REVIEW OF AIRBUS CRASH & BUDGET SYSTEM
- Given new data by Daallo event &
AirAsia -
Sohei
Matsuno
Prof. (of freelance),
Dr (of Eng. without borders)
Palembang,
South Sumatra, Indonesia
E-mail:
sohei_matsuno@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
It’s passed 1.5
years since AirAsia Airbus crashed (Dec.28 2014). It
was followed by two Airbus crashes: Lufthansa (Mar.24 2015) and Metrojet (Oct.31 2015).
Five reports are presented by the writer (of this report), which read by many. It’s
high time to review the effects of these Reports. To fulfill this purpose, the
writer needed two categories of data, (i)
current status of studies on Airbus crashes and (ii) measures taken by flight operators. Despite writer’s
repeated requests, nothing has come. The former was timely given by Daallo
event (Feb.2 2016). Investigations into it are going and data are appearing. For
the latter, data from AirAsia and/or Lufthansa are indispensable, as both are
operated with a budget system that played a certain role in the crashes. A
legal action to get it costs, say, US$ 200,000 which the writer can’t afford.
When the writer was being puzzled, the matter came to a sudden solution. He secured
the data from AirAsia officials with US$ 200 when he met two occasions by
chance on a round trip between Kuala Lumpur and Haneda Airports. The data are good
enough to give a finishing touch to the then-unfinished Report. It’s herewith about
to enter.
Keywords: Airbus crash, bulkhead-fatigue rupture,
budget-system’s foibles
INTRODUCTION
Definitions and Abbreviations
For
definitions of technical terms, Cause, Determinant and Fatigue, cf. [7] and [12]. For the definitions of logical terms, Induction and Deduction,
cf. [15].
Abbreviations used in this report are to be read as
follows:
UE: European Union, US: The United States of America, UK: The United Kingdom, IS:
The Islamic State, BEA: Bureau
d'Enquêtes Accident (Accident Enquiry Bureau), Paris, NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board, CEO: Chief Executive Officer,
He: The writer of this Report, WW II: the 2nd World War, WIB: Time in West Indonesia, BPR: BEA’s Preliminary Report, IED: Improvised Explosive Device,
ABIDS: Acquired
Basic Intelligence Deficiency Syndrome, D-event:
Daallo Airline Airbus’ forced landing (2016), M-event: Metrojet Airbus crash event (2015), L-event: Lufthansa Germanwings Airbus
crash event (2015), A-event: AirAsia
Airbus crash event, F-event: Air
France Flight 447 Airbus A330-220 crash event.
Background of
this Report
In
a causation study on a plane crash, there’s a background against which the
study is badly affected. It’s a computer-programmed automation system that has
generally prevailed major societies. People in these societies needn’t (rather
shouldn’t) process any inputs with their thinking. They used to input given
data, process the data by hardware (computer) run by software (programs) and
follow the output as supreme decisions. Or finally, people may hand over the
outputs to robotic hardware. In this way, everything is under the control of a
full automation system. As the majority of the societies are going this way for
about three generations, people in the societies have been ABIDS patients. In
these societies, if things are going as programmed, everything goes well. But
if something beyond the program happens, everyone in the societies is painfully
impotent to deal with the matter. This was discussed already in his past Reports,
[14], and [15]. Under the
above background, causation studies are apt to seek a temporizing hypothesis
that brings minimum monetary, time and reputation losses to the societies
involved. Almost all researchers and operatives who participate in the studies
and practices believe, ‘It's the best way to protect interests of the societies
and the people working there,’ [8] and [9]. It may seem to be so in a short
term, but really not, in a long run, [8]
and 13].
It’s
not easy to let the status quo be on a right track, even if the right way is
shown, much less if it’s not. They’re never able to be. His interest is to know
if his Reports have any effect on the background.
Purpose of
this Report
Against
the background stated above, he reviews the current status in both the fields
of study and the fronts of practice, being based on the applicable data
especially new ones from D-event and AirAsia. The purpose of this Report is, through
the review, to confirm if there’s any effect of his Reports on the current study
fields and practice fronts.
STATUS QUO OF CAUSATION STUDY & TO DO AWAY WITH IT
General
The
most serious symptom appears not only in the Airbus crash but also generally in
a causation studies is the meager setting up of a hypothesis by induction. To
decode the data recorded in CVR, FDR etc and to confirm or deny the hypothesis
with the data by deduction may require some expertise. It’s of artisan. Contrarily,
to set up hypothesis, it needs a wide range of experience
and knowledge in socio-politico-techno-scientific fields accumulated by
routine mental and physical activities, and strong inspiration power cultivated
through them. Alas, these are what the people in the societies governed by software
(programs) and hardware (automation) are lacking in.
This
Report, in this Sect. convinces readers
of the importance of setting up a hypothesis, and shows how to level up current
hypothesis setting-up works to an ordinary level in haste with four primary courses.
Importance of setting up a
hypothesis
Every
study is to commence with a plural hypothesis. From among them, the one that best
follows from the premises (set up by wide range investigations) is to be found
inductively. It’s the most provable hypothesis. Its authenticity must be
confirmed or denied by material evidence, e.g., data from CVR, FDR etc, deductively.
If confirmed, the hypothesis is eligible for a theory. If denied, the study must
go back to a starting point and undergo the same process again with another
hypothesis. It shall be repeated at least until a hypothesis that doesn’t
contradict the material evidence is found.
In
this context, an incorrectly set up hypothesis results in resource / time
losses. Worse still, it very often leads the study to a wrong theory, since the
deduction apt to follow the hypothesis that’s normally comes from a superior
position to the deduction team. It’s not surprising that sounds of the axing
cockpit door is heard despite no axe exists (L-event), [2] and [3], the plane’s
weak sections are not identified despite they are obviously visible at the
crash site (M-event), [19], or, in
an extreme case, material evidence is forged in deduction processes to meet a given
hypothesis (Airbus A320 crash, France, 1988), [4].
It’s
to be recalled that deduction with material data from CVR, FDR etc without a
hypothesis can’t reach its destination, though laymen often think it can. Deduction
without a hypothesis is tantamount to a kite of cut string. It doesn’t know
where it should go. Suppose material evidence, e.g., DNA and finger prints of a
culprit have been found at the site. How can the forensic team single out a culprit
from a population of people with the material evidence only? It’s practically
impossible. It’s possible only when a population of people have been
short-listed to a handful of suspects by induction with a hypothesis. If a case
can be solved deductively only with material evidence without a hypothesis,
it’s only a case where the culprit is caught red handed. But it’s never the
case in a plane crash. However, the converse is true, i.e., a cause can be reached
without material evidence with a hypothesis only. M-event is the very example.
The Russian team’s bomb hypothesis is a product of a premise that assumes
flawless hardware (plane), software (programs) and operatives (pilots and
maintenance staffers), [6]. If it’s
true, there’s no internal factor that causes the plane crash. A possible cause
is an external impact, i.e., a bomb only. This hypothesis is intact even if
there’s ‘no evidence of bomb’ as Egyptian investigators say, [5]. As per the Russian hypothesis, the
bomb must have been, but only it has yet to be found. The Russian hypothesis
can collapse only when its premise, ‘flawless plane’ is denied, [19].
Readers
have been convinced of the importance of setting up a correct hypothesis.
There’re several bases to realize it effectively. Let’s learn them in the next Sub-sect.
Bases to reach the most probable hypothesis
General
There’re four basic ways in this
regard, viz. (i) to study a case
tracing back to past one(s), in other words, to study a case by analogy with past
one(s), (ii) to think matters
providing for the future, i.e., to consider matters from a long-term viewpoint,
(iii) to learn facts going
down to a foundation level, i.e., to learn facts based on principles. The last
is a method to help the above contemplative processes, (iv) to find a Determinant of the study object. They are
explained in the following Sub-sub-sects.
Analogy between an event and past
one(s)
Suppose
there was a certain pattern of plane crash. But its cause wasn’t properly identified
in a study. Hence, the problem wasn’t properly dealt with in practical fronts.
What happens then? It’s a repetition of the same pattern crashes of the same
cause. The converse is also true. If there’re a series of crashes of the same
pattern within a certain period, their causes are, quite possibly, the same. It’s
wonderful rather than strange if event-by-event a different cause is concluded.
The three Airbus
crashes, viz. A-, L- and M-events happened within one year from Dec 2014 to
Oct. 2015. By analogy, he’s learnt that the three events showed similar patterns.
Hence, the cause of them could be the same too. On the way of the analogy, it
was also learnt that the three events had been already preceded by F-event
(June 1 2009), [4].
The
similarities in the patterns of the four crash events are: (i) involving Airbus, (ii)
rare events in cruising altitudes, (iii)
an ominous short-time irregularity of a control-system, (iv) followed by a fatal paralysis of a total
control-system, (v) except
L-event, ending up
consecutive steep ascent followed by stall/descent motions to crash, (vi) fuselage after crash that
indicates cockpit’s and tail’s different behaviors of destruction from main
body’s, (vii) no
flight-balance recovery by either pilots or autopilots, and no distress call
from pilots, after something fatal happened.
Despite
a clear common pattern of the events, popular hypotheses give a different cause
for each. Let’s learn of them first.
As
to F-event
There was a pitot-tube
trouble. While coping with the trouble, a pilot reacted to the situation incorrectly (mistakenly)
by having placed the plane at a
nose-up position in stead of a nose-down instruction, and ultimately caused the aircraft to
enter an aerodynamic stall from which it did not recover
and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. cf. BEA's Final Report.
As
to A-event
There was a
matter with a vertical rudder. While the captain coped with the trouble, the copilot
‘pulled up’ the plane nose when the captain instructed him to ‘pull down’
instead of ‘push down'. This miscommunication resulted in an aerodynamic stall
and the plane crashed into the Java Sea. cf. Preliminary Report by Indonesian
Investigation team, [1].
As
to L-event
There was an
elevator trouble, though it isn’t related to the event by BPR. The copilot deliberately
descended the plane until it crashed to the French, [2] and [3].
As
to M-event
A flawless
plane and operation were set up as a premise of the hypothesis. A passenger who
sat a window-side seat in the rear cabin smuggled a bomb, and exploded it. The
plane severed at the section in the rear cabin and crashed to the Sinai mountain
desert. cf. Russian investigators’ report, [6].
But an official report (Preliminary Report by Egyptian Investigation team),
says, ‘There can be found no evidence of bomb so far,’ [5].
The
above stated causes are different event-by-event. But, to be interested, there’s
a common tendency among them. That is, all hypothesis but Egypt’s attribute the
cause to an act of a dead man (pilot, copilot or passenger). On what ground
does it happen? It does happen on the ground of die-hard belief in a premise, ‘flawless
hardware and perfect software in the system,’ though they agree that some minor
(non-essential) matters might be. It’s proven by the fact that every case study
starts with comments by aviation experts who admire the high safety records of the
corporate bodies involved, [12]. If this
is accepted as a premise of a hypothesis, a cause coming from it can’t be
nothing more than human acts. Among the humans, the safest are the dead ones,
since they are no longer able to tell their tales.
In M-event, Airbus’ rear part
broke up in mid-air. Hence, the pilot-centered hypothesis is inapplicable. ‘A
structural failure in mid-air,’ is an inevitable premise. But the cause of the
mid-air failure is controversial, i.e., (i)
bomb explosion (of Russian team), (ii) no evidence of bomb (of Egyptian
team) and (iii) cockpit-bulkhead fatigue rupture (of him). Egyptian
report is transient. Its due studies may find evidence of bomb, or may confirm
the transient conclusion and find a cause in some technical matters other than
a bomb. Anyway, the Egyptian study has one step neared to but still several
steps away from a true cause.
Judgment from a long-term
viewpoint
As discussed in the previous sub-sub-sect., to take past events
into account is an effective way in any causation study. In this Sub-sub-sect., the importance to
see a matter focusing on its future effects is emphasized. However, to handle a
matter on a time axis is not a favorite scheme but a weak point for the societies
governed by a program-automation system. You see? The routine jobs of the
people working at a program-automation governed organization is the repetition
of: inputting data of a matter facing now, processing them with cotemporary
soft/hardware and having real-time outputs as a solution with which the matter
is to be instantly worked out. In this system, everything goes well in a
present tense. However, when they meet something happened beyond the program,
they can’t adapt themselves to the unfamiliar situation, since the matter
requires taking past and future matters into their consideration. If the crash
event is dealt with their acquired sense, the cause is inevitably attributed to
dead man’s act. It minimizes the loss at present. However, there must be crash
events in a future, as the cause resides. On the other hand, if the structural
cause is identified and measured based on it at the practice fronts, it costs
greater than the former at present. However, a crash event of that cause will
never happen again in a future. The point in this issue is, if the structural
flaw pointed out by him is accepted. It’s hardly possible to expect it in a
near future. He hopes much from the people who are still maintaining potential
creativeness (maybe not kinetic as is oppressed by the system). They’re at
least able to understand the true cause. They’d be best players to solve the
matter if given an environment where they could exhibit their full thinking
power without any restrictions. It’ll be briefly discussed in the last Sub-sect.
Learn facts based on
principles
There’re two reasons why this Sub-sub-sect. is here, viz. (i) causes of crashes are mostly
not of high-class origins but of low-level mistakes, (ii) hence, causation studies generally needn’t high-tech
theories and/or sophisticated lab tests but primary principles and home tests. Really,
his six Reports explain five crash events only with primary to high school
level intelligence and home-work-class tests. Readers are requested to verify his results by your primary ~ high
school level intelligence and tests.
Finding a Determinant in each
event
Any object in any causation study
has a Determinant that abstracts the nature of the object. If it is identified,
the causation studies can be done much easier than without it. It’s explained
with the three events.
In
the case of A-event
The
Determinant is, ‘existence of fatigue marks at the cut sections of the
fuselage,’ especially of the cockpit, [12].
The
fuselage was found in the sea bottom having divided into three parts, viz. a
cockpit, a tail and a main body. It means that the weak sections were at these
cut sections. But the cause of the occurrence of weak section is unknown. If fatigue
marks are found on the cut sections, fatigue is the cause of the weak-section occurrence.
Further unknown is which separation is related to the crash, the cockpit or the
tail. To determine it, further data is needed. There’re three, viz. (i) uncontrolled sudden ascent, (ii) no balance recovery either
by pilots or autopilot, and (iii)
no distress call from pilots. All of them, except (ii) in L-event, are common for all the four events.
As
to (i), the sudden ascent had
no relation to the rudder trouble, in which the captain was being engaged. The
sudden ascent was not caused by copilot’s act of ‘pull up’ but by a paralyzed
elevator control system. Captain’s instruction, ‘Pull down.’ was made when the
captain realized sudden assent of the plane. As to (ii), the fatigue
cracks started at the lower part under the cockpit deck where a set of control devices
were equipped. The rudder trouble occurred under this condition. The cracks had
already reached up to the cockpit windows’ level during years. It was enough
critical for fatigue rupture to happen. Rupture started under the cockpit deck.
It caused the total paralyses of the control system. The sudden ascent was the
consequence of it. It was felt by the captain. [19]. As to (iii),
the captain immediately placed himself back on his seat, and tried to recover
the balance of the plane, but of course in vain. The rupture grew up to the
windows level in a moment. The captain
himself became physically defunct due to consequential explosive decompression.
The
fatigue rupture at the tail is not compatible with any one of the above three,
(i), (ii) and (iii).
That is, if fatigue marks are confirmed on the cut section of the cockpit, it
leads to the conclusion; ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in the cockpit’ is the cause
of A-event. The causation study can stop studying at this moment with all other
helpless efforts. A series of the four crashes can be also explained analogously
with this common cause.
In the case of L-event
The
Determinant is the geographic location of the crash site. BPR shows the collision site by Photo 1. It says, ‘cut trees and trunks, no vegetation on the
gouged and the gouged ground are the results of the collision.’ Its location is
500 m lower
altitude and 4.9 km shorter distance
than the Radar's data do. cf. Fig. 1.
It explains the location inductively as shown in Fig. 1 that contradicts Rader’s location. BPR says plane
didn’t change its descent rate until it collided with the ground (blue line).
As per Radar, the plane entered horizontal flight at 2050-m altitude, having
kept the altitude, collided with the ridge (red line). The
discrepancy between them exceeds the tolerance of error. The denial of either
undermines either of hypotheses’ logical bases. Then, the hypothesis itself is
forced to collapse. As proven by M-event, after plastic deformation to break
down to numerous pieces, debris has no more energy to rebound as photo 2
shows. A true collision site is shown in Photo 2 by × mark, [13].
Fig. 1
(down to last pages) Photo 1
Photo 2
In
the case of M-event
Photo 3
is a bird’s-eye view of the main crash site. He calls readers’ attention that
there can be seen no rebound of the plane debris. Photo 4 is a near-site view of Photo
3. It tells that though the cockpit didn’t separate from the main body,
still it exhibits a destruction feature that’s independent of the main body.
The
Determinant of M-event is the pattern of fuselage’s cut sections. If there’re
no weak sections, the cut sections can’t be the ones as seen in Photo 5, 6 and 7. The sections must show irregular figures that appear
spontaneously at any section. Reversely, if the cut sections show clear plain
figures, weak sections were there. At the time of collision, the main body must
have been separated at these weak sections first, and each severed section shows
each pattern of destruction. This is clearly the case of M-event. cf. Photo 5, 6 & 7.
Now,
let’s learn why these particular sections are plain cut. These
sections are in the parts of discontinuity in shape (cockpit), or in structure (tail,
existence of a pressure bulkhead). There’s stress concentration at these
sections that can cause fatigue cracks there. If these parts have a joint, it
aggravates the discontinuity and so does the risk of fatigue too. The joint is
normally performed in a clear cut section.
Photo 3
Photo
4
Photo 5
Photo 6
Photo 7
The severed rear
body is shown in Photo 7. It tells
further the following facts: The separation of the tail with horizontal stabilizers
and elevators (a part of the rear body beyond the pressure bulkhead) preceded
the separation of the rear body. The cut section along the pressure bulkhead is
plain. It suggests the fatigue cracks had developed along the pressure bulkhead’s
perimeter (cf. Photo 6 again).
In the cut section where the rear body itself separated from the main
body (shown in Photo 7), there’s
neither in-shape nor in-structure discontinuity. The weak section there, if
it’d be, may have been made by the repair works that the plane underwent in 2001.
The weak section of fatigue cracks was limited within the upper half of the
cabin fuselage. Hence, the plain cut appears only in the upper half. The lower half
shows the irregular appearance as fatigue cracks didn’t penetrate into the
lower half through the deck. Be aware! The fatigue rupture in this section is
not the cause of M-event, but the cause of the rear body separation from the
main body.
With the feature of the
cut-sections, the existence of weak sections in the plane is proven. The
premise of a flawless plane has been herewith denied. Another cause besides
‘dead man’s act’ is given a chance to appear, with which the M-event can be
reasonably explained.
Summary
Points in his past Reports
The points of his past Reports on
the four Airbus crashes are; (i)
making analogy between them, his Reports identify common characters in them, (ii) based on it, the Reports conclude
that they have a common cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in a cockpit,’ (iii) his Reports disagree to
popular hypotheses that attribute causes to event-by-event different human acts.
His Reports
imply if past studies had given F-event a correct cause, and based on which the
correct measures were taken at the practice fronts, the three crashes didn’t
happen, and warn if ongoing studies give three crashes a correct cause, and appropriate
measures are taken at the practice fronts, there’ll be no more crash. If not,
the same crash will repeat again and again.
Data needed to finalize his Reports with this Report
He
wants to know (i) if the
current studies take his Reports into account, and (ii) how the study results are implemented in the practice
fronts. These can be directly identified if there’re responses to his Reports
from the parties concerned. But since his 1st Report on A-event was presented
in Jan. 2015 up until his 6th Report (this Report) has been completed as of May
2016, there has been no response from any party concerned, despite his repeated
requests. There must be reasons why no response comes. There’s a plural possible
reason: (a) the people
working at the parties concerned have not yet met his Reports. (b) His Reports are
techno-scientifically too poor to be worth reading. (c) The parties concerned have been so busy that they can’t
respond all reports one-by-one. (d)
The writer of the Reports is a professor of freelance who has no powerful
politico-official / socio-financial backing up. Hence, if they let him stand
alone, he and his Reports will fade in sooner or later. Then, not to respond is
the safest, easiest and cheapest way to counter the matter. The above mentioned
are all he can think about by mobilizing his full intelligence and capability. If
there’d be anything else, please let him know. He welcomes it and follows it up.
If
(a) is true, the information
gathering of the parties concerned is going without internet systems. It’s not
conceivable. (b) is not true.
His Reports have steady records of downloading. (c) is also false, as it means they don’t mind an eyesore,
i.e., his Reports on the rank above their
articles when searched. (d)
might be true in this secular society, but won’t be in history. His true
intention is ‘to go down in history.’
A genuine
reason of ‘no response’ to his Reports is, maybe, ‘they can’t openly express a
denial of his Reports, since they know his Reports are right. They also can’t
express an affirmation to his Reports too, as its impact is too big. Anyhow, ‘no
response’ is a fact. He has got the necessary data in different ways as stated
in this Report.
Effects of his Reports on Airbus
crash studies and practices
Does
‘no-response’ mean insignificant effects of his Reports? No, it doesn’t
necessarily mean so. Really, the supreme authority of the matter under
consideration, BEA, is still being possessed by a visional hypothesis, ‘dead
man’s act’ as it’s symbolized by BPR of L-event. But the changes (though it has
yet to be steadfast) are seen in the two lower authorities, Indonesian and
Egyptian investigation teams with their preliminary reports of A- and M-event
respectively.
According
to former’s latest preliminary report, ‘there was a minor matter with a rudder
control system. While the captain was being engaged in dealing with the matter,
the captain ordered the copilot, “Pull down!” The correct expression was, “Push
down!” The copilot heard it “pulled up.” Because of this miss-communication,
the plane entered nose up instead of nose down. It resulted in a stall from
which the pilots couldn’t recover the plane’s balance, and crashed.’ The
preliminary report regards the trouble in a rudder control system as a minor hardware
trouble in a local device, i.e., places it in an introductory part for the
principal part, “pilots’ error”. In this context, it still pertains to the
mediocre hypothesis that used to attribute the events to “dead man’s act”.
In
fact, the trouble in any control system is an ominous phenomenon of the sequent
fatal destruction of the total control system, consequential sharp ascent, stalls
and a crash. These are common character in past three events (not in L-event)*.
In fact, the ominous control system trouble is obviously seen in each event.
It’s clearly pointed out by his Reports. Though the Indonesia team sees the rudder
trouble be unessential, the team has brought this rightly essential matter into
the study field. In this context, it may be appreciated. The team’s preliminary
report has been sent to the supreme organization, BEA, for its examinations.
He’s really interested what kind of responses will it be.
*The
total paralysis of the control system and consequential stalls and descents
didn’t happen in L-event, as the copilot interrupted it immediately before it
was about to happen by timely descending the plane. But the copilot couldn’t
salvage the plane from a crash, as the ominous elevator control system trouble (to
which the copilot quickly responded with the descent) didn’t allow the copilot
to do so.
A
more concrete assertion has come from an Egyptian investigation team. It declared
‘no evidence of bomb has been found so far,’ in M-event. It’s practically a
denial of the hypothesis that stands on a premise of ‘no flaw in hard/software
and operations in M-event.’ It naturally forces the team itself to find some techno-structural
flaws in the event. If it could perform the job, it should be admired as a game
changer in the Airbus crash causation studies.
A
point in issue is: ‘the team couldn’t be bold enough to say, ‘there’s no
evidence of bomb,’ unless it had had an idea of 'the plane had techno-structural
flaws' beforehand. Had the team met it in advance? There had been already his
Reports that forwarded the plane’s flaws. Is there any report else that points
residual flaws in the plane? If the team would find something else, it’s admirable.
It’d be eligible for the Nobel Prize.
The
effects of his Reports on the current causation study field are, for the time
being, have yet to be crystal clear. However, one point he must emphasize is
that if his assertion is recognized, and is implemented in practices, regardless
of overtly or covertly, the same crash won’t happen any more. If not it
repeats. The public can realize it sooner or later.
NEW INPUTS
General
The new data were sought in order
to know real-time effects of his Reports on Airbus crash study fields and practice
fronts. As discussed in the previous Sect.,
his Reports may have certain effects on both the study fields (stated) and the
practice fronts (to be stated later).
At the study fields, statements, comments and
hypotheses appearing in connection to the newly happened D-event show no
difference from the old one, i.e., ‘dead man’s act.’ Really, the aspects of
D-event are different from the four events. But, from a causation point of view, it pertains to the same category
of the four events in a wide sense. Its cause is ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture’ at
the section of structural discontinuity in a cabin, not in a cockpit.
There’s no material evidence of
bomb but enough clues of no bomb. However, the current situation of D-event
studies proves how consistent the sense of “dead man’s act” is. It suggests ‘if
the outlook of a new event is different from the past ones, his hypothesis
can’t play any role, even if the nature of them is the same.’
At the practice fronts, he reconfirmed
the feature of a program governed organization and its weak points. He learnt
the entity how the regime mended its programs to have let them conform to a
problem that had newly happened.
The above stated entities are
discussed in the following Sub-sects.
From D-event
Incident
Flight 159 (DAO 159/D3 159), operated by Somali-owned Daallo
Airlines, took off from
the Mogadishu airport at 11:00 local time on Feb. 2 2016 en route to Djibouti
City. A big sound was
heard 20 minutes after it took off at an altitude of about 4,300 m. The captain thought it was a sound by
a window having got out of the fuselage. The cabin was immediately hidden in a
sick mist. After several seconds, the mist disappeared and visibility came
back. Then, a hole ripped in the right side fuselage behind a gateway door,
close to the seat 16F, abeam the forward wing
root, was seen. The
aircraft was able to return to the airport safely, with one passenger
unaccounted for. All
other 73 passengers and 7 clues on board at the time of incident disembarked safely. Only two
passengers were taken to a hospital with minor injuries.
Investigation
Many speculations of being much the
same have appeared, saying, ‘Somalia-based terror group, Al-Shabaab, linked to Al Qaeda, is
thought to be behind the blast that ripped a hole in the side of the jet.’ To
be timely, on Feb. 13, eleven days after the
incident, Al-Shabaab, in an email statement, claimed responsibility for the
attack. Having
got a good promotion, subsequent
investigations are going with a hypothesis that says, ‘the suicide bomber, a deceased wheelchair-bound passenger,
is D-event’s culprit.’ During his studies on
Airbus crashes, this is a 5th event explained by a popular hypothesis ‘dead
man’s act.’ By editing applicable news, its hypothetical story is assembled as
follows:
A security camera recording from the airport
shows one of two men, seemingly airport employees, takes a laptop (computer) and hands it over to
another employee who gives it to
the passenger (suicide bomber). The
laptop concealed TNT. The passenger had some connections to
airline or airport personnel. The passenger was able to bypass airport security by smuggling the explosive
device in the passenger’s wheelchair.
This passenger was transferred into a regular seat after being brought onto the
plane. But he moved to a
different seat, as the passenger
knew precisely where to sit and how to place the device to maximize damage. Really,
the passenger sat a right-window-side seat (16F) near from the root of a right
wing where a fuel tank was located. The
passenger blew himself up there and the blast ripped a hole on the right side
of the fuselage. A
fire had erupted on the flight. The cabin was filled by smoke. The passenger
himself was also engulfed in flames, and sucked out of the plane through the ripped
hole by the air pressure within seconds after the blast.
Official
investigations to verify the above hypothetical
configuration are underway by Somalia's Air
Accident Investigation Authority, the National Intelligence and Security Agency, with the cooperation of airport
authority and local police. Daallo Airlines, a technical team of Hermes Airlines, the owner of the aircraft, as
well as the aircraft's manufacturer, Airbus, are also participating in the active investigations. The FBI is contributing its efforts to the investigations too.
The results of the
investigations up to now are as follows:
On Feb. 3, the missing
person's body was found in the Balcad area, about 30 km north of Mogadishu. The deceased passenger was identified as Abdullahi
Abdisalam Borleh, a 55-year-old male from Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland region of Somalia, a teacher at an Islamic school. Borleh was going abroad for
health reasons, according to Sheikh Mohamed Abdullahi, a mosque imam in Hargeisa. A Somali federal
official stated that Borleh had been in security agent’s list, but never as a
dangerous person. A senior Somalia immigration official said that Borleh had
obtained a Turkish visa to work in Turkey as an adviser at the foreign
ministry. A letter was allegedly sent from a certain institution to the Turkish
Embassy in Mogadishu, having asked the Turkish Embassy to facilitate a visa for
Borleh to be "an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Investment
Promotions."
Both airport employees
who handed over a TNT-charged laptop have been arrested. Two passengers on the
plane, including one who was sitting in the next seat to Mr Borleh, have been
arrested on suspicion of being accomplices. At
least 20 people, including
government officials and the two airline employees, have been arrested on
suspicion of being linked to the attack.
Transport Minister Ali Ahmed
Jamac confirmed that the
explosion was caused by a bomb that was meant to kill all on board.
Two US
government sources said that initial forensic testing of the damage on Flight 159 had detected possible
traces of TNT residue on the aircraft.
The pilot, Vlatko
Vodopivec,
thought firstly the sound heard was a
sound by a window having got out of the fuselage. But going with the
tide of the “dead man’s act” hypothesis, he changed his previous words, saying,
‘What I heard was of the bomb blast.’
Vodopivec also criticized the lack of security around the aircraft at the
airport, describing the facility as "chaotic." In an interview with
the Associated Press, Vodopivec explained, ‘the security is zero. When we park there,
some 20 to 30 people come to the tarmac, of which no one has a badge or those
yellow vests. They enter and leave the plane, and no one knows who is who. They
can put anything inside when passengers leave the aircraft." In this
way, he suggested, ‘not necessarily the
suicide bomber only, but there were a lot of people who could plant a bomb.
Vodopivec
also suggested, ‘The blast likely would
have set off a catastrophic secondary explosion in the fuel tank if the blast
took place when the aircraft reached cruising altitude. But, fortunately, the
explosion happened at a lower altitude of between 12,000 feet and 14,000 feet.’
Comment: Somalia asked FBI agents for help
with investigations, and several are on the ground assisting in Mogadishu, the
spokesman, Aato, said. "This was a
sophisticated attack ... so we reached out to our international partners."
Denial of ‘dead man’s act’ hypothesis
General
For
him, the efforts by the authorities concerned to determine a suicide bomber is
tantamount to making grandchildren without a child. There’s ‘evidence of no
bomb’ rather than ‘no evidence of bomb’. Alas, the people governed by given programs
everyday for a long time have lost the ability to identify it. Readers needn't
any sophisticated/high-tech knowledge. It needs only basic knowledge of primary
science, in between primary and high school levels. Let’s learn.
Unbecoming
suicide bomber
(1)
From social circumstance
Al-Shabaab
or generally extreme Islamic groups, e.g., IS, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda etc, do not
rely on elderly people (much less handicapped) in suicide operations. It is
because the elderly people can’t react to a given situation quickly. But what
is on earth is they don’t like to shorten their remained short lives. Really
speaking, they are unreliable for the purpose. The suicide bombers are
exclusively yang people, very often teenage boys and girls. This is historically
true. The Kamikaze suicide airmen in the WW II were all youths of high teen and
low twenty.
Do
readers know what Al-Shabaab means? It means ‘Youths’.
(2)
From personal circumstance
As stated
above, the deceased passenger was expected to have medical treatment in Turkey.
It doesn’t conform to the person who resolved to be a suicide bomber. He also
had obtained a working visa to work at the ministry of foreign affairs in
Turkey as an adviser. It’s unnecessary to carry out the purpose of suicide bombing.
A tourist visa is enough to execute the purpose. It’s much easier to obtain
than to obtain a working visa.
Every
situation doesn’t agree to what the passenger, Mr Borleh is a suicide bomber.
Scientific
evidence of no bomb
The
parties concerned have yet to identify the most primitive but most essential
material evidence which he’s about to explain in this Article. It’s
commonplace that people, who are possessed by a wrong hypothesis and have no
interest in anything that are incompatible with their concept, can’t see even
existing things. It’s no wonder if they can see something not existing but meet
their concept. Let’s see the matters in detail.
(1)
Chemical evidence (No soot, no smoke, no fire)
There’s no
trace of soot throughout the cabin. cf. Photo
10 and 11. If there’s no soot,
there’s no smoke. If there’s no smoke, there’s no fire. It is said that, after
the blast, the cabin was covered by a volume of smoke. Really, if a bomb
blasts, there must be fire and smoke, since all IEDs Al-Shabaab uses are made
of petrol origin fuel. Both the fire and smoke can’t disappear within seconds
of time. In fact, it wasn’t smoke but a mist. The mist appeared when warm and
pressurized air inside the cabin was invaded by and contacted with the air
outside the fuselage of lower temperature and pressure after a hole was ripped
on the side of the fuselage. There could be emitting sparks from being broken
fuselage while it was deforming, cutting flattering until it was finally
severed from the mother fuselage. The moving mist reflected the light of the
sparks. It was seen as the fire. There was no fire but heat was. It was
generated while the broken fuselage was subjected to cold works. Mr Derleh’s charred
body is the result when having been tangled with thus heated fuselage. The charred
body by heat is different from the burnt body by fire. Please differentiate
between them.
The lower/out/back-side
fuselage of the ripped hole is discolored by cold work heat generated in the
broken but still connected with the mother fuselage at its lower position and had
been flattering there until it was finally disconnected and flew away.
(2)
Physical evidence (No bomb blast)
Suppose there’s a fluid closed up in
a vessel. When pressure is applied at one point in a fluid, it is transmitted
everywhere in the fluid. If the fluid is a liquid, the pressure transmission occurs
instantly as a liquid is uncompressible. It’s also true if the fluid is gas. Everybody
knows it when fill a tire with air. If gas pressure is given in a short time,
e.g., by blast, the transmission takes time as gas is compressible. Now let’s come
back to the case of air pressure in the fuselage, when blast occurs at a certain
point in the fuselage, all the people in the closed up cabin must experience
the blast pressure as strong as it breaks a part of the fuselage. But nobody on
board was harmed except the sucked out passenger who took a seat nearest to the
ripped hole. Or even nobody felt the blast but heard a big sound only. There
can be seen insignificant physical harm in the cabin as well. cf. Photo 10 and 11. It is possible if, only if, a directional bomb was used.
Photo 8
Photo 9
Photo 10
Photo 11
Photo 12
(3)
No directional bomb
The bomb must have been a
directional one with a charge that makes the effect of a bomb focus on one
direction in which an object was. cf. Photo
12. The charge’s
back-fill must be strong so as to prevent the bomb from moving back by a blast
reaction. In D-event, to fulfill this purpose, the charge must have been fixed
on the floor. After the bomb blast, the charge had to remain in position. But it wasn’t found in the cabin.
That is, in D-event, a charge
(more massive than the bomb itself) wasn’t attached to the laptop. But even if
it was, it must clear a next question, ‘Can it produce a rectangular hole?’ No,
it can’t. Let’s learn it in the next Sub-sub-sect.
Rectangular ripped hole
General
Why
is the shape of the ripped hole rectangular? This is an essential question, but
it has yet to be answered. In this regard, Mr Rob, on Feb. 5 2016, expressed his skepticism as
follows:
“Interesting explosion caused by unknown for now - lots of straight line
on ripped parts, minimal or no damage on surrounding seats, when looking from
inside and outside (photos) opening seems reasonably square, straight lines and
'cuts'. I look forward to investigation findings.” cf. Photo 8 and 10.
Since Mr Rob expressed
this skepticism, he has been looking forward four month. He wonders if a
response comes, hence, herein responds to it on behalf of the defender.
Comment:
Mr Rob forwarded one more skepticism, “The ejected
passenger was a 55 yr. old male. Not the typical terrorist profile. I wonder if
the bomb was planted or if in fact the ejected passenger was the bomber.” For
this skepticism, he has already given his answer earlier in this Report.
How was the rectangular ripped
hole made?
A ghost story is roughly as
follows:
(a) The place
where the hole was ripped had been the position where an emergency exit was to
be provided in the original design.
(b) The place
where the emergency exit is provided is chosen on the root of wings in
conventional designs (cf. Photo 8 and
9), since passengers can be
evacuated more easily onto an inflated floating lifeboat using the wing as an intermediate
stepping stage.
(c) The plan
was cancelled by a design change. The reasons of the design change were (i) Airbus is a flawless plane, (ii) hence, the emergency landing
is almost a 0 probability, and (iii)
to provide an emergency exit for such a 0+ probability is practically nonsense.
(d) Hence,
for the sake of simplifying design / manufacture processes and realizing an
economical effect, the emergency exits should be omitted.
(e) To close
the space, a panel made of the same material as the fuselage was used. Fixing
it in position by means of weld with some additional stringers, the works
finished.
(f) It created a discontinuity in the fuselage,
but it wasn’t taken into account. Sure enough, fatigue cracks developed faithfully
along the weld lines, and when it reached a critical condition, the fixed panel
was severed from the position having let the original shape of the emergency
exit reappear as it had been before the design change.
Refer to Photo 8 and 10.
Photo 9 shows ‘United Airlines Flight 811’s emergency exit
that’s intact, but fuselage destruction happened having involved the gateway. Conversely,
the gateway was intact in D-event, as shown in Photo 8. The altitude and
the degree of fuselage damage when the United Airlines event happened were both
higher than of D-event. Nonetheless, the plane could land safely. It is because
the location where fuselage rupture took place was not in the cockpit but in
the cabin.
Reminder of L-event
The United Airlines
event is not of Airbus. But it’s analogous with L-event in a certain point. Hence,
it is discussed at this convenience.
United Airlines Flight 811 was en route from Honolulu, Hawaii, to Auckland, New Zealand,
when it experienced a failure on Feb 24, 1989. In
this event, the fuselage destruction was triggered by mid-air separation of the
cargo-storage door. The destruction developed to the gateway that was located
just above the cargo-storage door. When the destruction involved the gateway, several rows of seats were drawn out with the
separating fuselage, having resulted in the deaths of nine passengers. The
aircraft returned to Honolulu where it landed safely.
The cargo-storage door must have
been vibrating and the fatigue cracks had already reached the bottom of the
gateway. It’s proven by strait cut lines between the cargo-storage door frame
and the gateway.
It’s a reminder of the vibration
of the front-wheel-storage door (located just under the cockpit) and its repair
works just one night before L-event. The Lufthansa regards it a minor problem.
However, it’s highly possible the vibration of the front-wheel-storage door
caused (at least accelerated) the fatigue cracks in the cockpit, which caused
(at least triggered) the plane crash.
Location of joint
General
The cause of a series of Airbus crashes (object
of his Reports) is, in one word, ‘fatigue’. The fatigue is elaborated in his
past Reports, [16], [17] and [18]. Its definition is: ‘The weakening
of material when subject to alternating stress.’ It develops cracks in material
and terminates with structural rupture. It’s technically impossible to
eliminate the alternating stress; however, it’s possible to avoid fatigue. It’s
one of the important subjects in a study on properties of material. In the case
of Airbus crash, there’re several ways to meet the purpose in long and short
terms. Among them, the one in haste is to choose a proper location of a joint.
In this Sub-sub-sect., let’s learn it with a typical incident, Boeing 737 Aloha Airline Flight 243.
Boeing
737 incident
On April 28, 1988, a Boeing 737-200, N73711, Fight
243, operated by Aloha Airlines Inc., was cruising at 24,000-ft altitude, en rooted from Hilo to
Honolulu, had fatigue rupture and explosive decompression. About 18-m long cabin skin above the cabin floor,
separated from the plane. The separation began at STA 300 and ended at STA 540
during flight (cf. Fig. 2). The
damage of the aircraft is seen in Photo 13.
There were 89 passengers and 6 crewmembers on board. One flight attendant
was blown out of the plane during the decompression. It was only a fatality in
the accident. Eight others were seriously injured. The aircraft made
emergency descent and landed safely at Kahului Airport on Maui. The event
brought about a great effect on the airline industry. The vulnerable lap joint
of the earlier production Boeing 737, which failed in the accident, is not used
since then.
Boeing
737 investigation
Photo 13
Fig. 2
As
illustrated in Fig. 2, the Boeing
737 fuselage is divided into four sections. All but section 48 are pressurized.
The fuselage’s skin panels are joined by lap joints where upper and lower skin
panels overlap about 3 inches. The lap consists of two independent systems of
epoxy bonded and riveted. This method was problematic.
The
report from NTSB concluded that accident was caused by metal fatigue
intensified by corrosion. The entire cold bonded lap joint was broken. The lap
joint samples collected from the aircraft was found having extensive fatigue
cracking.
The
fuselage used to be pressurized and depressurized during each flight cycle. Hence,
the fuselage is subject to cyclic loadings. This generates alternating stress
in the fuselage. The stress concentration due to structural discontinuity at
the joint helps the fatigue development to rupture. This is the general mechanism
of fatigue rupture in the fuselage.
Learn from Boeing 737
incident
Boeing 737 incident gives three lessons, viz. (1)
despite lengthy efforts, a reliable joint is still far to reach, (2)
to use plural system in one joint doesn’t make sense, (3) the location of a
joint must be properly chosen.
(1) Among the problems of
a joint, a control factor is ‘fatigue’. To find a reliable anti-fatigue joint
is a long-time theme. It’s an absolute solution to the joint problem if it
could be. He recommended a friction joint in his past Reports, as it’s
predominantly used in steel structures with minimal problems practically. It’ll
be true in aluminum structures as well. Really, it may be heavier than a weld
joint. It’s a matter which is prior money or safety.
(2) Boeing 737 incident clearly proved the
combined joint’s nonsense.
NTSB explains it, ‘Cracks first made the cold lap joint
disbanded, putting all the loads on rivets, which further cracked rivet holes.
The cracks around rivet holes joined up over time and once reached critical
length resulted in catastrophic failure.’
That is, the two joint systems in one joint don’t work
together. They are destroyed one by one. It means that the strength of a
combined joint isn’t the total of the strength of the two joints, but the
strength of the stronger one.
(3) A joint section shall
be chosen in STA 300 ~ 540 and 727 ~ 908 in Fig. 2. STA 540 ~ 727 is not, since fuel tanks are equipped in the
wing roots. Despite fuselage rupture happened at cruising altitude, and its
size was 18-m long (about 1/3 of the
total cabin length, longer than cockpit length of about 3 m), the plane didn’t crash but safely landed. Consider! If it’d
happen in the cockpit.
From AirAsia
General
He got the needed data by chance. A chance doesn’t
come unless sought, But even if the chance comes, you can’t see an existing object, unless you keep an objective sense in mind. Have
always a Teleological mind! Keeping it in mind,
let’s enter the following Sub-sub-sects.
AirAsia’s response to A-event
At 2:40 p.m. on Feb. 22 2016, he
was on board AirAsia Airbus Flight D7522, en route from Kuala Lumpur
International Airport to Haneda International Airport. When the plane was about
to start, passengers were told by in-plane broadcast, ‘This plane can’t fly
because of technical trouble. You’re requested to change this plane with a
different one.’ While he was waiting for the alternative plane, he asked an AirAsia
staffer a couple of questions, ’What kind of mechanical trouble was that? Wasn’t
it possibly of a control system?’ The staffer replied, ‘Yes it was.’ He further
asked, ‘Does it happen frequently?’ The staffer replied, ‘No, it’s quite rare.
It never happened before a new rule was established after the 2014 AirAsia
crash. As far as I remember, it was only twice including this case. The past
case happened soon after taking off. The plane returned this airport safely.’ His
alternative plane took off Kuala Lumpur two hours after the scheduled time, and
arrived at Haneda at 0:10 a.m. on Feb. 23 2016.
A question is, ‘Had AirAsia found
the fact that a tiny irregularity of control system is a herald of a fatal termination?’
No, it hadn’t. As it’s proven in the next Sub-sub-sect.,
AirAsia hasn’t such an ability to find a cause of a crash by itself. There must
be an input from outside. Is there any source where such an input comes from? Yes,
there’s one. He pointed out it through out his past Reports. There’s no report
else. All others attribute the event to “dead man’s act”, except one, Egypt
investigators’ report. It practically denied man’s act (bomb). But it’s yet to offer
its original causation hypothesis. Further, when AirAsia has got an input to
counter the problem, can it set up a new program following the input? No, it
can’t. AirAsia isn’t technically self-confident to do it alone. It must have consulted
with the supreme organization, BEA, in advance. It’s contradictory for BEA to
agree to it, as its official stance is consistently, “dead man’s act”. The
people at BEA also have been unable to reach a truth. But if the truth is
given, they’re at least able to understand it. The parties concerned can’t deny
his hypothesis as it is too true to do so. But, at the same time, they can’t
agree to his hypothesis, as its impact is too big to do so. Therefore, their
option is: ‘neither agree nor deny his hypothesis, but covertly go with it.’
AirAsia’s physical
constitution
At about 3:30 p.m. on Mar. 22
2016, he was in front of AirAsia’s check-in counter at Haneda International
Airport to embark AirAsia Airbus Flight D7523, a scheduled departure time 11:45
p.m., en route to Kuala Lumpur International Airport. As he had already bought
the return ticket and self-checked in via www.airasia.com beforehand, a boarding pass was promptly handed
over. He submitted his passport as requested. He was waiting for a while to
take it back. Then, a guy came up to the counter, and told him, ‘Your passport
is spoiled. It’ll be regarded invalid by Indonesian Immigration Office, hence,
an entry visa won’t be issued, and you are forced to return Japan. Therefore,
you are not entitled to embark this flight. Please obtain a new passport
first.’ Really, there was a 5×3-mm cut-away at the edge of its 1st page.
But it didn’t mar any description on the page. Also it didn’t matter up to the
date. He asked the guy, ‘Why does it matter this time?’ The guy replied, ‘It’s
as per a new rule set up after an incident that a Japanese who tried to enter
Indonesia by a tourist visa but refused as his passport was spoiled. He was
skilled in English but still couldn’t convince the Indonesian Immigration
Office, much less a person who is not.’ He explained, ‘I’m not a tourist but
living in Indonesia with a stay permit, so I needn’t an entry visa but a
reentry visa, both of which are shown in my passport.’ The guy seemed
not to be interested in his explanations. The guy said, ‘I’ve no previous knowledge
of reentry visa and stay permit. But they do nothing in this case, because this
case is managed only by our company’s private rule that has no relation to your
status in Indonesia. It rules that a spoiled passport shall not be accepted in
the check-in process,’ adding, ‘when you arrive at Kuala Lumpur Airport, you
must once exit from the airport. When you check in again for the next flight to
Palembang, the same problem must happen. I’ll be accused of allowing the case.’
The guy concluded, ‘have your passport returned to you. Have the boarding pass returned
to us. The fee already paid ($ 2000) is not repaid as per our rule.’ He asked
the guy to let him see guy’s superior official. The guy replied, ‘There’s
nobody superior to me. I’m a person in the supreme position, as I’m authorized
to make a final decision on the matter.’ It was 4:30 p.m. (2:30 p.m. WIB). There
was still enough time to do something more before the flight departure. He
gathered the following data:
First, he
contacted an immigration official who was guiding incoming people to
immigration document check counters just in front of AirAsia’s check-in counter.
He asked the official, showing the spoiled part of his passport, ‘Is this
passport problematic?’ The official replied, ‘No matter at all, please go ahead.’
Pointing at the official, he told the story to one of the AirAsia check-in counter
staffers in charge. She said, ‘He doesn’t know our rule.’
Second, he asked an airport
information desk to have its general opinion. She said, ‘AirAsia's response
seems to be imperfect to give a decision such as to result in a certain loss to
a costumer. She gave him phone no. of Haneda Immigration Control Division to
have further consultation. He contacted the Division. The official in charge, Mr
Ishii, said, ‘I’m not necessarily unable to understand why AirAsia has done so,
as AirAsia has ever suffered from a monetary loss due to the similar case to yours.’
Third, he asked Thai Airlines
check-in counter if his spoiled passport had a problem. Thai Airways receptionist
said, ‘If you promise, ‘any expense relating to the passport will be paid by you,
it’s OK.’
Fourth, he asked Immigration
office in Palembang by e-mail with the spoiled status of his passport by facsimile,
‘If there’s any trouble when I come back to Palembang with the passport.’ An
official in the visa section, Mr Sore, replied, ‘You can reenter Indonesia as
the reentry visa has been already issued, However, you may not be able to clear
AirAsia check-in at Kuala Lumpur Airport, because they are doing their business
as per their own rule to which we can do nothing.’
Last, he called on AirAsia
check-in counter again. It was 11:00 p.m. The person who called himself a man
in a supreme position wasn’t there. He asked another person in position, ‘I guarantee
all expenses to happen involving this case shall be paid by me. Please let me
go.’ She said, ‘You’re really a bad loser. The case has been disposed already.
You must give up.’ He asked her to tell the self-styled supreme person to
conclude a memorandum on this matter. She said, ‘We’re not responsible to meet
your request as such. Hey, this office is closing now.’ Thus, the story
extremely ended.
Learning from AirAsia
AirAsia’s system is composed with
the budget programs. The system adapts itself to any
newly given condition by adding, subtracting and
modifying programs. The two examples (additions) were shown at this time. Many
of them, e.g., the spoiled passport mentioned above, the causality (spoiled
passport as a cause and its consequence monetary loss) is so simple that the
additional program can be provided by even poor thinking power. The matter is
with some of them that need strong thinking power which is not in the
organization of budget system by nature. To provide a program to meet a
happened accident is a typical example that can’t be managed by AirAsia, much
less to prevent a to-happen accident from happening. The thinking power in
check-in section and flight-safety section are different? No, they aren’t, so
far as the budget system is commonly applied to both. The budget system
prevailed all over AirAsia without exception. It was confirmed in the previous discussions
with AirAsia officials and stated in his First Report, [12]. If it is so, the quality of the people working in AirAsia
must be the same, i.e., they’re ABIDS patients from the rank and file up to a
supreme person, as proven by the self-styled supreme person himself.
Because of this weak point,
AirAsia can’t meet a crash unless given a solution by outsiders. In this context,
AirAsia’s measures against crashes can’t help being empiricism, i.e., unless it
has a crash, it can’t provide a program to meet it. In other words, AirAsia’s system
improvement is materialized based on a crash as a prerequisite.
The
statements in this Sub-sect. may be
different from the AirAsia’s transaction document on this case, since he failed
to conclude a memorandum with AirAsia, hence couldn’t find common words with
AirAsia on the case. If there’re any discrepancy between AirAsia and him, let
him know. For him, any input in any mode, pro or con, rational or emotional,
primary or sophisticated, realistic or romantic, is useful.
Besides
the above, there’s one more problem on this matter. As stated above, the reason
why AirAsia couldn’t make a referendum was, ‘no responsibility to do so.’ Didn’t
the self-styled man in the supreme position speak within the given authority?
Where no authority is, no responsibility is. This is a basic rule in any
administration. Is ‘where authority is, no responsibility is’ AirAsia’s unwritten
rule? He doesn’t think it is, because in the past case when he made his 1st
Report on AirAsia Airbus crash event (2014), an AirAsia official (though she don’t
call herself a person at a supreme position) agreed to make a referendum, based
on which he could make his Report. But this time, the attitude shown by
self-styled supreme power, ‘there’s no responsibility though authority is’ was at
least a partial tendency in AirAsia. This tendency also has its origin in the
budget system. The budget system withers unless this weak point ‘lack in
ability to settle a difficult-but-essential problem happened outside the set up
programs’ is properly addressed. In this regard, he herewith introduces two epithets.
Episode
1: At about 2:00 p.m. on April
1 2016, he was at Philippine Airlines check-in counter to embark Flight PR421
scheduled to depart for Jakarta at 3:30 p.m. As he has already self-checked in via
www.phlipinesairlines.com, a boarding card was instantly issued. He submitted
his renewed passport. About 10 min. later, a person seemingly at supreme
position hurriedly came to the counter and told him, ‘You haven’t return
ticket. Hence, you will not able to have entry visa by the immigration office
at the Jakarta International Airport (his destination). Please buy return
ticket first. If not, you can’t fly.’ He explained, as he did at AiraAsia
check-in counter, that his status was not a tourist but a resident in Indonesia
with a stay permit. Hence, he
needed neither a return ticket nor an entry visa but a reentry visa, both of which were shown in the passport. Unlike
the self-styled supreme guy at AirAsia check-in counter, she was eager to hear
his explanation, and finally she had understood before the time of closing
counter. She said, ‘Very sorry to trouble you, as it’s first time for me to meet
such a case as this. Thanks, I have got a new input from you.’ Suppose Philippine
Airlines is controlled by a budget system, and there’s a private rule that
defines, ‘a passenger who doesn’t possess a return ticket can’t fly,’ her
decision might be the same as AirAsia’s. This episode proves that people
working at an organization not governed by a budget system has better ability
to absorb new knowledge.
Episode 2: In
these trips, a CEO (Mr S,) of an Indonesian exporting Co. was accompanied with
him. He asked Mr S. to go with the same flight as his. However, Mr S. didn’t like
to do so, having said, ‘AirAsia brings on an uneasy feeling of ferocity.
Feeling of safety can’t exchange for money. Mr S. arrived and departed Haneda
Airport by Singapore Airways that arrives and departs about one hour earlier
than AirAsia does. Mr S. didn’t say the base on which such a feeling came.
Probably, it was based on Mr S.’s inspiration.
Remind of the fact that people
want to enter mining tunnels despite risky working conditions. For mining
companies, to keep cheap laborers at the site is an indispensable condition to
secure their benefits. The best way to realize it is to put the people there be
poor, preferably even tomorrow’s food is difficult to gain. Tomorrow’s live
can’t exchange for the risk that unnecessarily happens. In fact, every region,
where a rich coal, gold, diamond or uranium mine is, people there are extremely
poor.
For AirAsia, the targeted
passengers are the people for whom a cheap transportation fee is prior to an unnecessarily
happen crash. For the time being, the population to meet AirAsia’s expectation
is still big. But it’ll sooner or later wane. Mr S. is a herald of it.
Solution
by mobilizing thinking power
‘To
be constructive, he’s obliged to suggest a method how to salvage the program-controlled
societies from suffering their weakness, i.e., being impotent in handling the
essential but difficult problems that happened or to happen outside programs. A
matter is that the program-controlled organization needn’t creative thinking
power. A creative human of thinking power is rather a liability than an asset
in such an organization. A creative human is unfit for that organization, or
often exposed to enveloping attacks generally in this program-centered society.
Everything can be done only by ABIDS patients as far as the things are going
within the programs. As the matter of course, a creative human can’t be bled in
such atmosphere.
A
solution is simple, to set up an independent and isolated division where people
are given themes to be solved being free from all kinds of restriction. Remember,
under a deflation economy, to compete with price is suicidal. Every enterprise
should compete with originality. The originality is created by thinking power
of creative humans. A point in issue is that, the organizer of this division
must have knowledge on the characters of a creative human first. It needs a
lengthy lecture. This theme may be picked up in a different Report.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This Report’s
conclusions and recommendations are as follows:
(1) This
Report summarizes his past five Reports on the four Airbus crash events.
(2)
By analogy with four events, this
Report denies hypothesis of event-by-event different ‘dead man’s act,’ and confirms
his hypothesis ’fuselage fatigue rupture in a cockpit’ as a common cause for
all the four events.
(3) Egypt
investigators’ preliminary report of M-event has one step neared to a truth by practically
having denied the “dead man’s act” hypothesis, maybe or not maybe, under the
direct and/or indirect influence of his Reports.
(4) As for the
latest Daallo Airline Airbus forced landing, D-event, the ongoing
investigations nullified the (though still tiny) signs of improvement in the
field of studies on the Airbus crash. In study fields, status quo, the “dead
man’s act” hypothesis may still prevail for a while.
(5) Based on a
pack of material evidence, viz. no soot, no smoke, no fire, no blast, hence, no
equivalent casualty, except a sucked out passenger (accused falsely as a
suicide bomber), no equivalent damage in the cabin and, last but the most clear
evidence, rectangular shaped ripped hole, this Report denies the “dead man’s
act,” bomb hypothesis of D-event.
(6) A set of
circumstantial evidence also disagrees to the Islamism motivated suicide
bombing by a deceased passenger.
(7) The cause of
D-event is fatigue rupture along perimeters of an emergency exit, originally so
designed but closed with a panel by weld in a later design change.
(8) In a study
field, the parties concerned can’t openly disagree to his hypothesis, because
it’s true. However, they won’t agree to his hypothesis either, since they’re too
massive. Because of the big inertia, they can’t change their direction easily.
(9) In practice
fronts, they might use his hypothesis either covertly or overtly. If it’s the
case, the same crash will never happens again. If not, it repeats probably at
three times per year intervals.
(8) By site
sounding, it’s been confirmed that AirAsia is rigidly governed by budget system,
and consequently, AirAsia’s staffers at every section are, from a supreme
position to ranks and files, ABIDS patients, by whom AirAsia is well run as far
as things are going within the set up programs.
(9) It was
confirmed directly by contacting its practice sites; AirAsia has no power to foretell
a crash. Hence, its way to deal with a crash is empirical, i.e., to experience
a crash is an absolutely necessary prerequisite in AirAsia’s counter-crash
measures.
(10) In order to
minimize crashes, there’re long and short run technical and operational
measures which are explained in his past Reports. Among technical measures, a
short run measure to be exerted in haste is a review of the location of
fuselage joints. It shouldn’t be in a cockpit and at the section where a
pressure bulkhead exists. As an operational measure, his past Reports suggest
that any time, either on the tarmac or flight, when control system irregularity
is found, plane should stop taking off or flying and seek emergency landing.
(11) As an
organizational measure, this Report recommends to set up a division isolated
from the existing program governed sections, and entirely free from any type of
constraint. It needs much know-how and intelligence to secure its function. It’ll
be a theme of next Report.
EPILOGUE
No sooner had this Report been completed,
than another Airbus, EgyptAir Flight MS 804, crashed on Mar. 19 2016. News says:
The claims follow reports of leaked flight data showing
trouble in the cockpit .....
A commercial pilot with a major European airline told The Telegraph that other
parts of the data log suggested that windows in the right side of the cockpit
were blown out by an explosion inside the aircraft. The data was taken from the
plane's Acars system, which sends short transmissions from the aircraft to
receivers on the ground.
Regardless if it was caused
by bomb or fatigue, it’s a first time for structural failure in a cockpit to
appear concretely on the stage. Under this setting, if the bomb would be the
case, the “dead man’s act” hypothesis may nominate the copilot as a suicide bomber,
as the copilot is seated on the right in the cockpit. He’ll study the event.
But for the time being, let him wait and see their performance first. It’s easy
for him to dislodge wrong things from the place.
REFERENCES
[1] ‘Pilot response led to AirAsia crash into Java Sea,’ www.cnn.com/2015/12/01,
Dec 1, 2015 -
[2] Germanwings
crash: Co-pilot Lubitz 'practiced rapid descent',
From the sectionEurope, 6 May 2015
[4] Christian Roger, ‘The scandal of the Airbus A320 crash at
Habsheim, France,’ www.crashdehabsheim.net/ Jun 26, 1998
[5] Reuters, ‘Egypt says no evidence of
terrorism in Russian Metrojet plane crash,’
December 14, 2015 - 9:16pm
[6] Mada Masr, ‘Rebutting Egypt
report, Russia insists bomb brought down Metrojet plane in Sinai as inquiry
continues,’ Monday, December 14,
2015 - 21:43
[7] Sohei Matsuno, ‘SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING
(JAKARTA),’
[8] Sohei Matsuno, “JAKARTA FLOOD PREVENTION
PROJECT WITH A TRUE CAUSE,” www.iba.ac.id/ 8
Mar 2013
[9] Sohei Matsuno, “JAKARTA FLOOD
PREVENTION
WITH A TRUE CAUSE (sequel),” www.lba.ac.id/,
30 Apr.2013
[10] Sohei
Matsuno,
“JAKARTA-FLOOD PREVENTION BY TRAINING DIKE vs. GIANT SEA WALL,” www.iba.ac.id/
[11] Sohei Matsuno, “CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,“
www.iba.ac.id/
[12] Sohei
Matsuno et al, ‘A CAUSAL STUDY ON THE AIRASIA
AIRBUS CRASH EVENT,’ www.iba.ac.id/ 2015
[13] Sohei Matsuno, Asmadi, ‘A STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH Event,’ www.iba.ac.id/documents/,
2015
[14] S.
Matsuno,
‘STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS
CRASH,’
www.iba.ac.id/
[15] Dr. Sohei Matsuno1), MS. Pujiono, ‘LEARN
BEA'S PRELIMINARY REPORT ON LUFTHANSA CRASH,’ www.iba.ac.id/documents/
[16] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE,’ www.iba.ac.id Jan 6, 2012.
[17] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘’A STUDY ON THE CAUSE
OF KUKAR BRIDGE
COLLAPSE (sequel),’ www.iba.ac.id/
[18] Sohei Matsuno, ‘UIBA'S AND HAPPY PONTIST'S KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE THEORY,’www.iba.ac.id/documents/83
[19] Sohei Matsuno, ‘STUDY ON RUSSIAN
METROJET AIRBUS CRASH,’
soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/,
Jan
8, 2016
Apology: www.iba.ac.id was hacked. It’s undergoing recovery processes. Website will resume its normal operation
within three months. All the reports under his name in the REFERENCE
will be moved into /soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/ by the end of Jun. 2016. Sorry for readers to have inconvenience.
Fig. 1 last 60-second
trajectories by BPR and Radar24
Photo 1 Plane-crash site area (Photos are all from mages in
Google)
Photo 2 Plane-crash site by BPR (red hatch
Photo 2 Plane-crash site by BPR (red hatched area) & this Report (× marked point)
1
Nose 2
Cockpit 3 Door 4 Wing
Photo 3 Debris at main crash
site
Photo 4 GL view of 1, 2 and 3 in Photo 3
Photo 5 Back view of cockpit (upside down)
Photo 6 Tail severed
from rear body
Photo 8
Daallow Airlines Flight 159 Photo 9 United Airlines Flight 811 (Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia)
Photo 10 Ripped hole, view from inside plane Photo 11 Cabin feature nearby the hole
Photo 12
Charge for directional bomb
Photo 13 Fuselage damage Aloha
Flight 243 Fig. 2 Body sections of Boeing 737
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