caused the crash.
(2) Nov. 16 2015: The Russian Federal Security Service
stated, “The
crash was caused by a terrorist attack. Traces of explosives have been found in the wreckage of the plane. During the flight, a
homemade device with the power of 1.5 kg of TNT was detonated.”
(3) Nov. 17
2015: the website of Russia's President issued a summary of a meeting that’d been held
on Nov.
16 2015, during which the director of Russia's Federal Security
Service had stated, “Mr. President, we have studied the
passengers’ personal belongings and luggage and fragments of the plane that
crashed in Egypt on October 31. An
expert examination of all these objects has found traces of foreign-made
explosives. According to our experts, a self-made explosive device equivalent
up to 1 kg of TNT was set off on board, which explains why the fragments
of the aircraft were scattered over a large area.”
(4) Dec. 4
2015:
Egyptian committee preliminary report said, “No
evidence to prove an act of terror or illegal intervention.” In response, Russian spokesman Dmitry
Peskovre iterated, “Our
experts concluded this was a terrorist attack.”
(5) Dec. 14 2015: Egypt's Civil Aviation Authority reported, “The preliminary report has been finished and has been sent to ICAO as
well as all participants in the investigation.”
(6) Feb. 24 2016: President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi acknowledged
having said, “terrorism caused the crash.”
This is the stance of Egypt as a state. Meanwhile, the
press release by Egypt's CAA concludes, “Up
to date the committee did not receive any information indicating unlawful
interference, consequently the committee continues its work regarding the
technical investigation.”
(7) Aug. 30 2016: Egypt's CAA announced that a
delegation from Russia has arrived in Egypt to determine the initial point of
where the fuselage started to disintegrate.
(8) Sep. 8 2016: Egypt's
CAA announced, “A specific area was
identified, where most likely the disintegration of the fuselage began. The
related parts of the wreckage have to [be sent to .. writer’s comment] special laboratories to further
analyse the causes of the disintegration.”
(9) Oct. 31 2016: Russia's
MAK stated, “A specific area of the aircraft [has been] identified where the disintegration of the
airframe began. Evidence suggests that the airframe was exposed to high energy
elements from the inside to the outside.”
(10) Nov. 16 2016: It was reported that Egypt’s CAA released an interim statement
providing little insight into the sequence of events. Noteworthy details are
the examination of the cabin pressure controllers and the spectrum analysis of
FDR’s last second recordings.
The swerve (or generally the
analogy itself) has been ignored up to the date.
E-event
The swerve in E-event has been recordrd
by the Greece Defense Ministry’s radar. However, it was denied by the Egypt team.
In
E-event, controversies are the Egypt team (official) vs. the France team (BEA).
The Egyp team says, “A malicious act likely brought down the
plane. It’s evidenced by the
detection of explosive traces on the
remains of some of the victims. ”
BEA
opposes it, saying, “A fire broke out in the
cockpit while the plane was flying at its cruise altitude. The fire spread so
fast that the crew couldn’t control the plane.” It’s derived the hypothesis
based on the following seven premises, viz.
(1) FDR suddenly lost function while the plane was in a cruise altitude of 37,000 (ft).
(2) ACARS sent
messages of the presence of smoke in the
toilets and the avionics bay.
(3) FDR data agrees to
these messages.
(4) CVR replay reveals the crew’s conversation about the existence of a fire on board.
(5) Several pieces of debris retrieved from the crash site. Some of
them have signs of having been subject to high
temperatures, and traces of soot.
(6) A signal from the
emergency locator transmitter was sent at 00:37 (around
eight minutes after the transmission of the last ACARS message),
(7) Data from a Greek primary radar (sent by the Greek authorities
to the BEA) shows plane’s steep descentt in a turn before it collided with the sea water.
Needed
Explanations
Common for both events
In M- and E- events, planes were under
the autopilot control. And
there’s a diehard premise ‘flawless plane
and system’. Hence, he’s not surprised by the following statement that’s the
backbone of their hypothesis.
The New York Times Sinior officials at Metrojet, the charter company
that operated the aircraft, sounded definitive in their statements that the
plane and crew were faultless. “We absolutely exclude the technical failure
of the plane, and we absolutely exclude pilot error or a human factor,”
Aleksandr A. Smirnov, a former pilot and the airline’s deputy director for
aviation, told a packed news conference in Moscow.
Really, the main-stream hypothis is (semi-)bomb hypotheses. But it needs explanations.
M-event
As the bomb
hypothesis can’t logically explain the swerve (or any analogy in general);
all the hypotheses have been unanimously ignoring the swerve (or generally any
analogy). If there’d be any other reasons to ignore the analogy, they should be
explained. Metrojet plane’s last swerve is visualized in this paper. It
may help the explanations.
The states concerned have barely
reached consensus of opinion on the cause, terrorist’s
bomb. But there’s a latent objection at investigation teams’ level between the
Egypt official team and the Russian team. As far as the Egypt team keeps its
present stance, there’s a little hope in this study field, cf. [2]. It depends on if the Egypt team
can obtain a true cause. The 10 points of analogy will help it.
Russian team’s study result is “The aircraft skin had
undergone high energy dynamic influence (from inside to outside) due to
bomb explosion and its internal overpressure caused an inflight rapid
decompression (Interstate Aviation Committee report).” Russian team won’t
change this stance.
Russian team’s study results need explainations as follows:
(a) Bomb’s weight and its set place are wandering from 1.5
to 1.0-kg TNT equivalent, and from baggage hold to cabin respectively. The
self-styled bomb fixer, The IS group, shows an image of a bomb of the same type
as the one used in M-event. It’s a set of a 0.24-kg explosive can, a detonator and a switch. The Russian team
is requested to explain the discrepancy between the Russian team and the Executive
group. cf. Photo 5.
(b) Doesn’t Russian team agree to the tail-cone-first disintegration? If yes, it needs twin-bombs. May he have Russian explanations?
(c) Last but most!
It’s true all the broken fuselage segments (pieces of isolator as well) are
hanging outside from the portside cut section as indicated by red arrows in Photo 4 (a). If it was caused by the
bomb pressure acted from inside to outside, why are the broken fuselage
segments and isolator pieces hanging inside at the 3-m distant starboard cut section as shown by blue arrows in the same
Photo 4 (a)? In a view angle from
the starboard, the inside-hanging broken fuselages etc aren’t visible. cf. Photo 4 (b).
Photo 5 IS-used IED in Metrojet Airbus attack
The primary physics tells, ‘If air
pressure increases at one point in a closed vessel, the pressure is transmitted
equally from corner to corner throughout the vessel.’ It means that the force which
tore the rear body wasn’t compressive force from inside to outside, but shear
force due to rear body’s toward-starboard movement relative to the main body.
This is an example of not to view present objects (in this case, inward hanging
broken fuselage segments) that don’t meet the viewer’s convenience.
E-event
EgyptAir plane’s last swerve is shown by the data from the Greek primary radar (sent by the Greek authorities to the
BEA). But Egypt team
refuses it. Both can be true, only if the plane midair disintegrated, and the
Greek radar saw the main body that swerved and Egypt radar saw the rear body
that didn’t swerve. He thinks it’s the case. He’s sure that the analogical
aspects identified in M-event must have happened equally in E-event. Frankly
speaking, he’s rather confident of the same aspect for all except L-event. It’s
not clear in F-event because of deep sea effects. But in A-event, the plane’s
body parts distribution on the shallow sea bed reveals an upside-down crash and
a 3-part division of the plane body.
Egyptian team’s bomb hypothesis is constructed based on, ‘Explosive traces is tested positive on the remains of victims.’ It means the explosion happened in the cabin. But
the data reveals the event started with cockpit windows’ failure. Terrorists’ favorite
material to make IEDs is plane fuel. Further, the explosive-tested remains must
have been soaked in sea water that contains all the chemical elements shown in
the Mendeleev’s Periodic Table. How can they be distinguished from the bomb’s
elements? There must be explanations.
Li-battery hypothesis’ base is, “The airplane sends messages of a fire (this
is verified by the data recorder), the crew is recorded talking about a fire on
board, and there is soot on some of the wreckage. There is no doubt there was a
fire on board.”.
Before evaluate
this quotation, confirm the following 3 criteria. (i) Plane’s
interior / isolator materials are of flame-retardant that can’t burn
without continuous heat supply. (ii)
It’s true that an organic solution of Ethylene Carbonate solvent used for the electrolyte in Li-battery is a flammable
material. (iii) However, 0.002~0.01-kg solution is by
far short of heat energy to burn the flame-retardant interior materials.
He has a test
incinerator for plastics-disposal in his lab. Through daily-base tests, it’s
been clear that to burn 1-kg
unspecified plastics; it needs about 0.1-kg
kerosene. If Li-battery electrolyte’s
heat energy (cal./gr.) is the same as kerosene’s, 0.01-kg (or less) flammable solution in Li-battery can’t burn even
0.1-kg ordinary plastics, much less
flame-retardant plastics, much2 less quickly, much3
less under limited oxygen (O2) in the cockpit, much4 less
if the cockpit right windows were broken at cruise altitude, as O2
in the cockpit was as thin as 20 (%)
of O2 at the normal condition. Li-battery
hypothesis has no chance to execute such a big job unless otherwise given 104
times more heat energy. It need explain how to give.
The truce is ‘The airplane sent messages of false-warnings
of smoke,
everybody concerned (including crew) converted smoke into fire.
So-called soot is a splotch of stuck synthetic materials (of interior /
isolation), once melted by heat due to fuselage-metal cold-work and solidified
again on the smashed fuselage. There was heat but no fire on board.’
He predicted in [1] that, in E-event studies, a copilot-bomb hypothesis would appear.
It’s come but in a modified form of copilot-semi-bomb hypothesis. This is another trial of
attributing a cause to dead pilot. The Li-battery
is an alternative to bomb which, in E-event, obviously unfits the reality. The pilot-semi-bomb hypothesis combines hackneyed
causes of bomb and pilot error to save the bomb orthodox
hypothesis.
It’s said, “French investigators
have always leaned towards a mechanical fault (for origin, click the red underlined) as the
cause of the crash, saying they suspected that a mobile phone or tablet had
caught fire.”
He thinks, “French
investigators have never learned
towards a mechanical fault throughout 1st~4th and
extra events. In E-event, its stance is the same.” In the Airbus-crash-event
studies, mechanical failure can’t be on agenda under the premise, ‘flawless plane and system.’
CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper summarizes its
conclusions and recommendations as follows:
(1) A
remarkable characteristic of the E-event studies is smoke-detector’s feint data
transmission. It detected fog
but transmitted it as smoke.
Its 1st effect was a miss-induction of fire from which (semi-)bomb hypotheses have been derived.
(2) The 2nd
effect of the feint data is to let researchers disregard the analogy by giving
a convenient by-pass ticket. Every hypothesis could unburden their uneasy job
of learning the analogy that isn’t compatible with the (semi-)bomb
hypothesis.
(3) There’s a
human effect that the above two flaws have gone easily. It’s the nerds who, by
nature, lacks in ability to make analogy between the things.
(4) The 10 points of analogy of the 5 events, in which especially
concrete-analog item is the last swerve with steep descent, have been
forwarded in this paper before readers.
(5) It’s
recommended for readers to try to deny the 10 points of analogy first. If you’ve
done it, God Luck. Else if undeniable, go to (6).
(6) If the 10 points of analogy have been recognized, a common cause
must be considered. If the cause is the same, its consequences must be the same
too. Based on the premise as this, he’s induced the causal Hypothesis of ‘cockpit
fuselage fatigue rupture.’ It’s been deduced by site Photos and FDR data. He’s also composed the sequence of the event
4-dimentionally.
(7) Given the
comprehensive event analyses, readers are kindly advised to review each study,
referring to the following 6 items, (8) ~ (13), as a guide line, if you will.
(8) Years-long-fatigue-crack
development preceded each of the 5 airbus crash events. It used to begin at the
bottom of the avionics bay and rose up on both sides of the cockpit fuselage.
(9) The
rupture happened when the crack reached a cockpit windows’ lower frame elevation.
The rupture took place at either the beginning or the end point of the fatigue
crack line. It paralyzed the control system totally in several (~10s) seconds
of tine.
(10) The
control system paralysis induced the midair disintegration of the plane body in
3-stages from the tail cone, HS to VS (except F-event, in M-event, + to the
rear body).
(11) In the
midair disintegration, a flutter played a main role with additional wind
pressure and inertia force. A structural weakness, ‘presence of fatigue
cracks along the joint perimeters of firewall and RPB,’ made the separations
be remarkably easy. The 3 patterns of the cut edges are visible in every debris
photo. They’re due to 3 patterns of cut mechanism, viz. by slow fatigue, flutter
(fast fatigue) and wind pressure, inertia force (indicated by respective marks in
photos).
(12) The
event was finalized by the swerve of steep descent with an upside-down carriage,
and collided against the ground or sea waters (except F-event).
(13) It isn’t
strange that any aspect of any event is commonly possessed by all the other events,
as the settings in terms of cause, plane, altitude, Vspeed, Gspeed etc are the
same among them. It can be confirmed, though the deep sea may obstruct to do it
in some items. Nonetheless, they’re supported by other means as have been done
in a variety of means in this report.
(14) If you’ve
reached the same destination as his, God save you, else if you still wander as
sleepwalkers, doctors save you.
参考文献 (REFERENCES)
直接関連文献 (Directly related
references)
Google.com,
検索キーワード: study
on airbus crash event,
Search
Results 約5,030,000 件中 1 ページ目 10件)
[1] Sohei Matsuno : STUDY ON EGYPTAIR AIRBUS CRASH
soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/2016/10/study-on-egyptair-airbus-crash.html
Oct 18, 2016 - This Report is of a study on EgyptAir Flight MS804 crash (19/May/2016). It's a 4th event in a series of Airbus crashes during a 444-day period...
[2] Sohei Matsuno : STUDY ON RUSSIAN METROJET AIRBUS CRASH
soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/2016/01/study-on-russian-metrojet-airbus-crash.html
Jan 8, 2016 - In the 4th event, Airbus' rear body broke up in mid-air. Hence,
the ... This report pertains to a causation study on a plane crash. In this study field...
[3] Sohei Matsuno : REVIEW OF AIRBUS CRASH & BUDGET SYSTEM
soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/2016/05/review-of-airbus-crash-budget-system.html
May 30, 2016 - In a causation study on a plane crash, there's a background against..... During his studies on Airbus crashes, this is a 5th event explained by a...
[4] [PDF] A
STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH
Lufthansa
Germanwings Airbus
crash event as it was so done for the AirAsia Airbus ... the methodology (methods, principles and rules) of a
causation study.
[5] [PDF] a
causal study on the airasia airbus crash event - Universitas IBA
www.akademika.iba.ac.id/.../AirAsia%20flight%20QZ8501%20missing_update17jan...
Jan 17, 2015 - A
CAUSAL STUDY ON
THE AIRASIA AIRBUS CRASH EVENT ... Keywords: AirAsia Airbus crash, causal theory, snare in budget system.
[6] [PDF] a
causal study on the airasia airbus crash event - Universitas IBA
www.akademika.iba.ac.id/.../AirAsia%20flight%20QZ8501%20missing%20up.pdf
A CAUSAL STUDY ON THE AIRASIA AIRBUS CRASH EVENT.
Sohei Matsuno
& Bahrul Ilmi,. IBA Univ., Palembang, South Sumatra, Indonesia.
E-mail: ...
[7] [PDF] LEARN
BEA'S PRELIMINARY REPORT ON LUFTHANSA CRASH
akademika.iba.ac.id/documents/153/Fig,%20BEA%20preliminary%20rep...pdf
Summarizing the
results of studies, the Writers shall forward this Report
before ... inductive / deductive investigations of the L-event with the データ from flight recorders ... Comment: A preliminary report
on AirAsia Airbus
crash provided by the...
[8] Airbus A320 plane crashes - AirSafe.com
www.airsafe.com/events/models/a320.htm
Jul 30, 2016 - Lists
fatal plane crashes and other
significant safety events involving
the Airbus A320
aircraft.
[9] [PDF] Aircraft
Loss of Control Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100039467.pdf
an analysis of accident データ by the NASA systems analysis group on behalf of.... Table 51 shows loss
of control events for civil aviation occurring in the United
States..... (URTA)11 developed by The Boeing Company, Airbus, S.A.S., and Flight ...
[10] [PDF] Human
Factors Aspects in Incidents/Accidents - Airbus
www.airbus.com/fileadmin/.../AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS-HUM_PER-SEQ01.pdf
Overall, high
workload is a factor in 80 % of incidents and accidents resulting from crew ... The operational
and human factors analysis of operational events (as ...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jun 6, 2018
[12] Christian Roger, ‘The scandal of the Airbus A320 crash at
Habsheim, France,’ www.crashdehabsheim.net/ Jun 26, 1998
[13] S. Matsuno, ‘STUDY ON
LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH,’
www.iba.ac.id/
間接関連文献 (Indirectly
related references)
[14] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘A STUDY ON THE
CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE,’ www.iba.ac.id, Jan. 6,
2012
[15] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘’A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDG[22E
COLLAPSE (sequel),’ www.iba.ac.id/
[16]
Sohei Matsuno, ‘UIBA'S AND HAPPY
PONTIST'S KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE THEORY,’www.iba.ac.id/documents/83
[17] Sohei Matsuno, ‘SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING
(JAKARTA),’, www.iba.ac.id/
[19] Sohei Matsuno, ‘JAKARTA
FLOOD PREVENTION WITH A TRUE CAUSE (sequel),’ www.lba.ac.id/, 30 Apr.2013
[21] Sohei
Matsuno, ‘CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA
FLOODING AS A CASE,’ www.iba.ac.id/
[22] John
Cox, The unnecessary mystery of EgyptAir 804, Ask the Captain: USA
TODAY, July 26, 2018
