A STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS
CRASH
(Updated on June 4 2015)
Dr. Sohei Matsuno1), MS. Asmadi2)
1) Prof. 2) Lecturer, at Faculty of Eng.
IBA University PLG, RI
E-mail: sohei_matsuno@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
The Writers (of this paper) predicted in their earlier report on the AirAsia
Airbus crash that a similar event would happen at about 5-yr interval. Really,
the Lufthansa Germanwings Airbus crash has come but much sooner than they assumed,
only 86 days later. For this event, there have been a variety of causal
speculations. However, few make an analogy between the two events despite their
resemblance. Unlike AirAsia event, it was fine when this event happened. Hence,
the favorite weather/pilot-error hypothesis isn’t applicable to this
event. Given a criterion, a co-pilot-suicide hypothesis has appeared. Black-box-data
analyses are going with this hypothesis. The purpose of this report is to forward
a bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis that shall replace the co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis for a right solution to this event.
To realize the purpose, this
report proceeds in the following steps: (i)
defining two logical terms, induction and deduction, clarifying a
background to which the events happened, making an analogy between the two
events, identifying the behavior of the plane on its last problematic timeline,
(ii) learning the ongoing causation
study, (iii) showing the
Writer’s Bulkhead-fatigue rupture Hypothesis, and (iv) summarizing its conclusions.
Keywords:
Lufthansa / AirAsia crashes, Airbus / Budget airline, analogy between plane crashes
INTRODUCTION
Purposes of this report
The
direct purpose of this report is to present the bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis
for the Lufthansa Germanwings Airbus crash event as it was so done for the AirAsia
Airbus crash event, REFERENCE [1]. On the way, this report tends to
think convincing the societies concerned of the methodology (methods,
principles and rules) of a causation study. In this way, this report works to salvage
a causation study that’s currently in disarray. This is the indirect purpose of
this report.
Definitions of logical terms
(1) Induction
This
is a logical process of any form of reasoning in which a hypothesis, though
supported by premises, does not follow from them necessarily. The one that
survives this process is the hypothesis that gives a genuine conclusion. A
conclusion reached by this process is also called an induction.
(2) Deduction
This
is a logical process of reasoning in which a conclusion follows necessarily
from the premises. A conclusion reached by this process is also called a
deduction.
Note 1: As to
definitions of technical terms, ‘cause’
and ‘fatigue’, cf. [1] and [18] respectively.
Note 2: As to
abbreviations in this report, cf. GLOSSARY (shown
at the end of this report).
[Explanations]
The
above expressions of the definitions are abstract. Hence, for the sake of
readers’ better understanding, they’re to be concretely explained as follows.
The first step of induction is to
gather as many relevant premises as possible. The premises are such as status
of the consequence, its behavior on space-time dimensions,
techno-socio-cultural circumstantial evidence, analogy to past events etc. Next
is to assume a plural hypothesis for a conclusion.
As premises accumulate, the degree to
which the premises come to support a hypothesis, as measured by the logic, should tend
to indicate that false hypotheses are probably false and that true hypotheses
are probably true. In this way, among the assumed hypotheses, the one that
follows from the premises without a contradiction is found. It’s a genuine
hypothesis.
Induction precedes deduction,
unless an event has vis-á-vis happened and been red-handedly evidenced on the spot,
since the event can be reached directly by deduction without induction.
In deduction, the premises are
given as material evidence, e.g., black box data. A conclusion necessarily
follows from the premises. Deduction is to be guided by induction with exceptions
mentioned above. Deduction proves induction.
In this context, it’s clear that
induction is more strategic / complex by nature, and needs wider, deeper and
stronger intelligence, experience and inspiration (not imagination) than deduction
(often forensic technicians’ job) needs. A misjudge in induction leads a study
to a wrong conclusion unless deduction checks induction properly.
There’re two things that the
Writers call readers’ attention in this concern. That is;
(1) The material
data are not necessarily such that those lead to an absolute truth
independently. For instance, the black-box data are often opaque that can be
interpreted into a plural way, and how to interpret them is black-box-data
analyzers’ prerogative. If they’ve been given a hypothesis composed by their superior
body (in an inner circle), they tend to interpret the data so as to meet the
given hypothesis, regardless of its reasonability. An example seen in the A-event
is shown herewith.
There was about
5 minutes after an emergency happened till the plane plunged into the sea.
During this time, pilots had no contact with ATC Center, could do nothing to
recover plane’s balance, gave no voice to CVR and didn’t send a distress
signal. For these material data, the weather/pilot-error
hypotheses judges; ‘If there’s mechanical failure, pilots must inform of it. No
message is a good message, as it means no mechanical trouble is. For pilots, sending
a distress signal is a second priority at the time of emergency. A supreme
priority is to solve the facing problem. The distress signal is to be sent
after everything has been settled. In the A-event, pilots’ efforts were in vain
until the last moment; hence, there was no distress signal. Pilots were
concentrating their efforts tacitly on the problem, or their voices vanished
into screaming warnings. That is, according to the hypothesis, no
communication, no plane’s balance recovery, no recorded voice and no distress
signal are all the evidence of pilots’ and control system’s good physical statuses
during the event. Contrarily, the Writer’s Hypothesis judges that no contact,
no voice etc are the evidence of pilots’ and control system’s physical defunct.
You see? For the same material data, there’re two interpretations that are of completely
opposite directions, [1].
(2) If a black-box
investigation goes without a hypothesis, it can reach nowhere. Suppose, at a
crime site, fingerprints and DNA of a culprit have been found as material evidence.
Can the material evidence single the culprit out from a population of people?
No, it’s practically impossible, unless otherwise given a small finite number
of inductively-identified suspects. Remember! A black-box data analysis without
a hypothesis is tantamount to a kite with a cut string. It must be guided by a
correctly defined hypothesis.
If
there’d be any discrepancy between induction and deduction, either of them is
wrong. The study must be reviewed and restructured. If a hypothesis has been
faultily set up, both are wrong even if they agree to each other. It can happen
by interpreting the black-box data so as to meet the hypothesis given by a
superior position to the black-box-data-investigation technicians. In the worst
case, forging data, or even substituting secretly a false black-box for an
original one happens. It really happened in the Airbus
A320 crash event, Habsheim, France in 1988.
Background of L-event
A- and L- events are, from a
macro view point, results of a disproportionately rapid development of airline
automation, having left basic intelligence, which the development should accompany,
behind. The events are not isolated phenomena. They’ve appeared in a global
automation drive that commenced in 1950s. It’s been ceaselessly pursuing to
substitute automatic devices for humans. The automation is driven in the belief
that humans commit errors but high-fidelity automatic devices do not. It’s in
effect contributed to reduce the number of workers and, at the same time, to
marginalize them to auxiliary keyboard punchers who know nothing about basic
principles of the matters they’re engaged in. It’s prevailed in all sectors,
including education and research. Really, current graduates’ basic intelligence
deficiency is unpardonable. It is further waxed by due computerized practices. They
can manage everything so far as the things are going as programmed. But once
something beyond the programs happens, they’re painfully impotent to manage them.
It has passed two-generations since a computerization drive began. Hence, all
the current societies are, from the president to the rank and file, occupied by
ABIDS patients. The aviation industry is a typical example among all the societies.
The above is the background
against which a cause or a to-be cause is not found or is overlooked after or
before the plane crash, and the same event repeats again and again.
Three
generations ago, people in all sectors had controlled everything with their own
brains. As they had been bred in this way throughout their education and
practices, they were able to manage problems in that way too. Regrettably,
those who witnessed the automation era are, at youngest, 85 years old if still
arrive. Hence, they’re in their dotage. Suppose there’d be someone who is miraculously
capable as he was 60 years ago, God’s willing, what role would he play in a
plane crash causation study? May it be of the heroic outlaw Robin Hood, the ingenious gentleman
Don Quixote, the original (but absurd) solution maker Mr. Bean, or anyone else?
Readers shall see it.
Plane’s behavior in last 15-min. timeline
It is shown in Fig. 1.
The Writers call readers’ attention to three significant characters in
the altitude chart; viz. (i)
after the plane had reached a 11400-m cruising altitude, it was still climbing
at a slight rate of 75 (m/min.).
After 4 minutes, it reached 11700-m
altitude, (ii) immediately
after the above ascent, the plane descended with a steep but constant
rate of 1070 (m/min.) down to 2000-m altitude in 9 minutes, (iii) at the end of the descent, the
plane had level flight of a constant 2000-m altitude and 710-km/hr speed for 1.3 minutes until it collided
the mountainside. The behavior in speed is also shown in Fig. 1.
Note: ft: feet (1 foot = 0.3048 m), kts: knots (1 knot = 1.852 km/hr)
Time (hr.min.)
Barcelona (Spain) ↑ the
Mediterranean Sea the French Alps↑
Fig. 1 Altitude / speed
chart of Germanwings Flight 4U9525 (Source:
Flightradar24)
During the 15-min. period, the plane had no communication with ATC
Center, no voice recorded in CVR and no distress signal to ATC Center as stated
earlier.
Any induction (hypothesis) that explains the above plane behavior without
contradiction to the given premises, including material evidence from black-box
data, is the hypothesis that gives a genuine cause of the L-event.
ONGOING
CAUSATION STUDY
Co-pilot-suicide hypothesis
General
In
this and next Sects, every quotation
doesn’t show its origin to avoid criticism by name. If readers are interested
in them, it is found in websites, e.g., mentioned in [2] ~ [6]. All the
quotations are written in Italic
letters.
A-event is a typical case to which
the weather/pilot-error hypothesis is comfortably applied. There was a storm on
the course of the crashed Airbus. But five other planes were concurrently
traveling the same stormy zone, and had passed the zone without trouble. cf. Fig. 2. As the weather alone cannot be
an enough cause, there must be one more factor with which a compound cause is
to be composed. As the additional factor, conveniently chosen is a dead pilot’s
error. Attributing a cause to dead pilot's error is the safest way in the
causation hypothesis composition, since the pilot can no longer speak for his
cause. This is the background against which the weather/pilot-error hypothesis appears.
Its logic is usually, ‘Pilot’s efforts to avoid the bad weather caused the
mishap.’
However, L-event happened when it
was fine. The worldly hypotheses’ favorite compound cause is inapplicable to lt.
Hence, the hypothesis is forced to attribute the consequence totally to a pilot
only. Further, pilot’s error is difficult to assume under the fine weather. That
is, there’s no way for the hypothesis other than to impose particular nature of
either (or both) ideological or (and) mental matter on one pilot (not two
pilots as it’s scarcely probable). This is the background against which the co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis has appeared.
Fig. 2 Planes flying over the Java Sea concurrently with AirAsia
8501
(Source:
Jason Rabinowitz @AirlineFlyer)
Episode
For
the sake of readers’ better understanding in this regard, the Writers herewith
forward an episode before readers:
It was early
1980s when one of the Writers (then professor at Niigata University in Japan)
was visited at his office by his dear reporter (then Chief of Niigata Branch
Office of xx-Newspaper, one of the four leading dailies in Japan). The reporter
informed him that the Niigata Prefectural Police HQs regarded him as a
communist, as one of the detectives attended a police-media joint meeting had
spoken. The reporter, who knew him be by far different from a communist through
his publications, added, ‘I immediately convinced them of their wrong concept.’
He asked the reporter, ‘Why do they regard me as a communist?’ The reporter
replied, ‘No reason. It’s their nature. For them, any theories or persons of
unfamiliar originality or personality are all communism and communists.’
Nowadays, it may be converted into Islamism and Islamists. The Writer possesses
the Koran. His computer saves data of the Islamic State. These are to reinforce
his basic intelligence. He wanders one day he might be arrested as a radical
Islamist.
In SSR, it went
in a different manner. A secret service used to regard those people of unfamiliar
personality (of course, not as communists but) as mentally deranged who only
fit for a lunatic asylum where they had to undergo brain-wash therapy. It was
often kindly penetrating a prick into their front brain to make them be persons
of few works.
Keep the above
in mind; let’s enter the following articles to discuss the real matters.
Induction in co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis
In
short, it is practically not a hypothesis to solve the event reasonably with
maximum socio-techno-scientific efforts but hypocrisy to settle the matter as quick
as possible with a minimum socio-economic impact. It is inducted by wishful imaginations
and improper discards.
It
assumes Islamic and/or mental motivation for the co-pilot. However, if the co-pilot’s
act was from an Islamic motive, why didn’t he target the Eiffel Tower but the
French Alps, as 9/11 plane hijackers’ didn’t target the American Rockies but
the WTC Twin Tower? In this context, An Islamic motivation doesn’t make sense
with the cause of L-event. Then, how about a depression cause? First, to
involve population is an inevitable consequence of a suicide bombing (a drone bombing
as well). Second, a person of depression does not necessarily commit suicide.
According to a study on Afghanistan / Iraq war veterans, the probability of
persons of depression commit suicide is 0.03 %. Any study on an important
subject such as this event shall not be grounded on such a low probability as
this. If dare do it, the authenticity of the hypothesis itself is 0.03 %. That
is, the co-pilot-suicide hypothesis hardly conforms to the cause of L-event.
The
hypothesis originally began with an allegation that says, ‘the captain left the
cockpit and couldn’t get back to the cockpit as it was locked from the inside.’
It is said that the captain knocked at the door lightly first and strongly
later, but no response from the co-pilot. Finally, the captain frantically tried to smash his way into ‘Flight
4U9525's cockpit as he shouted at killer co-pilot: "For God's sake, open
the door,” but in vain. This story made a military-police-prosecutor group be
possessed by the co-pilot-suicide hypothesis,
having interpreted the story, ‘the co-pilot locked the door from the inside and
silently rejected to open it despite the knocking calls from the outside.’ This
interpretation is a product of wishful thinking and improper discards as
elaborated in the next article. cf. a quotation below.
‘Mr.
Robin said Lubitz (co-pilot) 'voluntarily' refused to open the door, adding that his breathing was
normal throughout the final minutes of the flight.’
Problematic imaginations
and discards
First, did the
captain really left the cockpit? In A-event, the same was consistently advocated
based on the CVR data. But it was finally denied by the fact that the body of
the captain was found in his cockpit seat. Unfortunately, in L-event, it’s
impossible neither to confirm nor to deny the allegation in this way, as the
fuselage had been wholly smashed to pieces. Remember! The absence of the
captain in the cockpit is an indispensable necessary condition of the co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis.
Second, the
cockpit door was really locked from inside? The door couldn’t be unlocked from the
outside even if it was not locked from the inside. That is, if the door
(airtight) was pressed from the outside by cabin air pressure, the door
couldn’t be unlocked. This is easily proven by a simple domestic test. Stand inside
a door that opens outside. Confirm first that it can be easily locked and
unlocked with a key. Then, lock it. Next, pushing the door forward you, try to
unlock it, and you’ll realize it be difficult. It is because of frictional
resistance between the lock bar and the door sash. The phenomenon happens
regardless of the type of the lock and if it is manual or automatic, as their
basic mechanism is the same. The cockpit door was pushed by air pressure of the
passenger cabin that was caused by greater air pressure in the cabin than the
one in the cockpit. It was due to decompression in the cockpit. Frictional
force on the lock bar due to air pressure may have reached a few ton-f vs. the force by manpower is a few
kg-f.
Third, was the
so-called cockpit-door-knocking sounds recorded in CVR have been compared to
the results of tests with other A320-200 Airbus cockpit door knocking? Can it
be recorded by CVR? Are they confirmed by means of Fourier analysis (one of
computer’s favorite subjects) to confirm if the recorded sound is really of the
cockpit door knocking? The Writers can do it if the digital sound record is
given. The sound recorded in CVR is analogue data, but still the same comparison
is possible by physical analogues, though its results are less objective than
the former’s.
The Writers are
skeptical, from the beginning, if the recorded sound is really of the captain’s
knocking at the door. They suspect it is the sound of the developing cockpit
bulkhead crack and rupture. In the first place, it is dubious if the door’s
sound waves generated by light knocking at the sound-proof-door from outside can
be recorded by CVR.
Last, if the
captain really tried to force his way into the cockpit, it’s not a heroic but a
helpless effort, since the door is so designed as to bear any conceivable
terror attack, and the captain himself must have known it. It was an effort of
‘kicks against the pricks.’ The captain must have had no way other than praying
to God for opening door. But, God’s willing, the door didn’t open. cf. a
quotation below:
‘In a desperate attempt to stop the fatal crash, Mr.
Sondenheimer
(captain) spent up to five minutes
attempting to smash his way into the cockpit using an axe.’
An
axe is strictly prohibited to bring in a cabin. How could the captain find it
easily? Anything that can be used to break a cockpit door, a crowbar (allegedly
the captain asked to bring) as well, are all not allowed bringing in a cabin.
First discard
that allowed all other discards to follow
The co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis committed a fatal discard in its first stage when it neglected a fact,
‘the plane crashed 12 hrs after it’d undergone repairs,’ as a minor matter.’ It allowed, in effect, all other hopeful-imaginations
and miss-discards to follow. cf. a
quotation below:
‘Lufthansa said the 24-year-old plane had just on
Monday had repairs to the hatch through which the nose wheel descends for
landing. A spokeswoman said that was not
a safety issue but that repairs had been made to reduce noise.’
For a person who
has basic intelligence in a theory of ‘wave motion and vibration,’ the noise is
a safety issue that should be carefully examined. A noise (sound) is a wave
motion being generated by a vibrating body. And the vibration is a No. 1 cause
of the fatigue. If there was an extraordinary noise, there could be
extraordinary vibrations. The reason why Lufthansa discarded the matter was likely
due to a lack of basic intelligence among the staffers in charge.
As the noise (vibration)
might have been while the plane was flying. Was it reported by pilots? How loud
/ high (low) pitched the sound was and how long had the part been subjected to
the vibration until it underwent the repairs? What were the irregularities? What
kind of repairs was made (allegedly within several hours)? Were there no
relevant irregularities around the problematic part? Was it confirmed that there was no noise after
the repairs? How was it confirmed? Clear answers to these questions are needed.
A mechanism how
the vibration of a part attached to a fuselage accelerates and triggers the
bulkhead fatigue and rupture is as follows:
Any component
(hatches, doors, windows, windscreens, and other devices) that is rigidly fixed
to a fuselage vibrates at the same frequency of but at less amplitude than the
exciting force, because the exciting force’s frequency (engines’ RPM) is much
higher than the natural frequency of the fuselage. It’s called forced vibration. If the fixing rigidity
lowers to elastic-plasticity, the component starts vibrating at its natural
frequency. It is called natural
vibration. Its frequency is less and amplitude is greater than the exciting
force’s. The resultant vibration is called free
vibration in which the forced and natural vibrations coexist. If the component
is structurally inhomogeneous, it generates natural vibrations of various
frequencies and amplitudes. These vibrations play a role of exciting force to
the adjacent sections of the fuselage. Of course the vibrating component itself
causes trouble around its fixed points. There’s another problem that is more
serious than it. There’re many devices attached to a cockpit fuselage. Each of
them forms an auxiliary mass-spring vibration system consisting of the mass of
each device and its supporting fuselage as a spring. If one of their natural
frequencies coincides to one of the exciting forces’ frequencies, it causes
resonance involving the device-fuselage (mass – spring) vibration system. Take
note that the attached remote control device might be the one involved in the
phenomena.
In this context,
it is highly probable that the overlooked flaws at the nose wheel accommodation
hutch under the cockpit had accelerated and triggered the fatigue and rupture of
the cockpit bulkhead. This assumption can be denied if, only if, the repairs had
been done long time (e.g., 20 years) before the crash. Really, JAL F123 aft
pressure bulkhead’s fatigue rupture occurred 7 years after the improper
repairs. In L-event, there was only a 12-hr time lag between the repairs and
the crash. The plane had no flight between the repairs and the crash flight. Practically,
the crash happened immediately after the repairs. There’s no reason to discard
the repairs from the consideration.
It is reiterated
in the next Sect. in which the
Writer’s bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis is studied in analogy with the
BEA’s co-pilot-suicide hypothesis.
Comment-1: In a
budget system, it is prohibited for stuffers to do anything that’s not included
in budget items. This is a factor in the budget system discouraging staffers to
find out and to grapple with problems, [1].
Comment-2: The
event has led to an upsurge of hero-seeking sentiment. If the event has only a
bad character, the event is not dramatic. From a circulation point of view, the
event is to be dramatic. Let it be so, the scenario must have a good character
as well. cf. quotations below:
‘The flight data recorder (FDR) revealed Mr. Sondenheimer's heroics on the
plane.’
FDR never
reveals such a thing. Media do it to play to the gallery. L-event has neither
good nor bad character. Those 150 on board are all victims of the bulkhead
fatigue rupture from a scientific view point. cf. a quotation below,
‘A social media campaign has been running for more
than a week to memorialize Mr. Sondenheimer's efforts to save those on board.’
To produce hero
has a negative effect on a correct solution to the event.
Black-box data analysis
The examiners of
CVR firstly regarded the co-pilot-suicide hypothesis as a speculation.
cf.
a quotation below.
‘A Lufthansa
spokesman said the carrier was aware of the Times story (co-pilot-suicide hypothesis), adding: "We have no information from
the authorities (BEA black-box data investigators) that confirms this report and we are seeking more information. We will
not take part in speculation on the causes of the crash.’
That is; in effect, they tried to
find their conclusion without a hypothesis. As stated earlier, it is an uneasy job
for them to accomplish studies without hypothesis, much more, in the case of
L-event where FDR missed its essential part, a memory card. cf. Quotations
below and Fig. 3.
‘BEA said it was “optimistic” the second black box,
the flight data recorder, would be found and the mystery of the crash solved.’
Comment: It
implies that if FDR is not found, the L-event is to be mystery forever.
‘FDR’s memory card containing data on the
plane’s altitude, speed, location and condition was not inside, apparently
having been thrown loose or destroyed by the impact.’
Comment: Black-box
investigations can neither confirm nor deny any hypotheses decisively without
the memory card, unless otherwise mobilize bold imaginations and discards.
|
CVR FDR
Fig. 3 Black
boxes damaged by shock (origin: www.pilotman.net, www.bea.aero)
|
|
It’s right
when the black-box-data investigators say, ‘Nobody knows if the determined
result is correct until we see the result.’ Similarly, it is right when drone
bomb attack operators say, ‘Nobody knows if the target is correct until we
see the result (a group of enemy fighters or a party of wedding ceremony
participants).’
It
takes so long time until the investigators reach the goal, if they do without
a hypothesis at best or it is impossible at worst. cf. a quotation below.
‘Jouty expected the first basic analysis in "a matter of
days" but warned this read-out could be object to errors and that more
work would be needed for a full interpretation.’
Now the co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis has been given. One of the investigators was quoted as saying, ‘The
CVR data support the hypothesis.’ Does it represent BEA as a whole? Let’s
learn.
A
Summary of the Transcript from the CVR Recording (provided by BEA, obtained by the German newspaper
Bild, translated by US. New York Times, reported by CNN and slightly rearranged for a
reasonable order by the Writers) gives the timeline of L-event as
follows:
(1) After reaching cruising altitude, Sondenheimer
asked Lubitz to prepare the landing. There is the sound of a seat being
pushed backward after which the captain says, "You can take over."
(2) Sondenheimer begs Lubitz to let him
in. Next comes the banging.
(3) Passengers then begin to scream. For
God's sake, open the door!" Capt. Patrick Sondenheimer screamed as he
banged on the cockpit door, pleading with the co-pilot. "Open the damn
door!" the pilot says.
(4) At 10:29 a.m., air traffic radar
detects that the plane is starting to descend.
(5) Three minutes later, air traffic
controllers try to contact the plane and receive no answer -- shortly after
which an alarm goes off in the cockpit, warning of the "sink rate,"
(6) Another three minutes pass. A loud
metallic bang is heard at 7,000 meters (almost 23,000 feet).
(7) It is 10:38, and the plane is at 4,000
meters (about 13,000 feet). Lubitz's breathing can still be heard on the
voice recorder, according to Bild's report.
(8) Two minutes
later, investigators think they hear the plane's right wing scrape a
mountaintop.
(9) A minute and half later and 2,000
meters (about 6,500 feet) lower to the ground, an alarm says "Terrain --
pull up!"
The plane slammed into the French Alps.
Note: It uses a local standard time.
There can be
seen three untimely time-settings in this timeline, viz. (i) (10:38 – 10:29 =) 9
minutes after the beginning of descent, the plane was still at 4000-m high. It doesn’t meet the reality. 9
minutes after the descent began, the plane was at 2000-m high. (ii) After the above stated 9 min.
the plane flew 3.5 more minutes. Really, 1.3 minutes after 9-min. descent,
the plane had already smashed to pieces. (iii) As to the statement ‘Two
minutes later, investigators think they hear …..,’ 2 minutes after a 9-min decent is time-wise at odd with the
reality. Further, it may be the sound from the last fatigue-rupture at the
cockpit bulkhead, if not an illusory hearing. Note: The problematic time
settings are, the Writers suppose, not BEA made but media group made during
their editorial processing.
Anyhow,
as the Writers start with a timeline of the event, BEA did the same at first.
Readers can make analogy between the Writers’ and BEA’s timeline in the next Sect. In this Sect., the Writers firstly call readers’ attention that BEA’s
timeline mentions particular individuals’ names but this report’s timeline doesn’t.
This indicates the intention of each report, i.e., to support a human-cause
(BEA) and an engineering-cause (the Writers). cf. following quotations.
‘Jean
Pierre Michel, lead investigator for the French inquiry, said on Saturday
that investigators are not ruling out any scenario with respect to the crash
out at this point,’
This statement is of BEA’s
open stance.
‘But French authorities have said that Lubitz
appeared to have crashed Germanwings Flight 9525 deliberately into the Alps.’
‘The sounds recorded on one of the
"black boxes" recovered from downed Germanwings Flight 9525 firms
up investigators' theory that the co-pilot locked the captain out of the
cockpit and then crashed the plane (CNN),’
‘Referring to Lubitz, Mr. Robin said:
'He did this for a reason which we don't know why, but we can only deduct
that he destroyed this plane.’
These statements represent
BEA’s real intention.
A person in charge ruled out a midair
explosion and expressed his reluctance to link the crash to decompression. cf.
quotations below.
‘While stressing it was too early to form a clear picture, he ruled
out a mid-air explosion and said
the crash scenario did not appear to be linked to depressurization.’
‘Jouty said it was too early to give
details of the cockpit recording. However, he said the information
investigators had put together suggested the plane had not exploded and did
not suffer a “classic decompression situation”.’
What does he mean by “classic decompression situation”? If it
means the bulkhead material (that governs the behavior of fatigue rupture and
decompression) is modern, it’s OK. Really, the material is not classic aluminum.
But if it means the decompression itself is modern, it’s a queer story.
There’s neither modern nor classic decompression, as there’s neither modern
nor classic temperature.
Given
the setting as the above, if BEA won’t support the co-pilot-suicide hypothesis
in due studies, BEA investigators’ mental stability itself must be on the
agenda. Of course, the Writers will support the bulkhead-fatigue-rupture
Hypothesis (explained in the next Sect.)
without fail.
BULKHEAD-FATIGUE-RUPTURE
HYPOTHESIS
Analogy
between A- and L- events
There’s a resemblance between the two events
as follows:
(1) The planes involved in the two
events are both Airbus A320-200 of
budget flights.
(2) Both the planes were more or less in a climbing tendency while they were
cruising before their final death descent.
(3)
After the plane entered emergency status, there was no communication between ATC Center and the plane, no pilot voice recorded in CVR, no act to save the plane and no distress signal sent from the
plane.
(4)
In both the events, it is (was) said that the captains were not in the cockpit when the plane
crashed.
(5)
The crashes are both high altitude
events that are rare statistically.
The
two events have differences as well. They’re as follows:
(1)
A-event’s descent was of an uncontrolled free fall until the plane hit the seawater, while
L-event’s was of controlled and
had a post-descent level flight until the plane hit the mountain.
(2)
L-event’s plane was 25 years old, while A-event’s was 6 years.
(3) The L-event’s plane underwent repairs at a nose wheel
accommodation hatches (existing below the cockpit) to eliminate noise. It was
12 hrs before the event. A-event’s plane did not undergo such repairs.
(4) The captains’ absence in the
cockpits was denied when his body
was found in the cockpit in A-event. In L-event, it can be neither confirmed nor denied in the
same manner as A-event.
(5) In L-event, the plane hit steep solid mountainside
with 710-km/hr flight speed and its fuselage was smashed to pieces. While in A-event, the
plane hit flat liquid seawater
with 200-km/hr falling speed and the
fuselage split in three big parts.
(5) The bulkhead fatigue rupture in
the cockpit (the Writers assume it’s a common cause for both the events)
seems to have developed slowly ~
rapidly in L-event, while in A-event explosively.
Hence, the primary consequence, decompression, developed slowly ~ rapidly in
L-event though it did explosively
in A-event.
(6) Consequently, one of the two
secondary consequences, physical defunct of the co-pilot, progressed rather slowly
in L-event than instantly of the pilots in A-event. Similarly, another
secondary consequence, mechanical defunct of the plane’s remote control system,
was total involving engines and helms
in A-event, while in L-event it was insignificant.
(7) It was fine when L-event happened, while
A-event occurred under the stormy
weather.
If something
of rare event happens with a short time lag and high resemblance each other
in their feature, there’s no reason to discard an analogy between them. BEA has
yet to do it up to now. They should do it in their due diligent studies.
Plane’s behavior for last 15 minutes
General
The following
arguments are done with captain’s
absence in the cockpit, because of four reasons; viz. (i)
The Writers can’t deny its possibility. (ii) They understand why BEA investigators
adhere to it. It is because their co-pilots-suicide
hypothesis can’t stand without it. (iii) Contrarily, the Writers’
bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis can go with it. (iv) Then, to avoid being engaged in such an unessential subject,
the arguments shall go with it.
After the
plane reached cruising (pre-descent) level flight, it had showed a slight but
not ignorable ascent before a sudden descant. This period is a prelude to the
crash event. After the pre-descent level flight, the plane descended a steep
but stable decent. After the descent, the plane had short but not ignorable
(post-descent) level flight until it smashed against the mountainside. That
is, the last problematic minutes begins at the time when the auto-pilot was
set on a cruising flight position. It is Time 0-min. It terminated at Time
15-min. when the plane crashed into the mountainside. That is, it consists
of pre-descent level flight (5 min.), descent (9- min.) and
post-descent level flight (1+ min.).
Note: In the
following explanations, refer to the plane’s behavior on the timelines of the
Hypothesis and the hypothesis shown respectively in the previous Sects.
Identifications
The
Hypothesis identifies the plane’s behavior in its last 15 minutes as follows:
(1)
After having set auto-pilot on a cruising position
at Tim 0-min., the captain unlocked
and opened the cockpit door and went out the cockpit at about Time 1-min. The cockpit door was
closed and automatically locked. There was no difficulty to unlock and lock
the door at this Time.
(2)
Despite the cruising level flight setting, the
plane showed a tendency of ascent.
An
uncontrolled ascent in high altitude cruising level flight before a sudden
descent was a common behavior in F-event in
2009, A-event in 2014 and L-event in 2015. The Writers have yet to be able to
explain the cause of this uncontrolled ascent. However, they assume the
wireless hydraulic control unit attached to the cockpit panel might have
started being affected by the early-stage development of the bulkhead fatigue
rupture. In any case, it’s an undeniable fact that the Airbus’ uncontrolled
ascent in cruising altitude had preceded the decent in all the three events.
(3)
The co-pilot probably tried to balance the ascent
by fractional manual descents several times. Slow decompression must have
been developing during the cruising, and the co-pilot had suffered from difficult
hearing.
(4)
The captain wanted to reenter the cockpit at
around Time 3-min, but found it
was impossible to unlock the cockpit door. He asked the co-pilot to unlock it
from the cockpit side. Alas, the co-pilot couldn’t hear it, hence, didn’t
answer. Though he couldn’t hear captain’s plea, provably, he might have tried
himself to open the door, but it was unable to unlock too. There was only one
chance in the early stage of decompression to unlock the door, i.e., while
had the door pushed from the cockpit side toward the cabin side by the
co-pilot and the captain unlocked it from the cabin side, as the co-pilot’s
push could balance the push by air pressure in the cabin, having released the
lock bar from constraint due to Coulomb friction. The Coulomb Friction theory
is high school level intelligence. cf. a quotation below:
‘French prosecutor Brice Robin
sensationally reveals that the co-pilot of the doomed Germanwings Airbus
A320 locked his captain out of the cockpit before deliberately crashing into
a mountain to 'destroy the plane.’
(5)
As decompression had developed to an unbearable
degree, the co-pilot reflexively (deliberately, voluntarily, abruptly aren’t
suitable adverbs) set the auto-pilot on steep descent position down to 2000-m
altitude as regularly trained by exercises and instructed in the Airbus Flight
Manual that pilots are given. It was Time 5-min. cf. the following
quotations.
‘Here
are some of the factors that could have caused the pilots to make an
emergency descent. These are all speculative at this point, given the paucity
of information about the situation the Germanwings pilots faced.’
‘The
most common reason for an airliner diverting from its cruising altitude and
making a steep but controlled descent is to respond to a problem with the
plane's pressurization system. Aircraft like the A320 are pressurized to
about 10,000 feet while flying at cruising altitude, but a problem with this
system would force passengers to wear oxygen masks while the pilot brought
the plane to a lower altitude where outside air contains higher levels of
oxygen.’
‘This is a relatively common
occurrence for which flight crews are regularly trained, and typically pilots
are able to make a distress call followed by an emergency landing, depending
on the nature of the problem.’
Comment:
The co-pilot never set the auto-pilot on descent down to 100-ft
(30.48-m) altitude as popularly speculated but at 2000-m
as per a rule. It is clearly evidenced by the existence of post-descent level
flight of 2000-m altitude. The co-pilot set so, having hoped that, at the
designated altitude, he could manage the matter, e.g., turning to right with
a circular flight for an alighting emergency land on the Mediterranean Sea.
When the plane descended to 2000-m altitude, it had still 15-km distant to the mountainside. It
was enough distant for him to do so. cf. quotations below:
At 10.40.47, a French radar picked up Flight 4U9525 for the last
time. It was flying steadily at a height
of 6,175ft (1882.14-m) – almost exactly the altitude
(of 2000-m) at which the debris
that is now all that remains of the Airbus lies scattered on the
mountainside.
‘(Based
on) satellite data, he said it had found evidence the autopilot
was abruptly switched from cruising altitude to just 100 feet, the lowest
possible setting.’
‘Among
the new details, he said the airliner had flown in a straight line directly
into the mountain, but would not say whether that seemed to be at the hand of
a pilot or auto-pilot.’
(6)
During the descent, the fatigue crack and rupture
developed from slowly to rapidly and ended up in a stable deformation. Following
the development, it generated metallic sounds first lightly (crack
developing), next strongly (rupture developing) and last violently (Bulkhead
flattering at the rupture section). The fluctuation in sounds was popularly
regarded as captain’s knocking at door (first lightly, second heavily) and
(third frantically) by axing at the cockpit door. The crack-rupture
development lasted from Time 3-min.
to Time 8-min.
BEA says, ’The
co-pilot was breathing when the plane descended down to 2000-m altitude,’ suggesting he was still
good enough to have saved the plane but purposely he didn’t.
What on earth
are two, viz. (i) Even after brain death, human’s lungs breathe, heart
beats, (ii) It is dubious if CVR can record human breaths. It should
be tested with other A320-200 and compare it to the L-event record by means
of the Fourier analysis. The recorded sound was, more possibly, wind breaths
(much louder than human breaths) generated by flowing air across the fatigue
crack. The simplst way is to make an analogy with A-event’s CVR record.
(7)
After the descent, it entered the post-descent level flight that began at Time 14-min. The plane was in 2000-m altitude and 15-km distant before
the mountainside. The co-pilot’s intention, at the time when he set the
auto-pilot, was, ‘after the plane descent to the designated altitude, make
the plane turn to the right for alighting emergency land on the Mediterranean
Seawater.’ Alas, he couldn’t do it as he’d been physically defunct. At Time-15-min. the plane smashed to the
mountainside by the auto-pilot as had been so set and had no further command.
The Hypothesis
and its induction
The
Writers induct their Hypothesis that the cause of L-event is the bulkhead
fatigue rupture in the cockpit. It caused slow-to-rapid decompression in the
cockpit. It’s a primary consequence of the cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue crack-rapture.’
It made the cockpit door be unable to unlock. So the captain couldn’t reenter
the cockpit. The co-pilot lost his auditory sense as it’s the first symptom
of the slow decompression. He reflexively set the auto-pilot on a steep
descent position down to 2000-m
altitude as so trained and instructed. It was his last effort to save the
plane.
He
had fallen into physical defunct before the plane began level flight as soset.
As the co-pilot gave the auto-pilot no further command, the plane faithfully
kept its course to crash. They’re the secondary, tertiary to the last
consequence of the cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture.’
The
Hypothesis thus set up has no contradiction with all the premises. And there
can be found no other hypothesis that is fully compatible to the premises. In
this way, the induction has reached a conclusion, and the Hypothesis has been
established.
L-event
quite likely has been accelerated and triggered by nose wheel accommodation
hutch’s improper repairs implemented 12 hrs before the event. For the time
being, it’s unknown what role did the repairs and its consequential matters
play in the event. It can be proven by scrutinizing all the pieces of the
cockpit and identifying the existence of fatigue marks and their positions.
It is to be reinforced by the symptoms of decompression with co-pilot’s body.
If the fatigue marks would be found on its cut sections, the co-pilot-suicide
hypothesis should have Gone with El Plane Pasa.
An insertion
There’s
an insertion that assumes windscreen cracks. cf. a quotation below:
‘In a separate development, experts claimed the Germanwings plane may
have crashed because the windscreen cracked; causing a sudden drop in oxygen
levels that rendered the pilots unconscious. Reports circulating on
professional pilot forums suggested the black box on the Airbus A320 had been
analyzed and revealed that a 'structural failure' was responsible for the
disaster.’
The
Writers appreciate the insertion as a movement to get rid of the hypothesis’
logical impasse. However, they’d like to express their opinion that the
windscreen cracks won’t lower oxygen and air pressure in the cockpit to a meaningful
degree in any case.
A
wind pressure of Mach number < 0.8 (subsonic resume) to which commercial
airliners pertain is a postgraduate level theme. It needs sophisticated wind-tunnel
tests and analyses. This report herewith briefly introduces only its basic
matters.
Total
pressure (Ptotal) on an effective perspective unit area
perpendicular to a wind direction is:
Ptotal = Pw + Pa = 0.5 * r* v2 *
CD + Pa
--
- - - (1), where;
Pw: Wind
pressure (kg/m2), Pa: Atmospheric pressure
at any altitude (kg/m2),
r: Air density
at any altitude (kg*sec2/m4), v: Wind velocity (m/sec), CD: Drag
coefficient (dimensionless).
CD (defined by
wind-tunnel tests, is assumed) = 1. Other data at any altitude can be found in
reference books. Substituting them into Formula (1), Ptotal is determined. For instance, at 10000-ft altitude, r, v and Pa are 0.093,
200 and 7120. From them, Ptotal is 9000. Usual
air pressure in a cabin is 9400~9600 > Ptotal.
Hence, cockpit air may blow out at 10000-ft
altitude. But ‘A320 are pressurized to about 10,000 feet (7120 < Ptotal = 9000) while
flying at cruising altitude.’ cf.
a quotation in page 13~14. In this context, outside air still blows in at 10000-ft altitude. At 35000-ft altitude, Ptotal = 3670 < 7120, hence, cockpit air blows out. The pressure
difference between inside and outside cockpit is 7120 – 3670 = 3450 (kg/m2). If a crack
happens at a surrounding bulkhead where atmospheric air flows parallel to a bulkhead
(no wind pressure). In this case, Ptotal = - 0.5 * r* v2
+ Pa -------- (2). From Formulae (1) and (2), it is clear that Ptotal of a side
bulkhead is 2 * 0.5 * r* v2 less than the
one of a windscreen. The pressure difference is 7120 – 1190 = 5930 (kg/m2).
Referring to the fact that in- and out-side cockpit air has an equal potential head (h), and a velocity head of air inside cockpit (hv) is 0, the
above can be easily proven by Bernoulli’s theory, hv + h
+hp
= constant for both in- and out-side cockpit,
Unlike
fatigue cracks in a bulkhead, the scope and scale of crack development in a
windscreen is limited, Hence, A320’s pressure keeping system likely
overpowers a pressure decrease due to windscreen cracks. That is, oxygen in a
cockpit won’t problematically decrease at any condition.
ISSUES BEYOND
ENGINEERING
Legal issue
The
setting of co-pilot-suicide hypothesis up to now may be an accidental act.
However, would it last even after this report without reasonable
explanations, it’s to be an intentional act that should be prosecuted.
However, this is not an engineering issue but a judicial one with which the Writers
have no business.
Disproportionate
automation
As
discussed earlier, A- and L- events (probably many others as well) are
inevitable results of the over-automation shored up by the belief in computer-almighty.
It results in society’s weakness, i.e., a lack of ability to deal with
problems emerging beyond programs. An accident and a disaster are two typical
examples that happen beyond programs.
It is the reason why the causation studies on them aren’t easily
solved in general. The air crashes are a part of these general issues. As
discussed already, it’s the background against which an effective solution to
the problem is difficult. However, in this issue, there’s still a chance to
reach a correct solution, if the matter is handled from a long-run point of
view. This report is written for this chance.
Trend of
totalitarianism
There’s
another issue of more formidable nature. It’s totalitarianism. It’s as
follows: A stalemate in over-automation is appearing not only in the
technical but in many other sectors, e.g., political, economic, cultural etc.
The best example is a war policy. In unconventional wars against so-called terrorists
whose warfare is shored up by the belief in God-almighty. Fighters use IED,
suicide car bomb, martyr attack, kidnapping and selective killing (beheading).
All are manual, hence, can’t go without people’s support (contrarily, air
strikes, drone bombing are all computerized that can go without people’s
support). Terrorists’ strategy and tactics are all beyond programs. It is no
wander all the wars have yet to be conclusive. The Writers wonder all the wars
are unwinnable. Nonetheless, the war policy is consistent (no exit), because
wars are allegedly in the interest of nations.
Now,
bring the topic back to L-event, The co-pilot-suicide hypothesis is
consistent, no exit unless it’d end up in collapse per se. The hypothesis is a
computer-aided (black-box reliant) product; hence, It’ll go without people’s knowledge.
Really, the things are going in this way.
The
hypothesis is, in effect, a practice of a thought, ‘an individual may be
sacrificed for general interest.’ This ideology is the very totalitarianism
to which National Socialism and Communism representatively pertain. Under
this regime, the police regard theories or persons of unfamiliar originality
or personality as communism, Islamism, jargon and communists, Islamists,
lunatics. The Writers’ works are of unfamiliar originality. Readers who do
not understand or do not like the works will agree with the police. The
readers of the works are to be suspected of sympathizers. The Writers are no
longer able to write their works as they’re doing now.
How to meet
the issues of beyond programs
To
solve the issue fundamentally is very difficult and not engineers’ business
but politicians, who has charismatic great leadership. Such a politician has
yet to emerge on the stage. However, engineers can do and must do something
to deal with the issue. There’re two keynotes on this way, viz. (i)
to see the matter from a long-range point of view, and (ii) to seek a solution
to problems coming back to a foundation ground. There must be potential
talent in societies to meet these needs. Make all carriers open to the talent,
and the things naturally move to a good direction. To respond this report is
the first step of this movement.
If
L-event could be settled with the co-pilot-suicide hypothesis, it works out cheap, as it needs only a minor change
in the cockpit rule. It also causes less damage to the fame of Airbus and
Lufthansa. Contrarily, to settle the matter with the bulkhead-fatigue-rupture
Hypothesis is expensive. It also brings about more image-down to their
reputation than the hypothesis does. It’s true the former is more bankable in
the short term. Remember F-, A-, and L- events, in fact, carry a common
cause. However, the cause of the first F-event was wrongly defined as a
combined cause of minor mechanical failure (Pitot tube freeze) and pilots’
erroneous elevator handling (instead of nose down the plane, pilot nose it up).
If F-event would have been handled rightly, the second and the third events,
A- and L- events, that happened 6 years later, could be avoided. It implies
that the correct disposal of the event pays even in the medium term. Much
more, in the long term. The Writers encourage BEA investigators to respond
this report in any form (con or pro) as a first step to put the matter back on
a right track.
The
Writers have made the same call in their past causation study reports on
construction / structural accidents (bridge collapse, FNPP failure et al) and
disasters (JKT flood, 2011 Japan Quake et al) for institutions (HU, HT, WB,
OECD, JICA, BEA, JCEA, Scott-Ciwem et al), some by name, [7] ~ [18]. However,
there’s been no response from nowhere. They may presume not to respond is
less dangerous than to respond. May the Writers expect it in L-event?
|
CONCLUSIONS
This
report gives its conclusions as follows:
(1) The Writers’
Hypothesis assumes that the cause of L-event is the bulkhead fatigue rupture in
the cockpit. It has been confirmed: (i) this assumption has no
contradiction to all the given premises, (ii) there’s no alternative
hypothesis that fully satisfies the premises. Thus, the bulkhead-fatigue-rupture Hypothesis has been set up.
(2)
The co-pilot-suicide hypothesis’ wishful
imagination is seen throughout its logic. But the most imaginary one is to imagine
that co-pilot’s breaths are recorded in CVR and to regard it as evidence that
proves his good physical function until the last moment. The sounds are not co-pilot’s
breaths but wind breaths at a crack-rupture opening. It can be confirmed by in-situ
tests with other A320-200 and Fourier analyses, and in analogy with CVR data of
A-event.
(3)
The improper discards are also in many occasions. But the most fatal two are: (i)
The neglect of the repairs that the plane had undergone 12 hrs before the event
happened, and (ii) the omission of an analogy between A-event and L-event.
(4)
After the captain left the cockpit, the cockpit door was automatically locked.
When he wanted to reenter, he couldn’t unlock the door. It was not caused by
being locked from the cockpit side but the friction between the lock bar and
the door sash caused by the cabin side air pressure that pushed the door. The
cabin side air pressure was caused by the decompression in the cockpit. The
decompression was caused by the bulkhead fatigue rupture in the cockpit.
(5) When the
decompression developed to an unbearable degree, the Co-pilot reflexively set
the auto-pilot on a deep descent position down to 2000-m altitude as he had been so trained and instructed. He’d become
physically defunct before the plane descended down to the designated altitude,
hence, couldn’t give the auto-pilot further commands. The auto-pilot executed
the given command, having had no further command until the plane crashed.
(6)
There’s a high possibility that the repairs, which the plane had undergone 12
hrs before the event accelerated the development of fatigue cracks and
triggered rupture.
(7) To the
Writers’ regret, the Writers’ Hypothesis is not proven by black box data, since
FDR missed its essential component, a data-memory card. However, it’d be proven
by identifying fatigue marks in the cockpit debris and/or finding symptoms of
decompression in the co-pilot’s remains (be the Writers highest condolences on
him).
(8)
As the event is deeply tangled in politico-socio-cultural-monetary settings, its
techno-scientific disposal is not easy. To fundamentally solve this issue, it
needs ultra-powerful-charismatic leadership that will appear on the last stage
of the current too-stretched automation, but such leadership has yet to be in sight.
(9)
For the time being, what the people concerned can do and should do is to handle
each problem in a right way. The two keynotes on this way are (i)
to see a problem in a long term and (ii) to think a problem coming back
to foundation ground. To respond this report is the first step of it.
GLOSSARY
RI: The Republic
of Indonesia, US: The United States
of America, SSR: Soviet Socialist
Republic, JKT: Jakarta, PLG: Palembang,
WB: the World Bank
(the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development),
OECD: Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, JICA:
Japan International Cooperation Agency, BEA:
Bureau d'Enquêtes Accident (Accident
Enquiry Bureau), Paris,
ATC Center: Air Traffic Control Center, FNPP: Fukusima Nuclear Power Plant, JCEA: Japan Civil Engineering Association,
UIBA: IBA
University, HU: Harvard University, UT: University of Tokyo,
L-event: Lufthansa
Germanwings Airbus crash event, A-event:
AirAsia Airbus crash event,
F-event: Air France
Flight 447 Airbus A330-220 crash event,
CVR: Cockpit
Voice Recorder (a "Black Box"), FDR:
Flight Data Recorder (a "Black Box"),
IED: Improvised Explosive Device, ABIDS: Acquired
Basic-Intelligence Deficiency Syndrome, RPM:
Round per Minute, DNA: Deoxyribonucleic Acid
REFERENCES
[1] Sohei Matsuno, ‘SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING (JAKARTA),’
[2] news/article-3027967/’Pictured-time-hero-pilot-tried-break-door-Germanwings-‘
www.dailymail.co.uk/
[3] World News, ‘Asia AirAsia flight QZ8501 missing: Q&A - what is known about ...’
www.independent.co.uk/
[5]
The Guardian, ‘Germanwings flight
4U9525’ www.theguardian.com,
Mar
26, 2015
[6]
news/article-3011235, ‘Germanwings-pilots-REFUSE-fly-s-revealed-doomed-jet,’
www.dailymail.co.uk/
www.iba.ac.id/
Jan 6, 2012
[8] Sohei Matsuno, ‘a sequel to uiba's 1st report on kukar bridge collapse,’
[9] Sohei Matsuno, “uiba's and happy pontist's kukar bridge collapse theory,’ iba.ac.id/
[10] Sohei Matsuno, “jakarta
flood prevention project with a true cause,”
[12] Sohei Matsuno, “JAKARTA-FLOOD PREVENTION BY TRAINING DIKE vs. GIANT SEA WALL,” www.iba.ac.id/
[13] Sohei Matsuno, “CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,“ www.iba.ac.id/
[14] Sohei Matsuno, ‘uiba's and happy pontist's kukar bridge collapse theory,’
iba.ac.id/documents/
[15] Sohei Matsuno, “CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,“ www.iba.ac.id/
[16] Sohei Matsuno, ‘2011 JAPAN QUAKE OVERPOWERS PLATE TECTONICS,’
[17]
Sohei Matsuno, ‘2011
JAPAN QUAKE OVERPOWERed PLATE TECTONICS,’ soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/,
Jun 19 2013
[18] Sohei Matsuno et al, ‘A CAUSAL STUDY ON THE AIRASIA AIRBUS CRASH EVENT,’
Completed on April 24 2015
