Thursday 29 November 2018

LEARN AIRBUS CRASH FROM METROJET-/EGYPTAIR-EVENT


LEARN AIRBUS CRASH FROM METROJET-/EGYPTAIR-EVENT


 Sohei Matsuno, Prof. (ret.) of freelance, Dr. (Eng.) without boundaries
 Advisor on technical affairs, Jamilla Restaurant, Palembang, Indonesia
                                                 Kimora Matsuno (Proofreader), Student, Singapore International School
 
ABSTRACT

The writer (He) studied six Airbus events (1st~5th: crashes, extra: emergency-landing), viz. Air France (2009), AirAsia (2014), Lufthansa (2015), Metrojet (2015), EgyptAir (2016) and Daallo (2016) respectively. He’s presented eight papers. The 1st paper for the 2nd event concludes: (i) its cause is Cockpit fuselage fatigue rupture; (ii) it was preceded by the 1st event, and (iii) the same events of the same cause occur several times.
Really, it occurred 5 times. If the cause is the same, the consequences must have points of analogy. Reversely, would events have points of analogy; a common cause could be, much more, if each point is of rare occurrence.
Investigation teams have given each event each cause. None of them becomes any analogous point. Following a premise, flawless plane and system, they’ve no way other than attributing causes to human conducts, i.e., if the plane was being controlled by a pilot, then attribute to the pilot’s, else if by an autopilot, to terrorist’s. 1st~3rd events are of the former category. The causes have been attributed to pilots. 4th-5th events pertain to the latter. For the 4th, the states concerned have reached consensus, terrorist’s bomb. For the 5th, the official investigation team of Egypt concluded a bomb hypothesis. BEA team opposes it. It insists a semi-bomb hypothesis.
This study visualizes Metrojet event’s last-moment swerve with facts. The swerve is the most convincing point of analogy. Based on it, the study is extremely ended with the theory of ‘Cockpit fuselage fatigue rupture’.

Keywords: Airbus crash, material fatigue, human factor

INTRODUCTION

Abbreviations and Definitions
Abbreviations used in this paper are to be read as follows:
UN: The United Nations, EU: The European Union, PRC: The People’s Republic of China, US: The United States, IS: The Islamic State, BEA: Bureau d'Enquêtes Accident (Accident Enquiry Bureau), Paris, CAA: Civil Aviation Authority, He: The writer of this paper,
ACARS: Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System, CVR: Cockpit Voice Recorder, FDR: Flight Data Recorder, Gspeed: Ground speed, Vspeed: Vertical speed, HS: Horizontal Stabilizer, VS: Vertical Stabilizer, APU: Auxiliary Power Unit, RPB: Rear Pressure Bulkhead, GPS: Global Positioning System, GL: Ground Level, DL: Datum Line, MSWL: Mean Sea Water Level, DP: Datum Plane, YP: Yield Point, nc: number of cycles, IED: Improvised Explosive Device,

F-event: Air France event, A-event: AirAsia event, L-event: Lufthansa Germanwings event, M-event: Metrojet event, E-event: EgyptAir event, D-event: Daallo Airline event, ABIDS: Acquired Basic intelligence Deficiency Syndrome,
Definitions of technical terms, e.g., Cause, Determinant, Fatigue, cf. [1] ~ [6], [14] ~ [16]. Logical terms, e.g., Induction, Deduction, Boolean, cf. [2].

Backdrop of this Study
This is a causal study on Airbus crashes. The study’s society has a 2-fold backdrop of program control and oligopoly dominance, against which studies are badly affected. cf. [5] & [11]. As the backdrop has been overhanging the society for a long time, people in the society have lost their ability to manage problems happened or to-happen beyond programs. The society has no system to counter the weakness. Under this setting, a causal study is apt to begin studying with a dogmatic (often false) premise, and seek an easygoing-temporizing hypothesis that minimizes economic-reputational losses to the society. Majority of experts concerned believe, “It’s the best way to serve the society.” cf. [1] ~ [6]. It may be so in a short run, but never in a long run. In order to get rid of the backdrop, there’s no way other than showing a true cause.

Reasons to focus on M- and E- events

Reason 1
The M-event crash site supplies the richest data among all the 5 crash sites. It’s because of the geologic-topographic conditions at its crash site. cf. [2].
F-, A- & E-event’s crash sites are sea waters. In a sea-waters crash, plane’s severed parts and debris on seabed hardly express their positions, directions and carriage when the plane hit the sea surface, because parts and debris move with sea currents one-by-one in a different manner due to their weight/bulk & surface/bulk ratios. In addition, the parts and debris aren’t fully accounted for. The deeper the sea is, the greater the above stated effects are. In this context, the debris of A-event on the seabed (depth < 30 m) can be referred to for learning the status of the plane when it hit the sea. But in F- & E-event (sea depth > 3000 m) it can’t.
L- & M-event's crash sites are land (mountainous terrain). In L-event, the terrain against which the plane collided is a steep-stiff-rocky ridge and was covered by snow at the time of crash. Hence, plane’s fuselage smashed into small pieces slid and rolled down slippery-steep surfaces of both sides of the ridge, some of them scattered on the ridge slopes, and most of them accumulated at less inclined lower-streams. In this case, unlike a crash in waters, all the parts and debris of the plane can be collected if diligent. But the parts and debris aren’t at the same positions and in the same statuses (in shape, direction, carriage etc) as they were when the plane hit the land. M-event’s crash site is flat. It wasn’t covered by snow but by a layer of weathered rocks (pebbles, sands & clay). Having been subjected to weathering for a geologically long time, there's no rock crop. The flat land didn’t allow the parts and debris to have moved far on the ground (to be computed later). Further, the surface layer played a role of a shock absorber; hence, the parts and debris maintain their original status at a better degree. cf. [2], [4] and [7].

Reason 2
1st~5th events have 10 points of analogy (cf. the 2nd last SECT.) They’re all unique. The end swerve with steep decent is particularly of rare occurrence. cf. quotation below.
Nearby radar show 804 cruising at 37,000 feet for several minutes after the initial indication [of irregularity]. It then turns left, then reverses course and begins a spiral descent that ends with impact with the water. This highly unusual flight path is another piece of evidence that remains unexplained, ([...] added, underlined by him). cf. [22]
This paper explains the swerve to fulfill the need pointed out by the above quotation.
The five events are divided into two groups as per the condition ‘if the plane was being controlled by a pilot or an autopilot.’ Among the two groups, the one that solves the swerve effectively is an M- & E-event group. It’s because of 3 reasons, viz. (i) L-event had no swerve. (ii) F- & A-event had the swerve, but it’s been attributed to pilots’ error, as the planes were being controlled by pilots. (iii) In M- & E-event, the planes were being controlled by autopilots. Hence, the swerve can’t be attributed to pilots. An alternative object, to which the swerve is attributed, is a bomb or a bomber. To deny it in M- & E-event is easier than to deny pilots’ error in F- & A-event. Further, the denial of the former makes the denial of the latter be easier.

Role of D-event
In this event, the plane was being controlled by a pilot. As far as this point is concerned, it pertains to the 1st~3rd event group. But because of the following reasons, it shall belong to neither group. It’s an Extra-event. That is, a fatigue crack didn’t happen in a cockpit but in a cabin. Hence, the plane could come back to the airport of departure. Pilots didn’t die. If a pilot is alive, it’s uneasy to attribute the cause of crash to the pilot, cf. [12]. There was a dead passenger in D-event. It’s no wonder even if the investigations would attribute the crash to the dead man as an easy way. It’s really not.
D-event has played an extra role in this study, i.e., a full-scale / in-situ test to prove the reality of fuselage-fatigue-rupture and unreality of terrorist bomb attack. cf. [1] & [3].

Purposes of this Study
A primary (tactical) purpose of this study is to identify the most convincing point of analogy ‘Presence of Swerve in M-event.
A secondary (strategic) purpose is, based on the identified swerve, to make the Hypothesis, Cockpit fuselage fatigue rupture, be a Theory.

PRESENCE OF SWERVE IN CRASH

General
Sensibly speaking, a present object is materially detected, numerically measured and data-wise recorded, using suitable tools such as detector, sensor, meter, gauge, CVR, FDR, radar etc. Reversely, an absent object is not, even if sophisticated tools are used. However, in secular studies, to find absent objects or not to find present objects is rather commonplace. The topic in this SECT. is one of the examples. Two main players in this farce are a tool and a human. Readers are requested to learn this reality first from the following two Sub-Sects.

Character of Tool and Human
Every tool to detect or to measure an object has a function only for one kind of object or value such as sound, smoke or speed, temperature. But a tool is to be subjected to other inputs such as shock, pressure, strain, temperature etc that are not its own object. The matter is that a tool responds to these inputs within its capacity. In object detection, for instance, a smoke detector installed on planes indicates other inputs such as fog, dust, aerosol, colored gas etc, as smoke. In value measurement, a Pitot tube to measure fluid velocity expresses a fluid temperature change as a velocity change. A tape measure expresses a temperature change as a distance change. This nature, to indicate other inputs within its capacity, is common for all detectors and measures. The feint data are adjusted in usual practices. However, there’s no specified method of adjustment for the errors due to accidental inputs. Hence, the absent object or value is detected or measured as if it were. A factor that makes the matter be worse is humans. One aspect in this concern is that humans have the same nature as tools. That is, experts, professionals or scholars used to learn a variety of subjects within their narrow capacity of each specialty. They’re rather willing to use the false data given by the tools, if the data suit their convenience in their studies.
In this regard, it’s worthy to forward the following episode before readers.
It was 2010s when he was on board AirAsia Airbus en route from Kuala Lumpur to Tokyo. It was midnight when he used a rear lavatory to ease himself. After having flushed, he was about to go out. Then, the door was unlocked and opened from outside. He found a man with a blanched face. The man yelled “You smoked!” He responded “No! Why yes?” The man didn’t reply. Having pushed him aside, the man entered the lavatory and shut the door. He left the spot but kept observing what the man did. After a few min., he heard a sound of flushing. The man came out from the lavatory. After having had a short chat with a stewardess in front of the lavatory, the man left there, and, having passed his side without words, went back to the man’s position. He knew neither man’s position nor conclusion, since didn’t ask, as the man’s face was still blanched as it had been.
His analysis on the episode is as follows: (i) At that time, the temperature in the cabin was cool 21 (˚C) according to his wrist thermometer. His temperature is usually 36.6 (˚C). (ii) When urinated, warm urine steamed up. It rose to smoke-detector’s elevation. (iii) The detector caught it and transmitted the data to the man (maybe purser)’s monitor. (iv) The purser came to the lavatory at a jump. (v) The purser inspected, but couldn’t smell smoke but might smell urine. (vi) Then, the purser flushed. (vii) The purser’s conclusion was, “It was smoke. No evidence only.”
 The point in this issue is, ‘the detected steam was transmitted as smoke.’ Having been obsessed by the feint data, the purser disposed the case as per regulations set up.
It didn’t matter as it was urine steam. But it did matter if it was fog. Now, he’s facing the problem in this study. But it isn’t an isolated matter only in this study. It’s universal throughout the world.

Universality of Tool - Human Character
He’d experienced a lot of the same in Japan while he was in Niigata University, having been engaged in a variety of techno-legal consultations with Prefecture Police HQs, District Prosecutors offices, District Courts, Municipal Parliament etc, as an appraiser. In each case, his opinion was met by a plural counter opinion. To convince readers of the matter’s universality, he shall herewith introduce five examples from multi-tens to readers.
(1) Nagara River Levee Collapse Case (Gifu Prefecture, 1976)
The Nagara River is the 15th longest river in Japan. Its right-bank levee collapsed under a strong rainfall of the Typhoon No. 5. His opinion was, “The bank at the site had been constructed on a pond by reclamation without removal of slippery bed sediment. The remained half of the pound (50-m long) was left without fill at the toe of the failed levee slope.
His opinion was, “The levee slid because of lack in slide resistance due to the method of construction. The fact that the levee collapsed exactly at the pond location with the full width of the pond explicitly proves it.
Counter opinions of metrology experts were, “Unprecedented strong rainfall due to the Typhoon No. 5 is the cause. The levee collapse could have happened at any point along the River. The River levee collapsed at the point by chance. It prevented the levee from collapsing at any point else.” It ignored the existence of the pond.
(2) Matsuyama Hillside Landslide Case (Yamagata Prefecture, 1980s)
The landslide happened on a hillside under which peat mining had been active.
His opinion was “The ground have had cracks and then been weakened by the ground settlement due to the mining. It slid having had snow thawing water.
Counter opinions of geology experts were “The site is of geologically unstable ground that has a lot of faults. It’s a kind of geological phenomena that are originally actualized by Plate Tectonics. It happened by chance at the site.” It didn’t see the existence of mining tunnels just under the site ground.
(3) Nagaoka Rice Center Hopper Beam Disconnection Case (Niigata Prefecture, 1970s)
This was a disconnection of a beam that was one of the supporting beams of an unhulled rice hopper. It killed the master of the Center. The victim’s corpse was found next day beside the fallen beam.
His opinion was, “An inappropriately designed beam’s supporting joint was disconnected. The victim was hit by the falling beam.
A counter opinion was of a doctor of a specialist of heart disease (the victim was his long-time patient). The doctor replied, when asked to inquire into the cause of the victim’s death, “He died of natural death of a heart attack,” having turned a blind eye to an obvious trace of bruise on the victim’s head.
(4) Highway Hillside-Wall Collapse Case (Fukushima Prefecture, 1970s)
It was the collapse of twin masonry walls built in two stairs on an upper hillside of the road. They fell down onto a minibus that was timely traveling the walls section. A driver and passengers on board were killed in the incident.
His opinion was, “The upper-side wall was built with a too short setback from the top of the lower-side wall. Hence, the dead weight of the upper-side wall worked as a surcharge on the back-fill of the lower-side wall, having added excess soil pressure to the lower-side wall. It overturned the lower-side wall. The upper-side wall followed it by sliding down the slope.”
A counter opinion of soil engineering experts was, “It was caused by sandy soil’s liquefaction* ignited by traveling cars’ dynamic effect.” Adding, “It increased the pour water pressure of soil, having resulted in excess soil pressure that overturned the twin walls.” It didn’t become aware of the phenomena at the site, i.e., the lower wall overturned and the upper one didn’t but slid down after the overturned lower one.
* A phenomenon that happens in not enough compacted wet sandy soil when subjected to a dynamic load, as sand particles become a floating condition in a moment, changing the soil’s nature to a liquid phase. It often happens at a seismic time.
(5) Ojiya Road-cutting-Slope Failure Case (Niigata Prefecture, late 1970s)
The site is a hillside of quarterly tuff that has vertical fissures and strata that dip to the same direction as topography but with lesser angle. The slide happened after the cutting had been completed its design height of 20 (m). The tuff slid down on the strata, block-by-block, having been separated by fissures. Finally the slid section reached the total cut section of 300-m long, killing several workers.
His opinion was, “The Quarterly tuff lost its surface layer with vegetation by cutting and exposed to multiple dry-wet effects. Then, it underwent 1st stage weathering and changed its phase from rock to bentonite. This effect affected not only its surface but penetrated into the fissures. By nature, bentonite expands its volume when being wet, and shrink when dry. If it happens in the fissures, it causes swelling pressure; the tuff was pushed down on the stratum by this force.
A counter opinion of geology experts was, “It’s a block movement* of land. It can happen along faults anywhere in quarterly areas by chance. But its foreknowledge is difficult. ” It didn’t see the present fissures, but saw absent faults.
* Usually slow (occasionally quick) geological movement of a land block along fault surfaces due to plate tectonics.
Readers may have realized a mono-pattern of the specialists’ opinions. Their causes are all universal or global facts. Note! When Isaac Newton said, “The cause of an apple falling down from a tree is gravitational force,” this physicist was worthy of people’s admiration as a genus. But if an expert says, “The cause of a plane falling down from the sky is gravitational force,” the expert is worthy of people’s ridicule as a nerd. Remember, any universal (global) fact may have a chance to be a cause only when the matter can’t happen without it and it hasn’t yet had universal validity among the contemporaries. Any universal fact may have a meaning when the object possesses a particular weak point to the universal fact. Would it be found, it’d be the cause. The universal fact isn’t. A cause is, in general, a fact that’s particular (local) at the place and/or (synchronous) at the time of the event.
Now consider human error. A pilot error is a universal fact, as ‘To err is human.’ The bomb attack is also a global fact. Not only Jihadists but all the powerful states in all the continents are committing it. ‘To bomb is human.’ Find any weak point on the object against the universal fact, and it’s the cause.
An unprecedented gigantic example is the UN adopted study theme. It sees, ‘the global warming as the cause of every disaster. It doesn’t see a true cause, ‘drainage of hot cooling water from nuclear power plants into the sea’. The cause is big, but not global. Really, the disasters are local, i.e., in the zones of the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean side of EU, PRC and US where the nuclear power plant development is particularly remarkable. The UN-promoted project may appease people who’ve been fed up with social strain due to ongoing endless wars for a while. It’ll give nerds lucrative themes for a long time. But never bring about solutions to the facing problems forever. cf. [17] and [2] (Epilogue).

Mechanism of Swerve

General aspect of control system paralysis
Explanations in this Sub-Sect. are done with data of not only M- and E- but also F-, A- and L- events. The name of the event is mentioned in each explanation and illustration. As concluded in this paper, the five events have a common cause. Hence, their essential aspects must be analogically the same too at least in the currently discussing points, though there’re differences in detail aspects and digital values. Hence, any explanation and illus. of any event should be accepted commonly for all the events in the very point of discussion. Keep this in mind, and readers are better convinced of the following explanations.
A- & E- events have a plural swerve though others have a singular one. In the following explanations, they’re called collectively ‘(the) swerve’. cf. Fig. 1.
                        
         Origin: Greek Defense Minister Kammenos (BBC)                                      Origin: BEA Final Report
(a) E-event swerves (detected)                        (b) F- event swerve (recorded)
Fig. 1 last swerve(s) with steep descent (s & (s) are to be omitted)
The swerve that accompanies steep descent happened as an end aspect of a series of the control system paralysis. Therefore, the discussions on the swerve in this Sub-Sect. shall start with the general aspect of the control system paralysis. It consists of four Acts. They’re explained Act-by-Act as follows.

Act 1 is a decade-long development of a fatigue crack. It was a prelude of the control system paralysis proceeding. That is, the control system paralysis had a latent phenomenon, a fatigue crack. It used to start at the bottom of the cockpit’s avionic bay. It grew along both sides of a cockpit fuselage, slowly, symmetrically. The fatigue crack had needed about 2*104-times cn of alternating stress (= the flight number of times = the number of atmospheric pressure changes) until the crack reached a critical condition to rupture (M-event). As the fatigue-crack width is small (< μm), usually there’s no heraldic symptoms, e.g., an irregularity in a control system, decompression or fog due to decompression etc until the fatigue crack development nears the fatigue rupture.
In L-event, a herald appeared in a form of sluggish responses in elevator control in its on-bound flight one day before the doomed returning flight, [4], [7] & [13].
In D-event, flight crew reported pressurization problem and asked the captain to return. Then, the captain requested to return, without emergency declaration (the official notification of the Somalia authorities).   ----   His comment: It means that the fuselage rip was preceded by the decompression in the same day.
In E-event, it was actualized in its 6-rotation flights one day before the fatal one. According to media reports, smoke (fog) was detected at each flight. The plane underwent a technical audit at each landing, but every time the plane was allowed to continue a flight till the fatal one, [1].
These were the 1st and the last heraldic symptoms of the respective events.

Act 2 began at [04: 12: 56.6] (hr. min. sec., UTC) when the FDR of the Metrojet plane showed irregularities. It’s the Time 0 of the event. It lasted 5 (sec) during which the control system had been totally paralysed. cf. Fig. 2.

Fig. 2 Altitude and speed charts vs. time (min. sec.). Speed axis legend on right

Actural phmarenomena corresponding to the FDR data irregularity are as follows:
According to BEA’s investigation, E-event’s last flight had smoke (fog) in cockpit areas several min. before the Time 0. Pilots might have thought that it was feint information as the ones in the previous 6-rotation flights. But it wasn’t. The fatigue crack that caused the fog had been already at a critical condition. The rupture started with the loss of cockpit’s right windows. It developed to a next-door lavatory and down to the avionics bay, having been destroying every control device on the way. The speed of the fatigue-rupture development is much faster than the one of the fatigue-crack development. The pilots in the cockpit were kiled at the 1st stage of the rupture instantly. The plane became an uncontrolled drone at [04: 13: 01.6].

Act 3 is consequential midair disintegration of the plane. It took 21 (sec) until the big parts had severed from the plane. It happened in a order of 1st ~ 4th separations. Intermittent separations of fuselages and small parts continued until the end of the event.

The 1st separation was of a tail cone which houses APU. It happened by inertia force of the tail cone due to plane’s acute vibration, most probably at [04: 13: 01.6]. The separation owed its easy occurrence to the presence of a fatigue crack along the perimeter of a firewall. As the firewall provides the closure of plane’s whole fuselage, it’d been subjected to alternating stress at every flight. It caused the fatigue crack. It’s evidenced by a knife-cut-like edge. cf. Photo 1 (a), (b) and (c) mark.
It’s said, “RUAG Aerostructures manufactured this section per design requirements defined by RUAG engineering [...]. He wants to know, ‘How the requirements specifies the firewall-fuselage joint, especially as for the weld, as he thinks, ‘The weld might have had effects on the fatigue crack.’ cf. [2], [4] ~ [6], Can he?


       (a) view from hatch side      (b) Near View from upper side      (c) Cut edge at firewall
Photo 1 Tail cone’s knife-cut-like edge
The loss of the APU made elevators and a rudder be powerless. They’d no constraint at their pivots anymore. It allowed them to rotate about each pivot axis freely by external force (wind). Thus, after the tail cone separation, a flutter* had been ready to occur at the elevators and the rudder. It played a key role in plane’s subsequent midair disintegration.
*A flutter is a sort of oscillation by a wind. It occures in a thin structure parpendicularly to a wind direction. If the structure is too thin vs. its span, a flutter happens in the span as well. The most familiar example is a hoisted flag fluttering by a wind. The frequency of a flutter is different from a natural frequency of a flattering structure. But the flutter is quite a tricky phenomenon. When some of its frequencies happen to near the natural frequency of the structure, resonance takes place. It results in a big amplitude. The Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse (1940, USA) was caused by the flutter with resonance in its too thin stiffner girder vs. its span.
Flutter rupture is a sort of fatigue rupture. In fatigue rupture, the cn of alternating stress depends on the magnitude of the applied alternating stress. The greater the stress is, the less the cn is. If the stress is less than a fatigue limit, cn ∞, i.e., no rupture happens. In the airbus crash events, alternating stress was more than EP. It’s proven by the residual angular displacement and curvature radius at the cut edges. The flutter-cut edge is strait, but not knife-cut-like. It’s slightly zigzag, because of flutters greater, rougher and more irregular nature of alternating stress than the ordinary vibration’s lesser, finer and more regular nature. It’s the reason why the flutter rupture didn’t need 104 order stress-alternation cn as the cases of cockpit, RPB and firewall needed. It needed only more or less than 101 times cn. Timewise, it also didn’t need yrs long time but less than 21 (sec) in M-event. The strait-zigzag-cut edge can be seen in the Photos of debris.
The flutter can be tested qualitatively by a simple model. Prepair a sheet of thick A4 size paper. Roll it into a cylinder in either side by paste. Press it at its one perimeter line so as to mold a wing-like model. Close both open sides by a stapler. Insert a chopstick into the model to pivot it. Hang the model in front of an enough strong fan, 30-cm distant from and palarel to the fan blades. It flutters.
The wind speed, i.e., plane speed, when the disintegration happened was average 200 (m/sec). On the other hand, fan’s wind speed may be at most 3 (m/sec). It doesn’t matter, because the purpose of this test is to know the wing-shaped model’s flutter qualitatively. The model’s behavior is the same analogically as the real one. If a quantitative analysis is the case, it needs wind-tunnel tests whose wind speed must be so controlled as to realize the same similitude as the real structure.

The 2nd separation was of HSs with the fuselage between the RPB and the firewall.
As the tail cone had already severed, this side had been open ended. The RPB side had also developed a fatigue crack along RPB’s perimeter. But it had yet to be fully done. The portion above the deck in the starboard was still being fixed with the rear body. The fuselage between RPB and firewall, to which HSs were fixed, was unstable especially in portside. They were subjected to vibration of HSs and VS, excited by flutters of elevators and a rudder. The portside HS severed from the main body by flutter at the top where it was jointed. In the starboard, HS severed from the fuselage. The starboard fuselage was cut off by combined effects of flutters and wind-pressure along a lateral line from the endpoint of fatigue crack on the RPB perimeter to the ex-firewall perimeter. RPB and FDR didn’t follow the 2nd separation. They followed the 4th separation. The 2nd separation proceeded from [04: 13: 13.091] to [04: 13: 13.872]. The above stated separation aspect is proven by (i) linear-zigzag, knife-cut-like and irregular cut edges in Photo 1 (c) & 3 (marked by, , and ) and (ii) the time when flight data became unreliable.

The 3rd separation was of VS. After having missed the tail cone and the inter firewall-RPB fuselage, the VS was a 1-side mounted, 1-side partially mounted and 2-side open thin structure that’s vulunerable to the flutter. Hence, on the top of the forced bibration excited by rudder’s flutter, the VS itself had a flutter. VS’ cut edge due to flutter is seen on the remained VS’ vertical shaft broken by collision shock in Photo 1 (c), (marked by ), It’s seen in Photo 2 in which the broken VS shaft is put back to its original position. Its mounted line along the upper part of the rear body didn’t cut by flutters. VS was finally pulled away by wind pressure along this line. It left an irregular cut edge. cf. Photo 2 ( ). These linear-zigzag and the irregular cut edges prove the mechanism & aspect of the 3rd seperation.

The 4th separation was plane’s rear body with RPB and FRD. The separation happened at a cross-section between the rearmost cabin windows and the rear exit doors. It ended at [04: 13: 22.6]. The linear upper half of the cut section didn’t resist the separation. It’d already had a fatigue crack. The lower part of the cut section resisted the separation. It was subjected to various kinds of force, viz.(lateral, longitudinal) - (shear, moment) & tork due to plane’s (lateral / longitudinal) - (sway / pitching) & rolling. They created inertia force of the rear body. Among them, the terminator was the lateral-shear that pushed the rear body to starboard relative to the main body. It’s proven by the facts given in Photo 4. It’s elaborated in the 2nd last SECT.
Besides the short-period sway, pitching etc, plane had the long-piriod stall. It may have contributed to the separation but to a lesser extent, because it gave the rear body lesser acceleration (inertia force). The applicable track record data shows no eligible stall that realizes such shear force to sever the rear body. One more mechanism that might be responsible for the seperation is the fact, ‘The rear body was pulled towards starboard as the 3rd separation was biased to starboard.’ It did little. The phenomenon was too lateral to have been done by the starboard biased pull in 3rd seperation.
Comment: The 4th separation is particular in M-event only.
In this way, the main separations extremely ended at [04: 13: 22.6] It took 21 (sec). It accompanied separations of various sizes of open-ended fuselages by flutters and the wind pressure any time intermittently until the collision. The chlonogical order shown above may not necessarily conform to the spacial distribution of the respective parts and debris on the ground. The severed fuselages flew off by natural winds much farther than the parts did. The lighter parts, e.g., HSs and VS flew farther than the heavier parts, e.g., the tail cone and the rear body did.
     

 Photo 2 Sequence of separation (1st~4th)     Photo 3 Severed rear body (3 kinds of cut edges:
  and status of fatigue cracks (red)                 irregular, Knife-cut-like &  Strait zigzag)
  

(a) Rear body portside view                                      (b) ditto Starboard view
Photo 4 Cut section of Metrojet’s rear body

Act 4 is the end performance, swerve. It began at [04: 13: 39.384] and lasted 78 (sec)*.
A pair of ailerons functions for a plane to roll (to move around plane's longitudinal axis), which results in a swerve in flight path due to the tilting of the lift vector. That is, if a plane rolles left (right), it swerves left (right).
In M-event, however, it went opposit to the above, i.e., the plane rolled left and swerved to right. It’s because that after having lost the rear body, the plane’s gravity center moved forward, having passed the centroid of wings (where the lift force acts) by about 3 (m).
 A pair of ailerons are pivoted at its one side. Unlike the elevators and the rudder, the ailerons’ power unit was still constraining the ailerons. Further, their motion is so synchronized as to move to opposit angular directions each other hardware-wise. It means the lesser flutter and greater rotational resistace moment about the pivot axisis. These are the reasons why (i) wings didn’t sever from the plane until collision, and (ii) the pair of ailerons (or one of them) were (was) jamed at a certain position at last. The latter (ii) must have occured due to some mechanical failure in their power unit and/or synchronizing hardware. It can be confirmed by observing the wing debris. When it happened, the aileron(s) flutter waned but its (their) wind pressure waxed. It caused the plane to have rolled left and swerved to right. When the roll neared the upsidedown carriage, the swerve became insignificant. Having kept a linear alignment in its extreme end path, the plane hit the ground at [04: 14: 57.384] (hr., min. sec., UTC)*.
* Calculated in the next Sub-Sect.
As the events have 10 similarities, it’s highly possible there’s a common cause. Reversely, if there’s a common cause in the events, there’d be the same-pattern consequences (aspects) due to the same failure mechanism. Readers can compose the crash aspect as per only the following 3 criteria. Do it yourself, if you will, by a process of trial and error.
(1) There’re 3 kinds of cut edges in severed debris, viz. (i) knife-cut-like strait ones, (ii) strait but slightly zigzag ones and (iii) irregular-shaped ones. They’re shown in Photos of debris. The presences of the 3 kinds of cut edge are undeniable facts.
(2) A knife-cut-like edge is by low-speed fatigue rupture. A strait-zigzag edge is by flutter rupture (high-speed fatigue rupture). An irregular-shaped edge is by wind pressure or inertia force without a fatigue crack. These are the known facts through breaking tests, studies and experiences.
(3) A severed segment doesn’t sever again unless otherwise loaded. It’s a common sense.

Visualization of M-event’s Swerve

Data Collection
Mobilizing his utmost effort, he’s got eight applicable data. They’re shown in Fig. 3 and 4.
Fig. 3’s four illus. are compositions of the last flight paths or the last rader contact position (FR24) and satelite images of crash and main debris sites (Fig. 5). There’s no explanation on the discrepancy between the flight paths and the crash site.
Fig. 4s join the two realities, the crash site & the flight path. Fig. 4 (a)’s crash site is on the protracted flight path with no swerve. Fig. 4 (b) assumes a vertical descent also with no swerve too. It’s difficult for him to interpret these Figs. Do the Fig. 3s assume a natural wind that carried the plane’s main body from the flight path to the crash site? All the applicable data (altitude, location, time, Vspeed, Gspeed etc) disagree to it. Do the Fig. 4s mean the crash site location given by RIA is faulty? It’s also imaginary. They are under correction..
           
  (a) Origin: Reuters, Russian Emergence s Ministry, FR24                         (b) Origin: Graphics: AVH/Google Earth
 

                (c) Origin: washingtonpost.com                                        (d) Origin: Crick on the Fig. It automatically shown
Fig. 3 Debris field and probable flight route of M-event
   
    
          Origin: ditto                                                   Origin: Shown in Fig.
      (a) Dip descent on protoracted line of flight path                  (b) Vertical descent under last point
Fig. 4 Trajectory of M-event
Origin: Photo/Graphics: AFP/RIA
Fig. 5 Satelite image of crash site (L) and main debris site (R)

Data Correction
From among six data in Fig. 3 & 4, he adopted Fig. 3 (d) and Fig. 4 (b) in the following analyses. The reasons are: The adopted two have digital data. Fig. 4 (a) is only a data that gives the time of collision. But he doesn’t adopted it, because it doesn’t show ‘with what base it was defined,’ and the vital digital data, ‘the collision time’ itself is at odd with the reality. The collision time is defined in the next Sub-Sect.
Fig. 3 (d) has multi-matters, i.e.; (i) As FR24 itself admits, data after the plane lost FDR are unreliable. Take note, every tool, e.g., sensor, detector, has been more or less affected by accidental inputs. The GPS itself doesn’t give prcise values for vertical conponents (altitude &, Vspeed), though they may be referred to. But the data of horizontal components (location, Gspeed) are applicable with corrections if needed. (ii) The direction of the plane when it hit the ground shown in Fig. 3 (d) doesn’t coincide to the reality. Based on the plane’s status at the crash site given by the satelite image in a red frame of Fig. 5, plane’s direction of motion when it hit the ground is measured at S 60˚W (Ɵ = 60˚). cf. Fig. 6. (iii) The last portion of the recorded flight path, expressed by a chain of yellow circles in Fig. 3 (d) is too far. Would it be true, the plane’s Gspeed had to be 1700  (m/sec). It was really about 90 (m/sec). It’d be corrected reasonably.
The matters with Fig. 4 (b) are: (i) the last vertical ordinate. It’s the result of illustrators’ will to emphasise almost vertical descent of the plane. But in a time-altitude ordinate, it can’t be vertical so far as the Vspeed is finite, (ii) the digital data given in Fig. 4 (b), viz. altitude, Vspeed, Gspeed, and distance between last recorded point & crash site in Fig. 3 (d), contradict each other. This matter will be discussed again in the next Sub-Sect.
  
Composition of swerve alignment
Fig. 7 is a corrected figure of Fig. 3 (d). The swerve is a composite alignment of: (i) a circular curved section that contacts tangentially both the recorded last truck and the identified direction of plane’s motion when it hit the ground, and (ii) a linear section after the curved section to the crash point. It yields Fig. 8.
The related calcurations to Fig. 8 were done as follows:
Based on the scale shown in Fig. 5, the lengths of swerve’s circular and linear sections are calcurated. They’re 1800 and 700 (m) respectively.
              

      Fig. 6 Plane’s direction of motion               Fig. 7 Correction of flight’s last path (yellow
                 when it crashed                                 circle chain) & plane’s direction when crashed
  
Fig. 8 M-event’s last track to swerve
                                                                                  
The Gspeed of the plane when it hit the ground is computed.
Assume the energy of Vspeed is consumed by smashing the plane, and has no relation to energy dissipation of Gspeed by friction. Then, the Gspeed at the time of collision (v) is given by the Expression (a):
v = √(2*g*μ*s) ............. (a),    where;
g: Gravitational acceleration = 9.8 (m/sec2),
μ: Coulomb’s coefficient of friction  between metal and soil (0.6),
s: Sliding displacement of plane;s body after collision* = 12 (m) (photographic jugement),
Substituting these values into Expression (a), v = 12 (m/sec).
* The wings slid by 2 (m). Its motion was blocked by obstacles in front of wings. The front-body elements of rigidly fixed with the wings by I-beams followed the wings. The elements of not (or loosely) fixed with the I-beams slid freely from the wing block by 10 (m) relative to the wing-block. The calculations are done for the freely moved block, as it slid better faithfully to the Coulomb’s Friction Law than the wing-block did.
The sliding status must have been surveyed by site investigations. Given the data, he shall revise his photographic jugement, though there’d be insignificant differences between them.
When the plane started swerving at [04: 13: 39,384], its Gspeed was 272 / (39.384 34.163) = 52 (m/sec). Assume a constant Gspeed decrease, and an average Gspeed in this path was (52+12)/2 = 32 (m/sec).
FR24’s Gspeed at [04: 14: 39,384] is 47 (kt) = 24 (m/sec). Fig. 4 (b) shows altitude and Vspeed at [04: 13: 39.384]. They’re 28375 (ft) and 26432 (ft/min) respectively. Then, the plane hit the ground in 28375 / 26432*60 = 64.41 (sec). Meanwhile, the plane moves horizontally 24*64.41=1546 (m). The linear distance between the [04: 13: 39.384] point and the crash site is 1776 (m). That is, the plane can’t reach the crash site on time. The Gspeed at [04: 13: 39.384] isn’t 47 (kt). If it’s 100 (kt), there’s no contradiction in calculations as follows.
The travelling time from the beginning point to the crash site = 2500 / 32 = 78 (sec). The crash time = [04: 13: 39. 384] + [00: 00:. 78.000] = [04: 14: 57.384] (hr, min. sec., UTC).
Thus, the crash aspect has been explained. Now, ask questions! Did a bomber produce the planes’ end swerve?” Answer: No, unless the plane would have been hijucked.” Then, “Did a bomb do it?” Answer:No, a bomb had no relation to the swerve.” Then, what did it? The answer to this question has been already given. Aileron / the flutter did it.

REVIEW OF STUDIES ON AIRBUS CRASH EVENTS

General

 

Importance of Analogy in Event Study

Analogy is generally an effective means in a study. In an event study other analgous events give valuable hints to the study on the event. This study is a typicaL example.

The 10 points of analogy between the 5 Airbus crash events are as follows:
(01) Events of Airbus A320 family (except F-event, it was -A330),

(02) Events at cruising altitudes,

(03) Initiated by an irregularity in the elevator control system,

(04) Resulted in a total control-system paralysis (except L-event),

(05) Sequent steep ascent / stall / descent (except L-event),

(06) Ending up in anomalous swerve with a rapid descent to a crash (except L-event),

(07) Planes’ 3-part division ‘cockpit, tail & main body’ after crash (unclear in F- & E-event),

(08) Cockpit’s and tail’s different destruction manners from main body’s (ditto),

(09) No flight-balance recovery by either pilots or autopilot,

(10) No distress call from pilots, after emergency happened (except F-event).

It’s to be noticed that the analogy covers a wide range of items as (01): type of plane, (02): altitude where trouble happened, (03) ~ (06): aspect of events, (07) & (08): feature of plan e wreckage, (09) & (10): pilots’ / autopilots’ responses during the events.
Be aware, all the items are of rare occurence in general crash events. For instance, happening at cruising altitude is 7.5 % per all plane accidents. Possibility of occurence of 5 continuius events of such is 2.37*10- 4 (%). It happened in the 5 events. The other Items have the same character as this. In this context, it’s ultra-highly probable that the 5 events have a common cause. As seen, to make analogy needs a wide range of sense in which the nerds are lacking.
      

              Origin: BEA Final Report                                            Origin: Ministry of Transportation (ATC radar data)
         (a) F-event’s last swerve (recorded)                      (b) A-event’s last swerve (recorded)
        

          (c) M-event’s last swerve (visualised)                   (d) E-event’s last swerve (detected)
Fig. 9 Last swerve in four events
Among the 10 points of analogy, the most convincing one is Item (06). It’s shown in Fig. 9. Every illus. in the Fig. expresses the analogy concretely & analogously, hence, Fig. 9 convinces people of the presence of the analogy better than the other ones (rather abstract & digital) do. He recommends everyone to review each study by analogy between the 5 events especially with the swerve.
Comment: L-event didn’t swerve, because the copilot descended the plane immediately after he’d realized irregularity. It retarded the due development of system paralysis. Would the copilot haven’t done it, the plane did swerve without fail.

Investigation Process as usual
When an aviation accident happenes, an official investigation team is set-up in a state where the event has taken place. The team consists of investigators from the host and guest states concerned, i.e., a producer of the plane, an operator of the flight, and a controller of the departure airport. Besides the official team, plural investigation team from the states concerned also  independently participate in the investigations.
In M-event, Egypt, Russia and France are in positions respectively. Germany and Ireland also participate. They’re the states of the plane manufacture and registration. There’s an outsider Islamic State in M-event. It deposes the way of bombing. In E-event, the states concerned are Egypt and France (+ states of expertise). There’s no group who claimes a terror act. The states (investigation teams) participating in the events are called the states (parties) concerned.

Investigation Teams’ Study Results (as of date)
General
The cause of bomb meets the convenience of all the states concerned but the one, a controller of the departure airport. This political setting has characterized the investigations into M- & E-event so much. The official investigation teams finished the studies on the two events. But there’re still potential and actualized discord between teams in certain states. He considers the investigations are not to be ends themselves.
Focusing on the two keypoints, bomb (or its alternative) & swerve, and based on media reports, the investigation teams’ study results are summerized in the next Sub-Sect.

M-event
The studies’ development is chlonogically as follows:
(1)   After Oct. 2015: Egypt (as a state) initially denied widely held suspicions that a bomb caused the crash.
(2)   Nov. 16 2015: The Russian Federal Security Service stated, The crash was caused by a terrorist attack. Traces of explosives have been found in the wreckage of the plane. During the flight, a homemade device with the power of 1.5 kg of TNT was detonated.
(3) Nov. 17 2015: the website of Russia's President issued a summary of a meeting that’d been held on Nov. 16 2015, during which the director of Russia's Federal Security Service had stated, Mr. President, we have studied the passengers’ personal belongings and luggage and fragments of the plane that crashed in Egypt on October 31. An expert examination of all these objects has found traces of foreign-made explosives. According to our experts, a self-made explosive device equivalent up to 1 kg of TNT was set off on board, which explains why the fragments of the aircraft were scattered over a large area.
(4) Dec. 4 2015: Egyptian committee preliminary report said, No evidence to prove an act of terror or illegal intervention. In response, Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskovre iterated, Our experts concluded this was a terrorist attack.
(5) Dec. 14 2015: Egypt's Civil Aviation Authority reported, “The preliminary report has been finished and has been sent to ICAO as well as all participants in the investigation.
(6) Feb. 24 2016: President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi acknowledged having said, “terrorism caused the crash.” This is the stance of Egypt as a state. Meanwhile, the press release by Egypt's CAA concludes, “Up to date the committee did not receive any information indicating unlawful interference, consequently the committee continues its work regarding the technical investigation.
(7) Aug. 30 2016: Egypt's CAA announced that a delegation from Russia has arrived in Egypt to determine the initial point of where the fuselage started to disintegrate.
(8) Sep. 8 2016: Egypt's CAA announced, “A specific area was identified, where most likely the disintegration of the fuselage began. The related parts of the wreckage have to [be sent to .. writer’s comment] special laboratories to further analyse the causes of the disintegration.
(9) Oct. 31 2016: Russia's MAK stated,A specific area of the aircraft [has been] identified where the disintegration of the airframe began. Evidence suggests that the airframe was exposed to high energy elements from the inside to the outside.
(10) Nov. 16 2016: It was reported that Egypt’s CAA released an interim statement providing little insight into the sequence of events. Noteworthy details are the examination of the cabin pressure controllers and the spectrum analysis of FDR’s last second recordings.
The swerve (or generally the analogy itself) has been ignored up to the date.

E-event
The swerve in E-event has been recordrd by the Greece Defense Ministry’s radar. However, it was denied by the Egypt team.
In E-event, controversies are the Egypt team (official) vs. the France team (BEA).
The Egyp team says, “A malicious act likely brought down the plane. It’s evidenced by the detection of explosive traces on the remains of some of the victims. ”
BEA opposes it, saying, “A fire broke out in the cockpit while the plane was flying at its cruise altitude. The fire spread so fast that the crew couldn’t control the plane.” It’s derived the hypothesis based on the following seven premises, viz.
(1) FDR suddenly lost function while the plane was in a cruise altitude of 37,000 (ft).
(2) ACARS sent messages of the presence of smoke in the toilets and the avionics bay.
(3) FDR data agrees to these messages.
(4) CVR replay reveals the crew’s conversation about the existence of a fire on board.
(5) Several pieces of debris retrieved from the crash site. Some of them have signs of having been subject to high temperatures, and traces of soot.
(6) A signal from the emergency locator transmitter was sent at 00:37 (around eight minutes after the transmission of the last ACARS message),
(7) Data from a Greek primary radar (sent by the Greek authorities to the BEA) shows plane’s  steep descentt in a turn before it collided with the sea water.

 Needed Explanations

Common for both events
In M- and E- events, planes were under the autopilot control. And there’s a diehard premise ‘flawless plane and system’. Hence, he’s not surprised by the following statement that’s the backbone of their hypothesis.
The New York Times Sinior officials at Metrojet, the charter company that operated the aircraft, sounded definitive in their statements that the plane and crew were faultless. We absolutely exclude the technical failure of the plane, and we absolutely exclude pilot error or a human factor,” Aleksandr A. Smirnov, a former pilot and the airline’s deputy director for aviation, told a packed news conference in Moscow.
Really, the main-stream hypothis is (semi-)bomb hypotheses. But it needs explanations.

M-event
As the bomb hypothesis can’t logically explain the swerve (or any analogy in general); all the hypotheses have been unanimously ignoring the swerve (or generally any analogy). If there’d be any other reasons to ignore the analogy, they should be explained. Metrojet plane’s last swerve is visualized in this paper. It may help the explanations.
The states concerned have barely reached consensus of opinion on the cause, terrorist’s bomb. But there’s a latent objection at investigation teams’ level between the Egypt official team and the Russian team. As far as the Egypt team keeps its present stance, there’s a little hope in this study field, cf. [2]. It depends on if the Egypt team can obtain a true cause. The 10 points of analogy will help it.
Russian team’s study result is “The aircraft skin had undergone high energy dynamic influence (from inside to outside) due to bomb explosion and its internal overpressure caused an inflight rapid decompression (Interstate Aviation Committee report).” Russian team won’t change this stance.
Russian team’s study results need explainations as follows:
(a) Bomb’s weight and its set place are wandering from 1.5 to 1.0-kg TNT equivalent, and from baggage hold to cabin respectively. The self-styled bomb fixer, The IS group, shows an image of a bomb of the same type as the one used in M-event. It’s a set of a 0.24-kg explosive can, a detonator and a switch. The Russian team is requested to explain the discrepancy between the Russian team and the Executive group. cf. Photo 5.
(b) Doesn’t Russian team agree to the tail-cone-first disintegration? If yes, it needs twin-bombs. May he have Russian explanations?
(c) Last but most! It’s true all the broken fuselage segments (pieces of isolator as well) are hanging outside from the portside cut section as indicated by red arrows in Photo 4 (a). If it was caused by the bomb pressure acted from inside to outside, why are the broken fuselage segments and isolator pieces hanging inside at the 3-m distant starboard cut section as shown by blue arrows in the same Photo 4 (a)? In a view angle from the starboard, the inside-hanging broken fuselages etc aren’t visible. cf. Photo 4 (b).
Photo 5 IS-used IED in Metrojet Airbus attack
The primary physics tells, ‘If air pressure increases at one point in a closed vessel, the pressure is transmitted equally from corner to corner throughout the vessel.’ It means that the force which tore the rear body wasn’t compressive force from inside to outside, but shear force due to rear body’s toward-starboard movement relative to the main body. This is an example of not to view present objects (in this case, inward hanging broken fuselage segments) that don’t meet the viewer’s convenience.

E-event
EgyptAir plane’s last swerve is shown by the data from the Greek primary radar (sent by the Greek authorities to the BEA). But Egypt team refuses it. Both can be true, only if the plane midair disintegrated, and the Greek radar saw the main body that swerved and Egypt radar saw the rear body that didn’t swerve. He thinks it’s the case. He’s sure that the analogical aspects identified in M-event must have happened equally in E-event. Frankly speaking, he’s rather confident of the same aspect for all except L-event. It’s not clear in F-event because of deep sea effects. But in A-event, the plane’s body parts distribution on the shallow sea bed reveals an upside-down crash and a 3-part division of the plane body.
Egyptian team’s bomb hypothesis is constructed based on, ‘Explosive traces is tested positive on the remains of victims.’ It means the explosion happened in the cabin. But the data reveals the event started with cockpit windows’ failure. Terrorists’ favorite material to make IEDs is plane fuel. Further, the explosive-tested remains must have been soaked in sea water that contains all the chemical elements shown in the Mendeleev’s Periodic Table. How can they be distinguished from the bomb’s elements? There must be explanations.
Li-battery hypothesis’ base is, “The airplane sends messages of a fire (this is verified by the data recorder), the crew is recorded talking about a fire on board, and there is soot on some of the wreckage. There is no doubt there was a fire on board.” cf. [22].
Before evaluate this quotation, confirm the following 3 criteria. (i) Plane’s interior / isolator materials are of flame-retardant that can’t burn without continuous heat supply. (ii) It’s true that an organic solution of Ethylene Carbonate solvent used for the electrolyte in Li-battery is a flammable material. (iii) However, 0.002~0.01-kg solution is by far short of heat energy to burn the flame-retardant interior materials.
He has a test incinerator for plastics-disposal in his lab. Through daily-base tests, it’s been clear that to burn 1-kg unspecified plastics; it needs about 0.1-kg kerosene. If Li-battery electrolyte’s heat energy (cal./gr.) is the same as kerosene’s, 0.01-kg (or less) flammable solution in Li-battery can’t burn even 0.1-kg ordinary plastics, much less flame-retardant plastics, much2 less quickly, much3 less under limited oxygen (O2) in the cockpit, much4 less if the cockpit right windows were broken at cruise altitude, as O2 in the cockpit was as thin as 20 (%) of O2 at the normal condition. Li-battery hypothesis has no chance to execute such a big job unless otherwise given 104 times more heat energy. It need explain how to give.
The truce is ‘The airplane sent messages of false-warnings of smoke, everybody concerned (including crew) converted smoke into fire. So-called soot is a splotch of stuck synthetic materials (of interior / isolation), once melted by heat due to fuselage-metal cold-work and solidified again on the smashed fuselage. There was heat but no fire on board.’
He predicted in [1] that, in E-event studies, a copilot-bomb hypothesis would appear. It’s come but in a modified form of copilot-semi-bomb hypothesis. This is another trial of attributing a cause to dead pilot. The Li-battery is an alternative to bomb which, in E-event, obviously unfits the reality. The pilot-semi-bomb hypothesis combines hackneyed causes of bomb and pilot error to save the bomb orthodox hypothesis.
It’s said, “French investigators have always leaned towards a mechanical fault (for origin, click the red underlined) as the cause of the crash, saying they suspected that a mobile phone or tablet had caught fire.”
He thinks, “French investigators have never learned towards a mechanical fault throughout 1st~4th and extra events. In E-event, its stance is the same.” In the Airbus-crash-event studies, mechanical failure can’t be on agenda under the premise, ‘flawless plane and system.’

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper summarizes its conclusions and recommendations as follows:
(1) A remarkable characteristic of the E-event studies is smoke-detector’s feint data transmission. It detected fog but transmitted it as smoke. Its 1st effect was a miss-induction of fire from which (semi-)bomb hypotheses have been derived.
(2) The 2nd effect of the feint data is to let researchers disregard the analogy by giving a convenient by-pass ticket. Every hypothesis could unburden their uneasy job of learning the analogy that isn’t compatible with the (semi-)bomb hypothesis.
(3) There’s a human effect that the above two flaws have gone easily. It’s the nerds who, by nature, lacks in ability to make analogy between the things.
(4) The 10 points of analogy of the 5 events, in which especially concrete-analog item is the last swerve with steep descent, have been forwarded in this paper before readers.
(5) It’s recommended for readers to try to deny the 10 points of analogy first. If you’ve done it, God Luck. Else if undeniable, go to (6).
(6) If the 10 points of analogy have been recognized, a common cause must be considered. If the cause is the same, its consequences must be the same too. Based on the premise as this, he’s induced the causal Hypothesis of ‘cockpit fuselage fatigue rupture.’ It’s been deduced by site Photos and FDR data.  He’s also composed the sequence of the event 4-dimentionally.
(7) Given the comprehensive event analyses, readers are kindly advised to review each study, referring to the following 6 items, (8) ~ (13), as a guide line, if you will.
(8) Years-long-fatigue-crack development preceded each of the 5 airbus crash events. It used to begin at the bottom of the avionics bay and rose up on both sides of the cockpit fuselage.
(9) The rupture happened when the crack reached a cockpit windows’ lower frame elevation. The rupture took place at either the beginning or the end point of the fatigue crack line. It paralyzed the control system totally in several (~10s) seconds of tine.
(10) The control system paralysis induced the midair disintegration of the plane body in 3-stages from the tail cone, HS to VS (except F-event, in M-event, + to the rear body).
(11) In the midair disintegration, a flutter played a main role with additional wind pressure and inertia force. A structural weakness, ‘presence of fatigue cracks along the joint perimeters of firewall and RPB,’ made the separations be remarkably easy. The 3 patterns of the cut edges are visible in every debris photo. They’re due to 3 patterns of cut mechanism, viz. by slow fatigue, flutter (fast fatigue) and wind pressure, inertia force (indicated by respective marks in photos).
(12) The event was finalized by the swerve of steep descent with an upside-down carriage, and collided against the ground or sea waters (except F-event).
(13) It isn’t strange that any aspect of any event is commonly possessed by all the other events, as the settings in terms of cause, plane, altitude, Vspeed, Gspeed etc are the same among them. It can be confirmed, though the deep sea may obstruct to do it in some items. Nonetheless, they’re supported by other means as have been done in a variety of means in this report.
(14) If you’ve reached the same destination as his, God save you, else if you still wander as sleepwalkers, doctors save you.

参考文献 (REFERENCES)

直接関連文献 (Directly related references)
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akademika.iba.ac.id/documents/153/Fig,%20BEA%20preliminary%20rep...pdf
Summarizing the results of studies, the Writers shall forward this Report before ... inductive / deductive investigations of the L-event with the データ from flight recorders ... Comment: A preliminary report on AirAsia Airbus crash provided by the...

[8] Airbus A320 plane crashes - AirSafe.com

www.airsafe.com/events/models/a320.htm
Jul 30, 2016 - Lists fatal plane crashes and other significant safety events involving the Airbus A320 aircraft.

[9] [PDF] Aircraft Loss of Control Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100039467.pdf
by SR Jacobson - ‎2010 - ‎Cited by 17 - ‎Related articles
an analysis of accident データ by the NASA systems analysis group on behalf of.... Table 51 shows loss of control events for civil aviation occurring in the United States..... (URTA)11 developed by The Boeing Company, Airbus, S.A.S., and Flight ...

[10] [PDF] Human Factors Aspects in Incidents/Accidents - Airbus

www.airbus.com/fileadmin/.../AirbusSafetyLib_-FLT_OPS-HUM_PER-SEQ01.pdf
Overall, high workload is a factor in 80 % of incidents and accidents resulting from crew ... The operational and human factors analysis of operational events (as ...
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Jun 6, 2018

 

[12] Christian Roger, ‘The scandal of the Airbus A320 crash at Habsheim, France,www.crashdehabsheim.net/ Jun 26, 1998

[13] S. Matsuno,STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH,’

www.iba.ac.id/

間接関連文献 (Indirectly related references)

[14] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE,www.iba.ac.id, Jan. 6, 2012

[15] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘’A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDG[22E

COLLAPSE (sequel),’ www.iba.ac.id/

[16] Sohei Matsuno, UIBA'S AND HAPPY PONTIST'S KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE THEORY,’www.iba.ac.id/documents/83

 

[17] Sohei Matsuno, SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING (JAKARTA),’, www.iba.ac.id/

[18] Sohei Matsuno,JAKARTA FLOOD PREVENTION PROJECT WITH A TRUE CAUSE,www.iba.ac.id/ 8 Mar 2013


[20] Sohei Matsuno, ‘JAKARTA-FLOOD PREVENTION BY TRAINING DIKE vs. GIANT SEA WALL,’ www.iba.ac.id/
[21] Sohei Matsuno, ‘CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,’ www.iba.ac.id/
[22] John Cox, The unnecessary mystery of EgyptAir 804, Ask the Captain: USA TODAY, July 26, 2018





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