LEARN BEA’S PRELIMINARY REPORT ON LUFTHANSA CRASH (revised)
Sohei Matsuno
Prof. of freelance, Dr. without borders
Palembang, South Sumatra, Indonesia
E-mail: sohei_matsuno@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
This is a revised version of the Report of the same title in www.akademika.iba.ac.id/ that’s to be inserted in this soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/ after some illus.-sentence betterment. The Writer (he) had presented earlier a Report on the AirAsia Airbus crash (2014), in which he concluded a cockpit-bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis and predicted a similar event of the same cause could happen sooner or later, unless the event was properly handled. Sure enough, the Lufthansa Germanwings Airbus crash (2015) happened much sooner than he assumed (several years), only 86 days after the Airasia event. For thee Lufthansa event, various causal hypotheses have appeared. It was fine when the Lufthansa event happened. Hence, the favorite weather/pilot-error hypothesis is inapplicable. Given the criterion, a copilot-suicide hypothesis has emerged. He presented his 1st Report on the Lufthansa event in which he pointed out the causes of the two events are the same. Meanwhile, BEA released a Preliminary Report on the Lufthansa event. He’s learnt it. Summarizing the results of studies, he herewith forwards the 2nd Report (now revised) on the Lufthansa event before the parties concerned. The purpose of this Report is to confirm the authenticity of his causation Hypothesis by analogy with BEA’s Preliminary Report.
Keywords: Lufthansa / AirAsia crashes, analogy between airbus crashes, bulkhead fatigue
INTRODUCTION
Definitions and abbreviations
Definitions of technical terms (cause and fatigue) and logical terms (induction, deduction and determinant) are given in REFERENCE [9] and [15] respectively.
Abbreviations used in this Report are to be read as follows:
US: The United States of America, FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation, BEA: Bureau d'EnquĂȘtes Accident (Accident Enquiry Bureau), Paris, ATC Center: Air Traffic Control Center, ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization, He: The writer of this Report,
L-event: Lufthansa Germanwings Airbus crash event, A-event: AirAsia Airbus crash event,
F-event: Air France Flight 447 Airbus A330-220 crash event, BPR: BEA Preliminary Report,
CVR: Cockpit Voice Recorder, FDR: Flight Data Recorder, QAR: Quick Access Recorder, GL: Ground Level, GPS: Global Positioning System, YP: Yield Point, BP: Breaking Point, PP: Plastic Portion, KE: Kinetic Energy, WD: Work Done, kt(s): Knot(s), h(r): hour, min.: minute, sec.: second, ft: foot (feet)
Purposes of this Report
The purposes of this Report are the same as the ones of the previous report [16]. That is;
The direct purpose is to present a cockpit-bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis for L-event. The indirect purpose is to convince the societies concerned of how the methodology (methods, principles and rules) of a causation study should be. In this way, this report aims to salvage the causation study from being in current disarray.
Keynotes of this Report
This Report is of a rehearsal match with BPR as a sparing partner for a challenge match with BEA’s final report as a defending champion, for the title ‘A true cause of the L-event’. To pursue it, this Report underlines three keynotes as follows:
(1) The official stance of BEA is clearly declared in Foreword of BPR as extracted in the next Sub-sect. The matter is, “if BPR really abides by these plausible statements.” This Report verifies it.
(2) According to the statements, BPR’s primary objective is to offer basic premises for due inductive / deductive studies on L-event with the data from flight recorders (popularly called black boxes), viz. CVR and FDR. Hence, the quality of the data in these devices plays a key role in BPR. Therefore, the quality of them has to be learnt.
(3) Notwithstanding (2), BPR seemingly relies on the readings of automatic transmission data from the second radar (flightradar24) rather than the data in FDR. Hence, to assess the quality of flightradar24 (Radar) data is also needed.
Note: In this Report, quotations (except from BPR) aren’t necessarily shown with origins. It is to avoid criticism by name. If readers are interested in them, they can be found in websites, e.g., mentioned in [1] ~ [6]. Quotations are all written in Italic letters.
BEA’s official and actual stance
BEA declares its official stance in Foreword of BPR as follows:
The BEA is the French Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authority. Its investigations are conducted with the sole objective of improving aviation safety and are not intended to apportion blame or liability.
BEA investigations are independent, separate and conducted without prejudice to any judicial or administrative action that may be taken to determine blame or liability. This document is a Preliminary Report and has been prepared on the basis of the initial information gathered in the course of the investigation, without any analysis. ……. Nothing in the presentation of this document or in any of the points raised therein should be interpreted as an indication of the conclusions of the investigation. cf. [5].
Does BPR really abide by the above statements? Let’s learn.
If BEA faithfully abides by the stated official stance, BPR is nothing more than presentation of Flight Recorders’ data, just as they are, plainly, succinctly, without judgments and/or manipulations. If BPR is something more than that, it’d be inevitably affected by subjective judgments and convenient manipulations. It’s more likely if an investigation team has the direct participation of stake holders of the study object. In L-event, Airbus and Germanwings are pertinent parties. cf. next quotations extracted from Foreword in BPR.
The BEA associated the following foreign counterparts with the Safety Investigation, which then appointed Accredited Representatives. ....….. This made it possible to obtain the assistance of technical advisers from Germanwings; ….. The BEA also associated technical advisers from EASA, the DGAC, Snecma (on behalf of CFM) and Airbus.
The Safety Investigation is organized with three working groups in the following areas: aircraft, airplane systems and operations. The Accredited Representatives and the technical advisers were divided between the three groups.
BEA expresses its die-hard obsession about the copilot-suicide hypothesis (hypothesis) in BPR, 1.12.2 Previous Events, as follows:
A search undertaken in the ICAO and BEA databases since 1980 brought to light the existence of six public transport accidents whose conclusions show that they were caused by intentional maneuvers by one of the flight crew members, or mean that it is not possible to rule out the hypothesis of intentional maneuvers by one of the crew members that was intended to lead to the loss of the aircraft and its occupants.
In effect, BPR made judgments and manipulations that result in satisfying the hypothesis. It also tacitly discards the bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis (Hypothesis) in discussions. BEA may think it’s the easiest way to establish the hypothesis and to negate the Hypothesis. That is, despite its official stance, BPR’s actual stance is not eligible for the label of neutral. Its contents are full support of the hypothesis with judgments and manipulations. Sure enough, a group of hypothesis mongers has immediately takes a preparatory legal action based on BPR. On the other hand, this Report learns BPR to point out its subjective judgments / convenient manipulations, by utilizing the factual data in BPR. It’s an uneasy way to establish the Hypothesis and to neutralize the hypothesis.
Comment: A preliminary report on AirAsia Airbus crash provided by the Indonesian black-box investigation team is really eligible for the label of neutral. It fully abided by the policy mentioned in Foreword of BPR. Its report is a plain and succinct presentation of the raw data in black boxes just as they are, without subjective judgments and/or convenient manipulations. BEA must learn from the Indonesian team.
Quality of data in FDR, CVR and QAR
General
Airbus A320 is equipped with two flight recorders, viz. FDR and CVR, and four QARs. Their functions, statuses after the crash and its effects on the quality of data are learnt as follows:
FDR
It is a digital Flight Data Recorder with a memory card of at least 25 hours recording capacity. It provides information on about 600 parameters. It comprises a front interface casing and a protection casing that accommodates a memory module in which a memory card is installed.
As seen in Photo 1 (a1) and (a2), its front interface and memory module protection casings had been deformed, tore, and exposed to heat. It implies that the memory module Photo 1 (a3) had a direct thermal effect of conduction and radiation.
BPR says FDR was covered by soot. The soot comes from smoke. The smoke is from fire. But there was no fire in this crash. Hence, no soot could be. So-called soot is degenerated surface treatment materials of FDR. Then, where did the heat come from? Well, the heat didn’t come from external conflagration out of the FDR casings. It was internally generated in the casing itself when it was subjected to an instantaneous cold-work (deformation to tearing) at the time of crash. If the heat would be from an external origin, e.g., a fire outside the casing, it should take time until heat reaches the memory module by conduction, and could be isolated by an insulation-layer placed in the space between the casing and the module. However, if the heat is from an internal origin, e.g., generated by the cold work in the casing itself, heat instantaneously reaches the module in which memory cards are housed. Much more, the memory module was being stripped off with its protection casing and insulator. The effect of heat was severest at the front side in Photo 1 (a2), since generated heat was greatest (casing destruction was greatest) there, and heat protection was effectively 0 (the insulation layer was striped off from the position). Remember! The digital data in the memory card is susceptible to heat.
Given the situation as the above, it is hardly possible to imagine that the memory card in the module is intact. BPR says in its Article: 1.8.3 Synchronization of recordings, ‘The FDR recordings then were synchronized with those of the CVR using the radio communications with the control centre, the triggering of the GPWS alarms and the Master Warning parameter.’
Why FDR recordings must have been synchronized with radio-communications of ATC? Passengers from Jakarta to Tokyo must synchronize their watches with the Tokyo Local Standard Time. Since, there’s a 2-hr. time difference between Jakarta and Tokyo Local Standard Times. However, the Standard Time of FDR and ATC is equal. The flight data were sent real-time from the plane to a Second Radar (in this case, flightradar24) by a transponder. The Second Rader sent the data to the ATC Center. That is, they all hold a common Standard Time. FDR has a time recorder. If not, it offends against the rule. cf. the following quotation.
The FDR onboard the aircraft records many different operating conditions of the flight. By regulation, newly manufactured aircraft must monitor at least eighty-eight important parameters such as time, altitude, airspeed, heading, and aircraft attitude.
In this context, there’s no reason for BPR to synchronize FDR’s own recorded grandfather time with flightradar24 Radar’s child time or ATC Rader’s grandchild time. It’s equivalent to the confession of BPR that FDR’s time recording is too spoiled to readout; hence, BPR must borrow the time data from Radar recordings. The time is recorded in digital status. The data in FDR are all in digital status. Shock and heat work indiscriminately. Hence, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the data in FDR are damaged as generally as the time data.
_____________________________________________________________
↓All figures and photos are in Figure / Photo Collection at the end of this Report.↓
→ Photo 1 Damaged FDR of crashed A320
Comment: As FDR data usually play an important role in causation studies, undamaged FDR data is an indispensable necessity for BPR to hold out its ‘dignity’.
CVR
This recorder is equipped with a memory card and has a recording capacity of at least 2 hrs in standard quality and 30 min. in high quality. The data in CVR are analog except the time.
Photo 2 shows the mechanically damaged CVR of the Airbus after crash.
As seen in Photo 2, CVR’s memory module protection casing (left part in Photo 2) doesn’t show significant mechanical damage. Further, analog data are less susceptible to shock and heat than digital ones are. Hence, voice / sound data recorded in it may be able to be heard. However, its recorded time data disappeared as they were digitally recorded. It also needs synchronizations. More crucially, its analog data (sounds) must have been weakened by decompression, as the medium of sounds (air) was rarefied by the decompression.
→ Photo 2 Damaged CVR of crashed A320
Comment: Opaque analog sounds in CVR may be heard as human breaths. It’s an act of imagination. But an unclear digital number, e.g., ’09 41 ??’ shall not be read as ’09 41 06’. If dare do it, it’s an act of fabrication.
QAR
QAR records the same data as the FDR. The data are used exclusively for the flight analysis. Memory cards containing the flight data were extracted from the computer. But memory components from the two cards were so damaged that made it impossible to retrieve recorded data.
Quality of Radar data
First of all, the data sent from the plane were the ones before the crash, i.e., undamaged data. Second, the Radar data are products of objective-automatic processes without subjective judgments and/or manipulations. Hence, if there’re any digital discrepancies between FDR data and Radar data, the latter is more trustworthy.
Summery
From the above analyses, it is reasonably realized that BPR has been forced to rely on CVR and Radar data. BPR used FDR data in lesser occasions. For instance, in an altitude chart, BPR uses Radar’s data with an exception, in an essential item, i.e., ‘the data of time and altitude of the collision.’ BPR neither synchronizes the time with nor adopts the altitude of Radar. BPR rejects them, saying, ‘The data from FDR are used.’ This forced maneuver to help the hypothesis has ironically killed it with kindness. Readers will see it later in this Report.
LEARN BPR
General
There’re two items of facts that readers must keep in mind to learn BPR. They’re:
Control-system failure
One of the two items is the plane’s control system failures. It’d followed about the plane throughout the flights (out-bound and return flights) until the last moment. It’s expressed by BPR per se with its illus. and statements in four occasions. They’re to be explained one-by-one in this and following Sect.
Poor Flight Recorder data
BPR notes in 1.1 History of Flight, ‘the following elements are based on the flight recorders as well as on recordings of radio communications.’ However, as explained in the previous Sect., FDR and CVR perform poorly and less poorly respectively. Hence:
FDR data play lesser role even in crucial issues. For instance, to deny the decompression in the cockpit, it’s enough for BPR to exhibit the air-pressure data detected by a sensor in the cockpit and recorded in FDR, and to announce that it shows no decompression throughout the flight. But BPR doesn’t do so. Instead, it implies the normality in the cockpit by CVR data of copilot’s breaths. Likewise, many essential issues are explained with CVR’s analog data and Radar’s digital data. It implicitly proves his assertion, ‘FDR data were damaged too fatally by shock and heat at the time of crash to readout them properly.’
As discussed in the previous Sect., the audio data in CVR are synchronized (relocated) on a time axis borrowing the time data from the Radar. In this regard, readers should realize that the audio data in CVR that can be directly relocated are the ones that were sent to and recorded in the Radar recorder only. The sounds and voices of intra-plane audio data such as so-interpreted noises of seat sliding, sounds from cockpit door, someone’s call for the copilot etc were not sent to the Radar recorder. Hence, they are relocated on the time axis not directly by synchronization with the Radar data but indirectly by investigators’ subjective judgments and manipulations. Likewise, the identifications of audio data, e.g., of what, from where, of whom etc, are also by their subjective judgments. These judgments and manipulations are the prerogative of the investigators. The matter is if they have an aptitude for the judgments on audio data. It is to be discussed later in other Sect. of this Report.
Readers have to keep the above in mind in the following respective discussions.
Previous flight
The crash happened on the return flight from Barcelona to Dusseldorf. But an evil sign had already appeared in the previous (out-bound) flight from Dusseldorf to Barcelona. BPR describes it in 1.8.4 Previous Flight as follows:
All of the data from the previous flight, from DĂŒsseldorf to Barcelona, was recorded on the FDR. The recordings from the CVR included the last 50 minutes of this flight. Synchronization of these recordings and the radio communications with the Bordeaux en-route control centre, with which the crew was in contact, was performed based on the same principle as for the accident flight.
On the previous flight, the following facts can be noted:
Ëat 7 h 19 min 59, noises like those of the cockpit door opening then closing were recorded and corresponded to when the Captain left the cockpit; the airplane was then at cruise speed at flight level FL370 (37,000 ft);
Ëat 7 h 20 min 29, the flight was transferred to the Bordeaux en-route control centre and the crew was instructed to descend to flight level FL350 (35,000 ft), an instruction read back by the copilot;
Ëat 7 h 20 min 32, the aircraft was put into a descent to flight level FL350, selected a few seconds earlier;
Ëat 7 h 20 min 50, the selected altitude decreased to 100 ft for three seconds and then increased to the maximum value of 49,000 ft and stabilized again at 35,000 ft;
Ëat 7 h 21 min 10, the Bordeaux control centre gave the crew the instruction to continue the descent to flight level FL210;
Ëat 7 h 21 min 16, the selected altitude was 21,000 ft; Ë from 7 h 22 min 27, the selected altitude was 100 feet most of the time and changed several times until it stabilized at 25,000 ft at 7 h 24 min 13;
Ëat 7 h 24 min 15, the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded;
Ëat 7 h 24 min 29 noises like those of the unlocking of the cockpit door then its opening was recorded and corresponded to the Captain’s return to the cockpit.
The variations of the selected and flight altitude stated above are shown in Fig. 0.
→ Fig. 0 Selected / respond altitude charts in the previous flight
The public had been already well brain-washed by copilot-suicide-news circulations. Hence, the people were being possessed by a sentimental concept of a copilot-suicide act. Under this setting, the above descriptions could easily upgrade the sentimental concept to a devote belief level. cf. the following statements:
Cox said. "I've never seen it done, and it is the same methodology he used to fly the airplane into the ground. Was he practicing? I think that certainly is a possibility."
"He was practicing to see how the airplane behaved," said John Goglia, an aviation safety expert and former member of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board.
They lack in reality. For the above-standard copilot, such a descent as the one in the return flight is an easy practice for which the copilot needs no rehearsal. If copilot’s maneuvers in the above descriptions are learnt objectively, the maneuvers are more likely copilot’s efforts to accelerate the sluggish descent to reach the lower altitude instructed by ATC than the rehearsal to let the plane collide against the terrain in the return flight.
The copilot was twice instructed to lower the plane, viz. 1st from FL370 to 350, and before it’d been accomplished, 2nd to FL210. At each time, the copilot put the selected altitude at the instructed altitude as underlined in the above descriptions. The copilot applied shake-off operation to the plane when he realized the descent was too sluggish. People may do the same when something intended doesn’t go smoothly. Despite his 100~49000-ft selected-altitude-multiple-shake-off, the plane insignificantly responded to it. The altitude instructed by ATC could not be fully achieved before the captain returned the cockpit. cf. Fig. 0. The method to accelerate descent by inserting select descent of 100 ft was his private accomplishment that’s yet to be authorized. This creative copilot must have used the method in his past flights successfully. It might have been used by other young creative pilots as well. Even ATC may have tacitly permitted the practices of this kind. Of course it’ll never happen again after L-event.
As the usually-effective method to accelerate descent didn’t work when the copilot applied it to the out-bound flight in spite of multiple trials, the copilot might have felt something wrong in the elevator control system. This phenomenon, a disorder of the elevator control system, was an evil omen of the coming fatal event in the return flight. It was surely related to the repairs of the hatch vibration under the cockpit, which had been done 10-hours before the out-bound flight. The two affairs are so synchronized that the causality of the two is hardly possible to deny. The copilot didn’t come to a think about it. He didn’t even tell the story, since it needed to tell the not-yet-authorized practice.
What’d be learnt from the above description is, ‘irregularity in the elevator control system.’ Remind it’s a common sign in F-, A-, and L-event. It implies that the causes of these three events are the same. This insertion should be taken into account in due studies.
Comment: In this episode, he sees an example how difficult it is for any out-of-program problem to be detected in a strictly program-controlled system.
Last 13-minute flight
Flight data
BPR explains the last problematic 13-min. flight in 1.1 History of Flight as follows:
‘Note: the following elements are based on the flight recorders, as well as on recordings of radio-communications. The main points in the history of the flight below are referenced by the numbers on figure 1, page 10 (Fig. 1 (b) in this Report).’
*At 9 h 30 min 00 (point 2), the Captain read back the controller’s clearance allowing him to fly direct to the IRMAR point: (This was the last communication between the flight crew and ATC.)
*At 9 h 30 min 08, the Captain told the copilot that he was leaving the cockpit and asked him to take over radio communications, which the copilot read back.
*At 9 h 30 min 11, the heading started to decrease and stabilized about a minute later around 23°, which is consistent with a route towards the IRMAR point.
*At 9 h 30 min 13, noises of a pilot’s seat movements were recorded.
*At 9 h 30 min 24 (point 3Ž), noises of the opening then, three seconds later, the closing of the cockpit door were recorded. The Captain was then out of the cockpit.
*At 9 h 30 min 53 (point 4), the selected altitude on the FCU changed in one second from 38,000 ft to 100 ft. One second later, the autopilot changed to ‘‘OPEN DES’’ (3) mode and autothrust changed to ‘‘THR IDLE’’ mode. The airplane started to descend and both engines’ rpm decreased.
*At 9 h 31 min 37, noises of a pilot’s seat movements were recorded.
*At 9 h 33 min 12 (point 5), the speed management changed from ‘‘managed’’ mode to ‘‘selected’’ (4) mode. A second later, the selected target speed became 308 kt while the airplane’s speed was 273 kt.
*At 9 h 33 min 35, the selected speed decreased to 288 kt. Then, over the following 13 seconds, the value of this target speed changed six times until it reached 302 kt.
*At 9 h 33 min 47 (point 6‘), the controller asked the flight crew what cruise level they were cleared for. The airplane was then at an altitude of 30,000 ft in descent. There was no answer from the copilot. Over the following 30 seconds, the controller tried to contact the flight crew again on two occasions, without any answer.
*At 9 h 34 min 23, the selected speed increased up to 323 kt. The airplane’s speed was then 301 kt and started to increase towards the new target.
*At 9 h 34 min 31 (point 7’), the buzzer to request access to the cockpit was recorded for one second.
*At 9 h 34 min 38, the controller again tried to contact the flight crew, without any answer.
* At 9 h 34 min 47 then at 9 h 35 min 01, the Marseille control centre tried to contact the flight crew on 133.330 MHz, without any answer.
* At 9 h 35 min 03 (point 8“), the selected speed increased again to 350 kt.
Subsequently, and until the end of the recording:
* the selected speed remained at 350 kt and the airplane’s speed stabilized around 345 kt;
* the autopilot and autothrust remained engaged;
* the cockpit call signal from the cabin, known as the cabin call, from the cabin interphone, was recorded on four occasions between 9 h 35 min 04 and 9 h 39 min 27 for about three seconds;
* noises similar to a person knocking on the cockpit door were recorded on six occasions between 9 h 35 min 32 (point 9”) and 9 h 39 min 02;
* muffled voices were heard several times between 9 h 37 min 11 and 9 h 40 min 48, and at 9 h 37 min 13 a muffled voice asks for the door to be opened;
* between 9 h 35 min 07 and 9 h 37 min 54, the Marseille control centre tried to contact the flight crew on three occasions on 121.5 MHz, and on two occasions on 127.180 MHz, without any answer;
* between 9 h 38 min 38 (point 10•) and 9 h 39 min 23, the French Air Defense system tried to contact the flight crew on three occasions on 121.5 MHz, without any answer;
* noises similar to violent blows on the cockpit door were recorded on five occasions between 9 h 39 min 30 (point 11•) and 9 h 40 min 28;
* low amplitude inputs on the copilot’s sidestick were recorded between 9 h 39 min 33 and 9 h 40 min 07
* the flight crew of GWI18G tried to contact at 9 h 39 min 54, without any answer.
* At 9 h 40 min 41 (point 12•), the ‘‘Terrain, Terrain, Pull Up, Pull Up’’ aural warning from the GPWS triggered and remained active until the end of the flight.
* At 9 h 40 min 56, the Master Caution warning was recorded, then at 9 h 41 min 00 the Master Warning triggered and remained active until the end of the flight.
*At 9 h 41 min 06, the CVR recording stopped at the moment of the collision with the terrain.
Comment 1: Underlined phrases are controversial, e.g., all the descriptions of the plane speed aren’t consistent with realities as discussed in the next Sub-sect.
Comment 2: Statements that are accompanied with subjective modifiers (e.g., similar to, like etc) need objective verifications as discussed later.
Comment 3: Copilot’s breaths recorded by CVR do not appear in the above descriptions.
Comparison of BEA’s and Radar’s flight charts
BPR’s flight chart is shown in Fig. 1 (b) with Radar’s in Fig. 1 (a).
The altitude charts of the two are similar at a glance. It’s no wonder as BPR’s altitude chart is drawn being synchronized with Radar’s data. But if scrutinized, there can be seen essential differences between them at the beginning and the end sections. Let’s see them section by section.
→ Fig. 1 Last 13-minute altitude Charts of Radar and BPR
(1) Pre-descent level section
The descent began at the end of the pre-descent level flight. The beginning point of descent is clearly seen in the Radar’s altitude chart. But it’s not clear in the BPR’s. It’s because BPR inserted transition curves between the level and descent alignments. Transition curves (usually clothoide) are inserted also in the horizontal and vertical alignment of highways and railways to mitigate passengers’ uncomfortable feeling due to a discontinuous direction change. But in the L-event, the purpose of the descent was either a suicide (hypothesis) or an emergency escape (Hypothesis). In either case, to comfort passengers is at odd with the situation. The insertion of transition curve is bad rather than nonsense for studies on L- event.
The descent occurred 9 sec. after the descent setting. BPR measured 9 seconds not from ‘the beginning point of the descent, but ‘the beginning point of the transition curve. It in effect advances the descent-setting time by 67 sec. before the beginning point of the descent (the end point of the transition curves), cf. Fig. 1 (b), or 30 sec. before the genuine beginning point of the descent. cf. Fig. 1 (a).
Advancing the descent-setting time together with putting off captain’s cockpit exit time, a scenario has been so produced as if the copilot had been waiting captain’s exit, and no sooner had the captain exited the cockpit than the copilot set the descent. In this way, copilot-suicide hypothesis’ view point has strengthened. If the respective time points are reasonably located on the time line, the time lag between captain’s cockpit exit and copilot’s descent setting is at shortest 1 min.
Comment 1: Captain’s exit itself is skeptical, since a series of sounds such as so-interpreted seat sliding, cockpit door open/close doesn’t necessarily mean his exit. Is it fantastic to assume that the captain stopped exiting cockpit as he also recognized irregularities in the cockpit, and closed the door again once he opened, and remained in the cockpit?
Comment 2: In the first place, the sounds of seat moving, door open/close, captain’s call from the cabin-side, captain’s axing the cockpit door etc are really so as BPR identifies?
(2) Flight of descent section
This Report reveals that the descent was copilot’s emergency measure to manage the decompression, having abided by the Flight Manuals and regular trainings. To let the plane descend down to the safety altitude as quick as possible, the copilot set the selected altitude at the possible lowest, 100 ft. But the plane’s response to the setting was sluggish.
As the copilot had already learnt his original method to accelerate descent couldn’t work, the copilot had no way other than increasing plane’s speed to realize the plane’s quick descent. Copilot’s efforts are explained in BPR as follows.
At 9 h 33 min 12 (point 5), A second later, the selected target speed became 308 kt while the airplane’s speed was 273 kt
At 9 h 33 min 35, the selected speed decreased to 288kt. Then, over the following 13 seconds, the value of this target speed changed six times until it reached 302kt.
At 9 h 34 min 23, the selected speed increased up to 323 kt. The airplane’s speed was then 301kt and started to increase towards the new target.
At 9 h 35 min 03 (point 8“), the selected speed increased again to 350kt.
Subsequently, and until the end of the recording: the selected speed remained at 350 kt and the airplane’s speed stabilized around 345kt;
But the effects of copilot’s efforts to decrease altitude and increase speed were both insignificant.
As for the decrease of altitude, cf. the quotations below.
A BEA chart showed the plane didn't actually descend sharply while Lubitz was repeatedly adjusting the settings, so the passengers and crew might not have noticed any change.
Lubitz changed the setting in the "altitude select" window, although the airplane didn't move in response to the inputs, said aviation safety expert John Cox, president of Safety Operating Systems.
As for the increase of speed, BPR says, ‘Between 09 hr. 33 min. 12 sec. and 09 hr. 35 min. 03 sec., speed significantly increased from 270 to 345 (kts) and after that it was stabilized at around 345 (kts). According to Radar, the values for the same duration as the above are ‘slightly increased from 470 to 490 (kts), but after that significantly decreased to 370 (kts).’ The differences are beyond the tolerance errors. The different data came from different sources. Radar’s are from transponder which transferred data from the plane before collision. Contrarily, BPR’s are from FDR whose data were damaged by collision. Radar shows a speed chart in Fig. 1 (a), But BPR doesn’t do it in Fig. 1 (b). Supposedly, BEA is afraid of controversies by showing visible differences between the two results. This is another evidence to prove the fatal damage of FDR. It also means that there was obvious infidelity of plane’s speed / elevator control systems. But BPR mentions nothing in this connection.
Anyway, copilot’s efforts to save the plane were in vain.
Comment: During the descent, the copilot was exposed to 8000→3000 (kg/m2) decompression. This Report once assumed that after the exposure to the decompression, he must have been physically defunct. This assumption is to be reviewed. Unlike A-event’s explosive decompression, L-event’s one was slow to rapid. It may have allowed the copilot to have barely managed as the above.
(3) Flight in the end descent section
As seen in Fig 1 (a), the trajectory as per Rader data after 09 hr. 40 min. 36 sec. entered its last stretch, the post-descent level flight, [16], until it collided against the terrain at 09 hr. 41 min. 33 sec. However, BPR denies the existence of this level flight. It assumes that the plane kept its descent motion unchanged until the plane hit the terrain 30 seconds later at 09 hr. 41 min. 06 sec. The last level flight is not compatible with the copilot-suicide hypothesis. No wonder BPR eliminated it. But this forced analogy cannot help the hypothesis but even jeopardizes it. Readers see it in the next Sub-sect.
BPR’s last testimony on the control system irregularity is shown by its statement in BPR’s 2-INITIAL FINDINGS. It says:
An input on the right sidestick was recorded for about 30 seconds on the FDR 1 min 33 s before the impact, not enough to disengage the autopilot. The autopilot and autothrust remained engaged until the end of the CVR and the FDR recordings.
It’s not clear in the above sentence if copilot’s input was of descent or of ascent. According to the earlier information, it was of ascent. If it is the case, Hypothesis suffers a partial setback, as it assumed that the copilot had been unconscious due to rapid decompression at the descent. But for the hypothesis, it’s a fatal blow because it contradicts the copilot’s suicide act. It rather implies his consistent will to salvage the plane from crashing until the last moment.
The fact that the copilot was still physically functional and really so functioned at the time of 1.5 minutes before the crash indicates three things, viz. (i) ill-function of plane’s elevator control systems, (ii) copilot’s ultra physical strength and (iii) his professionalism.
Last 60-second trajectory
General
There’re 3-dimensional discrepancies between BPR’s and Radar’s plane-crash time and site, i.e., 27 seconds in time, 500 m in height and 4.9 km in distance. These are not of survey errors. Then, what’re they? It’s discussed in this Sub-sect.
Basic data used in analyses
At 09 hr. 40 min. 36 sec. (T(R)), the plane’s altitude, speed and the descent ratio (Alt(R), V(R) and Vv(R)) shows differences between BPR’s and Radar’s. But they’re within the tolerance of survey errors. Hence, the averages are used as the most probable values. cf. bold letters in Table 1.
The dip angle is computed Sin-1(1055(m/min.)/(665000(m/hr.)/60(min./hr))) = 5.462 → 5.5 (Âș).
Table 1 Input data used in analyses
(1) at T(R) (2) at T(M)
T(R)
|
Alt(R)
|
V(R)
|
Vv(R)
|
T(M)
|
Alt(M)
|
Vv(M)
|
||
Unit
|
hr. min. sec.
|
M
|
km/hr.
|
m/min.
|
hr. min. sec.
|
m
|
m/min.
|
|
BPR
|
09: 40: 36
|
2030
|
640
|
1070
|
09: 41: 06
|
1550
|
1055
|
|
Radar
|
ditto.
|
2070
|
690
|
1040
|
09: 41: 33
|
2050
|
0
|
|
Used
|
09: 40: 36
|
2050
|
665
|
1055
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
Analysis
As seen in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), a qualitative difference between BPR’s and Radar’s last 60-seconds trajectories is: ‘if a post-descent level flight existed after T(R).’
For the sake of easy recognition, their last 60-second trajectories are illustrated in Fig. 2.
→ Fig. 2 last 60-second trajectories of BPR and. Radar
Radar’s trajectory changes its descent to the level flight at T(R), and it didn’t change the altitude after T(R), via the last Radar contact time, 09 hr. 41 min. 00 sec. to the time T(M) when the plane collided with the mountainous terrain of 2050-m altitude at 09 hr. 41 min. 33 sec.
BPR’s trajectory after T(R) kept the constant motion as it was before T(R), till the time (T(M)) when the plane collided against the sloped terrain of 1550-m altitude at 09 hr. 41 min. 06 sec.
A key question is: if the altitude at the last Radar-contact time is just. If it’s just, BPR’s causal hypothesis collapses, since its trajectory doesn’t pass the last radar contact point which the plane really passed. To let the trajectory pass the point, the point must be lowered by 400 (m) to 1650 (m) altitude. Really, altimeter’s survey error is considerably great. But still it’s within a ±10 (%) range. As seen in Fig. 1 (a), the altitude of the last radar contact point is 2000 (m). Hence, Radar can reduce the altitude by 200 (m) down to 1800 (m) without so much prestige loss. But it’s not enough to rescue BEA. BEA itself must raise the altitude of the crash site by at least 150 (m). What kind of coordination would be done? The Writer shall wait and see.
Study on BPR’s and Radar’s collision patterns
In this Sub-sect., the plane-collision patterns are analyzed for DPR and Radar trajectories respectively in connection with the debris distribution.
Check and assess BPR pattern
The slope of the ground of the plane-crash site is estimated by photographs at 35 (Âș).
Then, the angle of incidence of the inrushing plane vs. the ground is: 90 – 35 – 5.5 = 49.5 (Âș).
If the plane’s fuselage and its debris rebound, the angle of reflection is 49.5 (Âș). It yields:
The direction of reflection (rebound) leans from the vertical axis to upper side at 14.5 (Âș).
The angle between the initial velocity vs. the horizontal axis is 75.5 (Âș). cf. Fig. 3 (a).
To blowup debris of total mass 70 (ton) to, on average, 250-m high and 250-m distant area, an initial velocity (Vr) of debris in Fig. 3 must be 300 (km/hr). This velocity can’t be generated theoretically. Let’s learn it.
If mountain’s massiveness / rigidity and plane’s colliding speed are taken into consideration, plain’s elasticity is practically 0. In other words, the plane’s structural property is plastic. As primary physics tell, a non-elastic body can’t rebound. It can be confirmed by comparing the plane’s kinetic energy before the crash (KE) with the total WD after the crash. KE = ½*m*v2, where m is the mass of the plane and v is V(R). Total WD = WD1 (by plastic deformation of fuselage to flat) + WD2 (by fuselage tearing to 1 × 1 (m) square pieces on average) + WD3 (by heat, sound etc). Among WD1~3, the greatest one is WD2. The smaller the debris size is, the greater the WD2 is. When an average size of 1-m square debris is assumed, WD2 only is as great as plane’s KE. That is, after the collision, there’s no more KE to transport the smashed plane debris to higher / more distant locations than the plane-crash site. In other words, debris must stay at the crash site. That is, the real debris scattering status contradicts the plane-collision pattern set up by BEA. cf. Fig. 3 (a).
→ Fig. 3 Geometrical plane-collision pattern based on BEA and Radar data
Comment: All the necessary data needed in the calculations, e.g., specifications of fuselage (skin, frame, stringer and interior / floor panel) materials and their properties (YP, BP, PP etc) can be found in search systems.
Check and assess Radar pattern
Radar defines the plane-crash time, 09 hr. 41 min. 33 sec. It is the time when the contact signal died out. This device can give only a time datum but can’t send flight data. The altitude and the speed at the time of impact are defined by assuming a constant altitude and speed after the last Radar contact. The Writer agrees to these assumptions as reasonable.
The last flight trajectory as per Radar data also qualitatively agrees to the reality. That is, after the crash, the debris of the plane ran down the steep slope by gravity force, having scattered about the debris on the ridge surfaces and along the ravines. cf. Photo 5.
Comment: The location of the crash site (one of the two determinants of L-event) has been checked inductively in this Sect. In the next Sect., it’ll be analyzed deductively by investigating the alleged plane-crash site with photos.
DETERMINANTS IN L-EVENT
General
There’re two determinants that directly relate to the cause of L-event. They’re: (i) where is the plane-crash site? (ii) Did the cockpit decompression really happen? If these two determinants would have been given, the study on the L-event could reach the cause easily. The matters such as copilot’s breaths, his study on and rehearsal of suicide performance, captain’s heroic axe wielding etc could find their proper positions naturally.
Plane-crash site (identified by BPR)
Learning the alleged site
BPR pinpoints the plane-crash site (BPR calls it the ‘accident site’) by latitude / longitude: as 44°16’47.2’’N / 006°26’19.1’’E. There’s no explanation, ‘if it’s by astronomic surveys or by a pocket GPS device.’ If by the latter, there’re tens of meters errors in the position, depending on geo-circumstantial conditions. The plane-crash site is shown by Photo 3. Its altitude at the pinpointed point (probably the end point of the flight course shown by red line in Photo 5) is given 1550 (m). Its special irrationalities have been pointed out in the previous Sect. inductively. In this Sect. the crash site itself is denied deductively with hard evidence in Photos.
BPR explains the plane-crash site as follows:
On the lower part of the site, about 20 m above the ravine, is an area where the vegetation had been torn up, tree trunks were uprooted, tree branches were broken and the ground churned up. Parts from the airplane’s wings and fuselage were found in this area. Apart from this area and the final debris field, no other contact with the environment was observed around the accident site.
The alleged site is seemingly a decomposed granite deposit area. Such a land is generally characterized by slow landslides. Photo 3 evidences it by a few cliff lines (top of sliding surface) of about 0.5 ~ 1-m high. The mode and scale of the landslide are slow and small. It’s occurred as frequent as several times a year in the end of each snow season. A landslide is caused by water from melting snow. The landslide is accompanied by small-scale snow-slides. The site also has had occasional-powerful-big scale avalanches in mid snow seasons. Photo 3 also shows: (i) two faults where pre-weathered bedrock crops (the bedrock was the sliding surface), and (ii) landslide marks nearby the ‘accident area’.
→ Photo 3 Plane-crash site area (asserted by BPR)
Inductively speaking, Photo 3 isn’t of the plane crash but of landslides the last one of which happened within 2 days after the plane crash. It is proven deductively in the next Sub-sub-sect.
Deductive denial of BPR identified plane-crash site
In Photo 3, there can be seen trees broken at about 2-m high from GL. BPR judges they’re the result of a plane collision. If it is so, the trees must have been broken at GL where the maximum bending moment occurs. The force that cut the trees at their intermediate height was avalanches in mid-snow seasons. That is, snow accumulated during the early days of a snow season is apt to be subjected to temperature changes of above and below a freezing point. Correspondingly, snow melts and refreezes, resulting in formation of a consistent frozen snow layer. It fixes tree trunks at their lower parts. In a mid-snow season, new snow accumulates on the old frozen snow layer. Any time when it’s warm, the new snow melts, but water can’t reach GL. The frozen snow layer interrupts it. Water flows down on its surface. An avalanche takes place at this surface. The sliding snow pushes trees downward. A tree trunk shears off at a point where the maximum bending moment and shear happen. It is the boarder between the frozen old snow layer and the sliding new snow layer. En passant, no rooted-out tree is seen in Photo 3, despite BPR says it is.
Readers also can see fallen upper parts of trees lying on the ground. BPR explains them as the cut branches by the plane collision. In fact, they’re the upper parts of trees cut and transported by past avalanches from upper sides. If they’re the branches cut by plane collision, they must still bear leaves. The Photo 3 was taken within a couple of days after the crash. The lying tree trunks are long-ago-dead ones. Remind that Christmas trees (without roots) keep their status during the Christmas season (more than a few weeks).
Photo 3 shows no vegetation on the ground. BPR imagines the plane cut it down, having kept the covering snow intact!?! cf. Photo 4. No vegetation is a common landscape of any landslide site.
There’re disturbed ground surfaces in Photo 3. BPR says it was churned by the plane crash. It is a trace of ground erosion by the melt-and-flow water at the end of this snow season.
→ Photo 4 Plane-crash site assumed by BEA (satellite image)
Photo 4 is the satellite image of the same site as Photo 3. It shows that the so-called accident area had been covered by lingering snow in the morning of L-event. As a piece of plane’s part is shown on the snow in Photo 4, it reveals that the landslide took place in the daytime within a couple of days after the plane collision, since the Photo 3 (no snow) was taken within 2 days after the L-event. Flat-shaped fuselage debris, e.g. of a wing segment, may have slid down the snow-covering slopes of ridge side surfaces and ravines like snowboards, and could reach the ‘accident site’ of 20-m higher than the ravine elevation there.
Comment: In Photo 4, a flight path is shown with a red line. Some of its notations are wrong. The last radar contact point is about 6 km this side (can’t be in the scope of Photo 4). The notation of ‘10000 FT’ has to be replaced by ‘6600 FT’, if it expresses the altitude of the flight path at the time of the last radar contact.
In Photo 5, BPR shows an ‘area damaged by the aircraft’ with red hatches. It is a typical pattern of an ‘area affected by landslide’ caused by melting snow. Photo 5 also shows: (i) two faults where pre-weathered bedrock crops (the bedrock forms a part of the sliding surface), and (ii) landslide marks nearby the ‘accident area’.
→ Photo 5 Plane-crash site identified by BEA and this Report
True plane-crash site (identified by this Report)
Then, where is the true plane-crash site? The answer is given in this Sub-sect.
This Report explains the plane-crash pattern as follows: cf. Fig. 3 (b) and Photo 5.
(i) The plane flew in horizontally and collided against the ridge summit of 45(Âș) slope with the plane’s joint of the right wing. (ii) The fuselage was deformed to flat and smashed to pieces. There was no rebound (explained already). (iii) The slope of the surfaces of both side of the ridge is about 45(Âș). (iv) By gravitational force, the pieces that had pertained to the right wing fell down along the east side ridge surface and other elements fell down the west side ridge surface, down to ravines at both sides of the ridge. (v) The debris further rolled/slid down the ravines of 35(Âș). (vi) While they were falling down, some debris came to halts along the ridge’s side surfaces and most of debris arrived at ravines. (vii) Many of them stopped at the lower ravines where their slope is relatively lenient, 25 (Âș).
If the plane-crash pattern is as explained above, the plane-crash point is identified by tracing back the fallen debris remaining at the highest elevations on both sides of the ridge reversely along the furrows of the ridge side surfaces up to the ridge summit. The Ă marked point where the trace back lines (yellow) meet the summit line is the plane-crash point. The color of the ridge summit nearby Ă marked is a little different from the color of other ridge summit.
As granite weathering develops, only soon site investigations can identify the traces of the plane-crash site there.
Decompression in cockpit
How to confirm or deny decompression
This is another determinant of L-event. The best way to confirm or deny it is to show the FDR data that records the air pressure in the cockpit. CVR data can also indirectly indicate the decompression by a fact that the recorded sounds become weaker when decompression begins as the medium of sounds (air) is rarefied. Both are easy. But BPR did neither.
There’re three other methods of verification to this problem, viz. (i) Check the remnant cockpit’s cut sections if fatigue marks are. (ii) Check all the fuselage debris if fatigue marks are, to confirm all the fatigue cracks in the fuselage. (iii) Check captain’s and copilot’s bodies if any symptoms of the exposition to decompression are. Method (ii) takes time, needs resources. Method (iii) may not be applicable if their families do not agree to it. He recommends Method (i).
He reminds readers of the fact that the cockpit and the aft kept their shapes better than the main body fuselage. In the A-event, the plane was found in the sea divided into three parts, cockpit, aft and main body with wings. Remember! When something that houses a structurally weak point is broken, the rupture always occurs first at the point where the weak point exists. L- and A-event reveals the weak points were in the cockpit and the aft where they join the main body. Really the structure is discontinuous at these points, [14]. If the cockpit has welded matters in it, it further worsens the discontinuity of the fuselage. The aft joins with the main body where a pressure bulkhead is. After the separation, each part has each rupture pattern that independently develops. In the L-event, the cockpit was not involved in a smashed-into-pieces pattern of main fuselage. It is highly probable that fatigue marks are found in the cockpit cut section, unless otherwise disturbed by ‘processing’.
BPR’s engagement in sound matters
Because of weak support by FDR digital data, BPR’s deduction on L-event is forced heavily to depend on CVR analog data, sound. This Sub-sect. alludes to the ‘sound’.
There’re three principal factors of sound, viz. strength, pitch (or tune) and tone. From an acoustic view point, they correspond respectively to amplitude, frequency and shape of waves. Among the three, the ‘strength’ of sound is the easiest subject to identify. Everybody can do it unless being deaf. To differentiate the ‘pitch’ needs talent. The person who can’t distinguish a 0.6 % frequency difference can’t be a sound professional. A person who can’t differentiate a 1.3 % frequency difference pertains to tune deafness. To evaluate the ‘tone’, it needs deep experiences and hard exercises. The aviation experts are not necessarily good enough for these standards. For instance, the CVR data of L-event weakens the sound strength after the cockpit decompression took place. ----- In vacuum, sound waves have no medium; hence, no sound is recorded. ----- Even for this easiest subject, ‘strength’ of sound, there’s no description in BPR. In this context, every judgment on sounds, ‘noise and voice,’ in BPR is dubious.
Suggestions
For the time being, this Report suggests in three points as follows:
(1) As to voices, the most controversial sound is copilot’s breaths. First of all, breath has no vibrating body with which sound waves is generated. A snoring is a kind of breath that generates harsh sounds caused by the vibrating of the soft palate. Does BPR mean this kind of breath? If yes, it means the copilot was unconscious, since the snoring occurs only when a human is unconscious, e.g., sleeping. There’s one more possibility. It’s the air cylinder vibration in human nostrils as pipe organ’s pipe. But the human nostril has no mechanism of pipe organ’s pipe. That is, there’s no vibrating body, no sound waves, hence, no human breath can be recorded in CVR. Then, is the breath sound illusory? Hum, it can be the sounds of wind breaths came from fatigue cracks in the cockpit bulkhead.
(2) As to noises, an expression, ‘noises similar to violent blows on the cockpit door,’ must be deleted, if the axe (shock-resistant by nature) is not found in the debris. The violent noises were the sounds of the cockpit bulkhead rupture.
(3) The people who best suit the acoustic audit are young chorus or orchestra members at music schools. The BEA is kindly advised to have their assistance. Or, at least, the works must be supported by forensic tools, e.g., Fourier analyses with a computer or sound spectrogram analyses by a sound spectrograph to make analogy with an original sound, e.g., a voice-print. Remember! These devices should be applied to original data that have yet to be subjected to any kind of processing. If the raw data are too damaged to undergo the talented/trained human assessment and/or appropriate forensic tools, it means that there’s no way to identify the nature of sounds, i.e., noises and voices, unless otherwise imagined. In this context, the aviation experts who are laymen in acoustics should refrain from commenting at random on the sounds.
COPILOT’S PERSONALITY
This Sect. learns copilot’s personality that induced people’s unilateral ill concept in the worst form with the L-event.
This is an example of the same cases occurring often but, in most cases, invisible in modern times. There’s a prominent precedent. That is:
In the 1940s and 1950s, the United States was in the grips of a “red scare”. Under this trend, the FBI tried to link Charlie Chaplin, ‘a creative genius who predicted the problems of automation already in 1930s,’ to the Communist Party. FBI with Attorney General’s support successfully deported him from the US. Chaplin explained the situation, ‘Under these conditions I find it virtually impossible to continue my motion-picture work, and I have therefore given up my residence in the United States.’
Comment: the Writer himself had the similar but smaller experience in 1980, [15], [16].
The relationship between a ‘beyond-program act’ and ‘politico-social responses to it’ for some representative examples are as follows:
* For law-order enforcers, an act of beyond a program (law) is criminal.
* In computer-governed organizations, an act beyond a program (rule) is dangerous.
* For below-standard researchers, an act beyond a program (standard) is murderous.
As it is so, this society is apt to be difficult for a creative human to live. Copilot’s suffering is to be seen with the same politico-socio-cultural dimensions as the above. Copilot’s creativeness (character being beyond program) induced a consequence with a particular event under certain conditions. It’s no wonder the copilot was depressed. But his will was not to surrender but to overcome the depression. It’s proven by his frequent consultations with mental counselors. Unfortunately, all his acts including the efforts to help the plane until the last moment were taken in ill part. Mass media sensationalism enlarged the tide. The tide must be stopped as it’s an evil sign not only for an individual but for the society. To recover from this socio-corporate-corporal disease, it is indispensable to provide an insider arena where any original suggestion can be expressed, with an incentive, never with reactionary persecution.
The Writer has presented causation study reports of originality in many occasions, [8] ~ [16]. They’ve been promptly and widely exhibited. Having sent a ball to an opposite court, he has felt refreshed. How to handle the ball is the matter of the players in the court where the ball is now. If the copilot would have a means as this, his depression should have instantly disappeared. In this way, the personal matter has a solution. But the matter in the program-governed society of lacking in dealing with the beyond-program problems has yet to be addressed. The solution is to digest the suggestions by a volley of open discussions. Its result salvages the organization from its weak point in detecting or finding the cause of to-happen or have-happened accidents, [16]. It is a right way but not necessarily easy to realize.
The Writer has made suggestions in his past causation study reports, [8] ~ [16]. Partly, they were responded either overtly or covertly. But mainly, his insertions used to fall off one like water off a duck’s back. This matter is to be discussed getting a good time in a future.
CONCLUSIONS
This Report summarizes its conclusions as follows:
(1) BEA declares in BPR that it’s independent, has no prejudice for any hypothesis.
BEA’s devout belief in the copilot-suicide hypothesis is obvious, when BEA urges in BPR ‘it is impossible to rule it out the hypothesis of intentional maneuvers by one of the crew members.’ It doesn’t matter. Every study must be guided by a hypothesis. The matter is: if the hypothesis is just. The copilot-suicide hypothesis is unjust.
(2) As FDR digital data are damaged by the thermal effect, BPR is composed mainly based on CVR analog data and Radar digital data. BPR exceptionally used FDR data in two occasions. One is plane’s crash time & altitude. It caused a fatal contradiction, i.e., the trajectory set up by BPR doesn’t pass the last radar contact point. The other one is the plane’s speed in its last descent flight. It has proved anomaly in the engine control system and FDR data damage rather than support copilot-suicide hypothesis.
(3) There’re two determinants that lead the study directly to the cause. One is the location of the plane-crash site. BEA’s site-investigation team identified the site. It’s pinpointed it with latitude / longitude: 44°16’47.2’’N / 006°26’19.1’’E and gave its altitude: 1550 (m). BPR reinforced it with a site photo. These findings play a key role in the copilot-suicide hypothesis; hence, form a crucial part of BPR.
(4) This Report inductively / deductively denies the plane-crash site identified by BEA’s site investigation team, and gives a true site. Its altitude is 500 (m) higher than and 500 (m) more upper side from the BPR’s. BPR’s site is not of the plane crash but of landslides. BPR’s site contradicts the confirmed facts. One of them is mentioned in the above Item (2). It disagrees to the debris distribution feature at the site too. The site identified by this Report agrees to all the confirmed facts and doesn’t contradict any rightly-set-up premise.
(5) This Report points out the inadequacies in BPR in another determinant, ‘cockpit decompression’. BPR indirectly denies the decompression in the cockpit by copilot’s breaths and other acoustic bases. It doesn’t convince enough. If BPR wants to prove the authenticity of the acoustic judgment, it must be supported by the acoustic talent, or at least supported by appropriate forensic tools. To have an ultimate answer to this question, this Report suggests checking if fatigue marks are on the cut sections of the cockpit bulkhead.
(6) There was an obvious disorder in plane’s elevator control system throughout the flights (out-bound and return flight) as BPR itself recognizes in effect. If the elevator control system would have been in order, the copilot could manage the emergency. BPR regards copilot’s struggle to manage the crisis as his effort to destroy the plane.
(7) The disorder in the elevator control system is a common sign in F-, A- and L-event. It implies that these three events have a common cause. It is ‘cockpit bulkhead fatigue rupture’.
(8) If BEA doesn’t take the matter pointed out by this Report into account, the same events of the same cause will happen again sooner or later.
REFERENCES
[1] Germanwings Copilot Lubitz Rehearsed Crash on Previous ...,
[2] NBCNews.com May 6, 2015 - Germanwings copilot Andreas Lubitz appears to have rehearsed downing his ... www.nbcnews.com/
[3] Germanwings Flight 9525: BEA Report Shows Copilot ...,
www.ibtimes.com, Transportation
[4] International Business Times, May 6, 2015 - A preliminary report by France's BEA investigation agency, citing cockpit data...
[6] France's BEA Releases Preliminary Report on ..., sputniknews.com/europe/2015 05 06
[7] The Happy Pontist: Pontist critiqued (again), happypontist.blogspot.com/2012/07/
[8] Sohei Matsuno, “uiba's and happy pontist's kukar bridge collapse theory,’ iba.ac.id/
[9] Sohei Matsuno, ‘SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING (JAKARTA),’
[10] Sohei Matsuno, “jakarta flood prevention project with a true cause,”
[12] Sohei Matsuno, “JAKARTA-FLOOD PREVENTION BY TRAINING DIKE vs. GIANT SEA WALL,” www.iba.ac.id/
[13] Sohei Matsuno, “CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,“ www.iba.ac.id/
[14] Sohei Matsuno et al, ‘A CAUSAL STUDY ON THE AIRASIA AIRBUS CRASH EVENT,’
www.iba.ac.id/ 2015
[15] Sohei Matsuno, Asmadi, ‘A STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH Event,’ www.iba.ac.id/documents/, 2015
[16] S. Matsuno, ‘STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH,’
MESSAGE
Dear Messrs at BEA, please feel refreshed by responding to this Report. Won’t you?
FIGURE / PHOTO COLLECTION
FIGURES
Fig. 0 Selected and responded altitude charts in the previous flight
Fig. 1 Last 13-minute altitude Charts of Radar and BPR
Fig. 2 last 60-second trajectories of BPR and. Radar
Fig. 3 Geometrical features of plane collision based on BEA and Radar data
PHOTOS
Photo 2 Damaged CVR of crashed A320 (Origin: ditto)
Photo 3 Plane-crash site area (identified by BPR)
Photo 4 Plane-crash site assumed by BEA (satellite image)
Origin: The New York Times | Flight path data from Flightradar24; satellite image by NASA/U.S.G.S. Landsat; debris location from French national police
Photo 5 Plane-crash site identified by BEA and this Report
