STUDY
ON EGYPTAIR AIRBUS CRASH
--- By Analogy with the latest
crashes ---
Sohei Matsuno
Prof. of
freelance, Dr. without borders
Palembang,
South-Sumatra, Indonesia
E-mail: sohei_matsuno@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
This Report is of a study on EgyptAir Flight MS804 crash
(19/May/2016). It’s a 4th event in a series of Airbus crashes during a 444-day
period started with a 1st event, AirAsia Flight QZ8501 crash (31/Dec./2014).
The four crashes have similarities. Suppose there’s a crash whose cause is not
properly addressed study/practice-wise, what’ll happen? It’s repetitions of
similar crashes of the same cause. Vice verse is also true. If similar crashes
happen within a definite period, a common cause is to be. The writer has
identified the common cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in a cockpit,’ and also
found, “Air France crash (2009) had already heralded the four events.”
The writer’s Report of the 2nd event, Lufthansa crash (2015),
predicted a few more crashes will be needed to reach the true cause.
There've been two crashes since then. As the Report did, this Report
again tries to let no more crash be. To realize it, this Report pursues
the study by analogy with the latest events, mainly with the 3rd event
‘Metrojet crash (2015)’, referring to an extra event, Daallo emergency landing
(2015).
This Report
concludes, “To prevent more Airbus crashes from happening, there’s no
way other than following this Report.”
Keywords: Airbus crashes,
similarities in crashes, cockpit bulkhead fatigue crack
INTRODUCTION
Definitions and
abbreviations
For
definitions of technical terms, Cause, Determinant and Fatigue, cf. [11] and [16]. For the definitions of
logical terms, Boolean, induction and deduction, cf. [19].
Abbreviations
used in this report are to be read as follows:
US: The United States of America, UK: The United Kingdom, IS: The Islamic State, BEA: Bureau d'Enquêtes Accident
(Accident Enquiry Bureau) Paris, FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation, ATC: Air Traffic Control, He: The writer of this Report,
CVR: Cockpit Voice Recorder, FDR: Flight Data
Recorder, ACARS: Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System, ABIDS: Acquired Basic Intelligence
Deficiency Syndrome, E-event:
EgyptAir Airbus crash (2016), D-event: Daallo Airline Airbus forced landing
(2016), M-event, Metrojet Airbus crash (2015), L-event: Lufthansa Germanwings
Airbus crash (2015), A-event:
AirAsia Airbus crash (2014), F-event:
Air France Airbus crash (2009), BPR: BEA’s Preliminary Report of
L-event, BFR: BEA’s Final Report of L-event.
Background of this Report
A
study on a plane crash has a background against which the study is badly
affected.
It’s
a computer-programmed-automation system that has prevailed major societies.
People in these societies needn’t (rather shouldn’t) process inputs with their
thinking. They process them by hardware (computer) run by software (programs)
and follow the outputs as supreme decisions. Further, people handover the
outputs to robotic hardware to execute the outputs. Habit is second nature.
People have been ABIDS sufferers. Against this background, if a problem of
beyond programs happens, they’re unable to manage it but dart this way and
that. It’s explained more in detail as follows:
First,
a creative person is generally a persona
non grata who disturbs a computer-program-governing society. ABIDS patients
are personae grata, since they run it
excellently. As major societies are going in this way for about three
generations, the ABIDS power has overpowered the thinking power.
Second,
as far as a thing is going as programmed, ABIDS people perform it excellently.
But if something beyond the program (a plane crash is one of typical examples)
happens, they’re painfully impotent to deal with it. Airbus crashes’ cause
isn’t of a sophisticated / hi-tech level but of a primary / basic class that
ABIDS people lack. For instance, they can’t consider a matter on a time axis.
More concretely, they can’t make an analogy between a present problem and past
ones, and also don’t see a matter in a long run. Both are basic devices in a causation
study. Together with their general lack of ability to consider a matter by
thinking, they only go hither and thither as the current investigations into
crash events do.
Third,
to make up for the above shortcomings, what used to be set up are: (i)
a premise of flawless hardware (plane and its equipment) and software (programs
to control their system) and (ii) deification of CVR/FDR. The
former allows investigators to attribute the crash automatically to a human act,
i.e., if the plane was being helmed by a human pilot at the time of crash then
to the pilot, else if autopilot was being in position, to a suicide bomber. The
latter intends to give the mediocre hypothesis a sanctuary, insisting, “Only
investigators, who are expertise in the sophisticated / high-tech subject,
hence, eligible to access data from CVR/FDR, can tell a truth.” As a natural
consequence, they used to keep the data covert, unless otherwise leaked accidentally.
It’s seen in F-, L- & E-event. F-event’s is discussed later.
Under
the above background, causation studies are apt to seek a temporizing
hypothesis to bring the least monetary, reputation and time losses to the parties
concerned, [8] ~ [21].
Purpose of this Report
To
put the current causation studies on a right track can’t be done in a short
time, much less if the correct way isn’t shown. The purpose of this Report is
to show it, by making an analogy between the E-event and the latest events.
E-EVENT STUDY BY ANALOGY
Preliminary knowledge
This study has
been done correspondingly to the following Sub-sects.
Before entering the respective discussions, readers are informed of two
particular characters of the E-event study in the following two Sub-sub-sects.
In this Report, the five
(Airbus crash) events includes F-event (2009) on the top of the four
(Airbus crash) events (2014 ~ 2016).
CVR/FDR play a little
role in studies on the four events particularly on E-event
CVR/FDR data
that usually play a key role in a deductive proof of an inductively derived
hypothesis. But in the four events, their role is little. In E-event, it’s
further less than the other three. It’s because of the following three
realties:
(1)
A fatigue crack starts at the
bottom of cockpit’s avionics bay. It advances upward slowly, taking a decade
long time until it reaches a rupture stage. As the fatigue crack has mere
width, unlike other fuselage irregularities, to detect it during this latent
period is difficult. The control-system devices in the bay are also
insignificantly affected during the period.
(2)
When the fatigue crack reaches
a critical extent, rupture takes place. It develops quick, taking only several-secconds’ to several-minutes’ time until it ends up in destruction.
The decompression in the cockpit fuselage rupture to total control-system
failure took 3 min. in E-event. En passant, if it’s caused by bomb blast, it
takes only micro-seconds’ time. It’s to be noticed that in all
the other four events, rupture advanced from an avionics bay up to a
pilot-cockpit. But in E-event, the rupture advanced in an opposite way, i.e.,
from a pilot cockpit down to an avionics bay. As more sensors are in the pilot
cockpit than in the avionics bay, CVR/FDR stopped recording in more items and
shorter time in E-event than in other four events.
(3)
There’s no data (essential)
after the total control-system failure. Further, from a few min. before the total failure, data
(indispensable) are dubious, as CVR/FDR are
possibly receiving faulty signals from sensors. Particularly in E-event,
due to the above stated realities, CVR/FDR gives further less data than the other
events.
Comment
1: The poor data is not only of CVR/FDR but of ACARS and Transponder. Among the
data, Boolean variables may be better trusted than digital ones. Recorded
absolute times (digital) are also worthy of doubt. It’d be accepted as relative
times on an independent timeline. Analog data in CVR are more acceptable than
digital ones.
Comment
2: In F- and L-event, CVR/FDR had been still working until the plane collided
with sea or ground, because planes’ descent after the partial control-system
failure retarded further control-system failures. Hence, CVR/FDR kept recording
until collisions.
Comment
3: FDR data of L-event were damaged not in mid-air by the cause mentioned
above. As explained in his Reports, [19],
it was by the heat generated when FDR was subjected to cold works due to
deformation and rupture at the time of ground collision.
Three reports needed to
be verified
There’re three unconfirmed reports that could help the study, would
they be verified. They’re as follows: Note: All the sentences written with Italic letters are quotations.
(1) Did EgyptAir
plane do three emergency landings within 24 hours before the crash?
Reports say “The plane did,” but EgyptAir says
“Didn’t.” cf.
the reports below:
Three separate warnings were transmitted from the
plane to the airline's base in Cairo during take-off on 18 May, The
Times reports.
Bulent KAVAKKORU from Istanbul, Turkey/Wikimedia, CC, French
broadcaster France 3 reports, “The
EgyptAir plane that mysteriously disappeared in the Mediterranean on May 19,
with 66 people on board, did three emergency landings in the 24 hours before
the crash.”
.jpg){kind=link}
EgyptAir has denied the claims, with Chairman Safwat
Musallam saying there had not been a fault with the plane. "We fully trust
the aircraft and pilot." Further, "You
do not investigate with preconceived technical or political ideas," the
source told Le Parisien.
Egyptian
investigators believe terrorism to be the most likely cause of the crash, a
theory that one person within the French investigation says has led to
deteriorating relations between the two teams.
According to reports, the signals
based on which the emergency landings were made are from the same ACARS as the
one that recorded a slew of messages of the fatal flight. The plane underwent a
technical audit at each landing. But no problem was found and allowed to take
off till the fatal flight. The emergency landings were prompted by signals
having sent ‘smoke’ onboard that went off shortly after taking off. cf. a
quotation.
EgyptAir flight MS804: “Smoke alerts sent in day
before crash.” The
EgyptAir plane which crashed into the Mediterranean last month sent several
smoke alerts in the 24 hours before it disappeared, it has been claimed.
Comment: The ‘smoke’ was actually
the ‘fog’. The ‘smoke’ that the doomed EgyptAir Airbus Flight MS804 experienced
in its 6-lotation flights between Eritrea, Egypt, Tunisia and France can’t be
heralds of a bomb blast. But the ‘fog’ can be the heralds of the fatigue
rupture. That is, fog was caused by slow decompression due to the first stage
fatigue rupture that’d been developing in the 6-rotation flights.
(2) Did a pilot have a
several-min. conversation with Egypt
ATC just before the crash?
Reports say, “A pilot did” but EgyptAir says “Didn’t.” cf. quotations
below.
Last week officials said there had been no distress call from the plane. But a French television station reported Sunday
the pilot of the EgyptAir flight spoke to air traffic control in Egypt for
several minutes just before the plane crashed. M6 television said the
pilot told Cairo about smoke that had engulfed parts of the aircraft and
decided to make an emergency descent to try to clear the fumes. M6’s story
quoted anonymous French aviation officials and was not confirmed by
the French air accident investigation agency, the BEA.
EgyptAir Flight 804 Update: Pilot
Spoke To EgyptAir Control before Descent — Report
Now, news about discussions between the pilot and
air control in the minutes before the flight crashed raise questions about the
integrity of the investigation.
Although an airline
spokesman said last week there had been a distress call from the Airbus 320,
the statement was denied by the Egyptian military and by EgyptAir.
Comment: This matter has a relation to some of the
investigators’ insertion, “A clear voice of ‘Fire’ heard in CVR.” It’s
discussed later in this Report.
(3) Had the plane turned
anomalously and plunged to 15,000 ft
before disappearing?
The
Greek radar confirmed, “The plane did” but Egyptian Authority says “It didn’t.”
cf. the following quotations.
“The plane made a 90-degree turn to the left and then
a full circle to the right, dropping precipitously to 15,000 feet from 37,000
ft and then plunging again to 9,000 feet before it disappeared from radar.”
Members of the Egyptian
investigation committee say “the aircraft did not swerve before it disappeared
from radar under a minute after entering Egyptian airspace.”
There
have been differing accounts of the Airbus A320’s final moments, with the Greek
defense minister’s account of “it abruptly turning to the left and then in a
full circle as it plummeted,” contradicted by Egyptian officials.
Comment: If the Greek minister’s account is true, it
means the E-event plane had rudder / elevation control system failures, and shares one of
the 10 points of similarity,
‘anomalous swerves before disappearance’, with other (except F-) events. cf. next Sub-sect.
Among the three unconfirmed reports, Item (2)
is of the communication exclusively between Egypt ATC and the plane. Hence,
there’s no way of independent verification. But the other two Items of (1) and (3) must have records. If
verified, it’ll help to know the plane’s conditions before and when the
emergency happened.
Similarities between the
five events
The
10 points of similarity between the five Airbus crash events are as follows:
(1) Events involving Airbus,
(2) Events at cruising altitudes,
(3) Existence of an ominous irregularity in
some flight control system,
(4) Ending up in a total control-system
failure (except F- and L-event),
(5) Sequent steep ascent / stall / descent to
crash (except L-event),
(6)
Anomalous swerve(s) in the fatal descent (except L-event),
(7) Planes’ three-part division of cockpit,
tail and main body after crash (unclear in F- event),
(8) Cockpit’s and tail’s different
destruction manners from main body’s (ditto),
(9) No flight-balance recovery by either
pilots or autopilot,
(10)
No distress call from pilots, after emergency happened (except F-event).
It’s to be noticed that the similarities cover a wide range of items
such as type of plane (1), altitude where trouble happened (2), behavior of
events (3) ~ (6), feature of plane wreckage (7) and (8), pilots’ / autopilot’s
responses to the event (9) and (10). Further, all the items are rare in general
crash events but common in the five events. For instance, happening at cruising altitude is
10 % per all plane accidents. On the other hand, it’s 100 % for the five
events. The other items have the same tendency. In this context, it’s highly
probable that the five events have one common cause.
It’s generally true,
e.g., if there’re a series of murder cases whose way is unique (rare) but
common to all the cases, it’s orthodox to assume a common culprit first. It’s
heterodox to assume case-by-case a different culprit throughout a series of
similar cases. Jack the Ripper case (London, in 1888) is a typical
example.
Comment 1: Item (4) didn’t happen
in F- and L-event, because plane’s intentional (L-event) and unintentional
(F-event) descent after Item (3) retarded the further fatigue rupture
development. In F-event, Item (10) didn’t happen; hence, pilots were conscious
as there was no decompression in the cockpit until the extreme end of the
event.
Comment 2: Items (3), (5) ~ (8) of E-event have not yet been (but
will be) confirmed.
Other studies’ causation
hypotheses on the five events
Brief
explanations of the respective events
Other hypotheses on the four
events are introduced in his past Reports, [16]
~ [20]. This Sub-sub-sect.
suffices to briefly explain the five events for readers’ digest.
(1) F-event
There was a
pitot-tube trouble. While coping with the trouble, a copilot who became
mentally unbalanced by a facing storm reacted to the situation incorrectly
by having placed the plane at a nose-up position in stead of nose-down, and ultimately caused the
aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall from which the plane couldn’t recover
its balance again and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. cf. BEA's Final Report.
(2)
A-event
There was a
matter with a vertical rudder. While the captain coped with the trouble, the
copilot ‘pulled up’ the plane nose when the captain instructed him to ‘pull
down’ instead of ‘push down'. This miscommunication resulted in an aerodynamic
stall and the plane crashed into the Java Sea. cf. [1].
(3)
L-event
Though there’d been already elevator
irregularities on the plane’s bound flight one day
before the event, BPR doesn’t relate it to the event, concluding the mentally
depressed copilot deliberately descended the plane until it collided with the
French Alps, [2] & [3].
(4)
M-event
In M-event, the plane was under
autopilot’s control. Further, Airbus’ rear part broke up in mid-air. Given the
conditions as the above, the pilot-centered hypothesis is inapplicable. ‘A
structural failure in mid-air’ is an inevitable premise. But the cause of the
mid-air failure is controversial, i.e., (i)
bomb blast (Russian team, [6]), (ii) no evidence of bomb
(Egyptian team, [5]) and (iii) bulkhead fatigue rupture (he, [20]).
Comment: Egyptian report is
transient. Its due studies may find evidence of bomb or confirm the transient
conclusion and find a cause in some technical matters other than a bomb. The
Egyptian study has taken a step forward but still many steps far from truth.
(5) E-event
The
studies on this event are still on the way, mainly as per ACARS data. Given the
currently applicable information, its would-be hypothesis may be as follows:
A
bomb was smuggled and planted in a cockpit nearby its right windows by somebody
(copilot?). The blast gave its direct effects on the right windows. i.e.,
spoiled and pushed them out. The fire and smoke almost spontaneously spread
from the cockpit to a lavatory of the next door of its back and a cabin, and 1 min.
later, into an avionics bay beneath the cockpit floor through cracks caused by
the blast. Further 2 min. later, two items of control-system failures in
the avionics bay were recorded. This is the final entry. 40 sec. after
it, the plane began abnormal swerves and plunged into the Mediterranean with an
uncontrolled descent, [7].
His
critiques on the hypotheses
(1) General matters
The critiques of the four events
are explained in his past Reports. Points in the Reports are: (i) making analogy between A-
and L-event, similarities are found, (ii)
the two events had been already preceded by F-event, (iii) the Reports reveal a common cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue
rupture in a cockpit,’ and (iv)
E-event is on the extension of the past four events.
The popular hypotheses aren’t compatible
with his Reports in connection with all the above study points stated in (i) ~ (iv).
First,
despite the obvious similarities, popular hypotheses give a different cause for
each event. But any one of the causes doesn’t
characterize any one of the similarities.
Second,
when the different causes are scrutinized, a common trend can be seen. That is,
all the hypotheses (except Egypt’s) attribute the cause to human acts of pilot,
copilot, passenger and/or collaborator. On what ground is this kind of thought
bred? It’s on the ground of die-hard myth ‘flawless hardware and perfect
software in the system,’ Note: They agree some control-system irregularities as
local-isolated-minor matters.
Third,
aviation experts’ comments on the Airbus crash used to begin with the
admiration for its high safety records, [16].
It means that the flawless plane is a scientifically supported concept. If
causation studies are done within a framework thus limited, a human act is a
cause of course. No wonder that everybody jumps on the bandwagon en route to this
destination. Hence, the confirmation or denial of the premise of the
hypothesis, ‘flawless plane’ shall precede the critiques on the E-event. cf.
the next quotation.
The plane involved, an Airbus A320, has one of the
best safety records compared to other popular models, with 0.14 hull loss fatal
accidents per million departures, according to Boeing, which analyzed safety
data between 1959 and 2013.
The
four events began in 2014, just next year after the end of the above
statistics’ observation period. Regarding the matter, what should be emphasized
is that the fatigue rupture has a latent period until
it becomes active. In the five events, the latent period seems to be as long as
a decade, which is an equivalent to about 15000 flight (= the number of cycle
of alternating force), because a dominant alternating force to cause fuselage
fatigue is an atmospheric pressure change at each flight. A primary factor that
governs a fatigue time is primarily the amplitude of the alternating force that
is practically the same for all commercial jet liners. But other factors, e.g.,
stress concentration by structural / material discontinuity / heterogeneity,
secondary stress by temperature change, residual thermal stress by hot works
etc, shorten the fatigue time. Take note, a weld joint in a cockpit satisfies
all the above factors. In this context, the excellent safety records until 2013
can’t deny the existence of fatigue-crack flaws in Airbuses. Its existence has
been confirmed with the Airbus wreckage of M-event, [20].
Now, let’s enter the respective events after his past five Reports
with
some new inputs.
(2)
F-event
An essential part of the leaked
CVR data of pilots’ conversations (spoken in French translated into English) in
the last 4 min. 21 sec. are quoted bellow. Note: Records
02:03:44 ~ 02:10:07 are omitted as are irrelevant to the matter.
No.1: 02:10:07
(Robert) What is this?
“ 2: 02:10:15 (Bonin) There’s nogood ... There’s no good speed indication.
“ 3: 02:10:16 (Robert) We’ve
lost the, the, the speed then?
“ 4: 02:10:27
(Robert) Pay attention to your speed. Pay attention to your speed.
“ 5: 02:10:28 (Bonin) Okay, okay, I'm descending.
“ 6: 02:10:30 (Robert) Stabilize...
“ 7: 02:10:31 (Bonin) Yeah.
“ 8: 02:10:31 (Robert)
Descend ..... It says we’re going up ... It says we’re going up, so descend.
“ 9: 02:10:35 (Bonin) Okay
“ 10: 02:10:36 (Robert) Descend!
“ 11: 02:10:37(Bonin) Here we go, we're descending.
“ 12: 02:10:38 (Robert) Douce! Gently!
“ 13: 02:10:41 (Bonin) We're ... Yeah, we're in a climb.
“ 14: 02:10:49 (Robert) Damn it, where is he?
“ 15: 02:10:55 (Robert) Damn it!
“ 16: 02:11:03 (Bonin) I'm in TOGA, huh?
“ 17: 02:11:06 (Robert) Damn it, is he coming or not?
“ 18: 02:11:21 (Robert) We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don’t
understand what's happening.
“ 19: 02:11:32 (Bonin) Damn it. I don’t have control of the plane. I
don’t have control of the plane at all.plane at all
“ 20: 02:11:37
(Robert) Left seat taking control!
“ 21: 02:11:43
(Captain) What the hell are you doing?
“ 22: 02:11:45
(Bonin) We've lost control of the plane!
“ 23: 02:11:47 (Robert) We've totally lost control of the plane. We don't understand at
all... We've tried everything.
“ 24: 02:12:14
(Robert) What do you think? What do you think? What should we do?
“ 25: 02:12:15
(Captain) Well, I don't know! (Captain urges Bonin to level the
wings.
They discuss, plane is in fact
climbing or descending, before agreeing that they are indeed descending.)
“ 26: 02:13:40
(Robert) Climb... Climb... climb... climb...
“ 27: 02:13:40
(Bonin) But I've had the stick back the whole time!
“ 28: 02:13:42
(Captain) No, no, no... Don't climb...
no, no.
“ 29: 02:13:43
(Robert) Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!
“ 30: 02:14:23
(Robert) Damn it; we're going to crash... This can't be happening!
“ 31: 02:14:25
(Bonin) But what's happening?
“ 32: 02:14:27 (Captain) Ten degrees of pitch
....
1.4 sec. later, CVR stopped recording. Investigators say, “At
this point, the aircraft's ground speed was 107 knots, descending at 10,912 ft
per min., 108 knots of vertical speed and 16.2˚ pitch. During the descent,
the aircraft had turned more than 180˚ to the right to a compass heading of 270
degrees. The aircraft remained stalled during its entire 3.5-min. descent from 38,000 ft before
it hit the ocean surface.”
The BEA, in a press release,
stated, "The BEA strongly condemns the disclosure of this transcription,
which is a violation of Article 14 of the European Regulation of 20 October
2010 that came into effect on 2 December 2010. This transcription mentions personal
conversations between the crew members that have no bearing on the event,*1
which shows a lack of respect for the memory of the late crew members*2.
The BEA safety investigation has not yet been completed and any attempt at
interpretation at this stage is partial and, as a result, can only fan the
flames of the controversies*2 of the last few months, which is harmful
to all concerned.*2"
*1 The
conversations between the crew members aren’t personal but of duties that have
bearing on the event.
*2 BEA is proud.
There’re much more powerful fish in the ocean of the world than the fish in a
well of the BEA. The leakage may be inconvenient to BEA. But the inputs from
outside men of knowledge and experience must be useful to BEA. The leakage of
the CVR data isn’t harmful but useful to all concerned, especially to
victims’ families for their quick due preparations and for pilots to restore
their honor more timely. BEA is afraid of controversies.
The controversy is a mother of development.
BEA’s primary judgment from the conversations is, “everything (every control system) is working fine.” cf. a quotation (from
BEA Final Report) below:
Aside (from) the loss of airspeed indication, everything is working fine.
Based on this premise, BEA depicts the F-event as follows: (i)
The pilots who crashed AF447 were three highly trained pilots flying for one of
the most prestigious fleets in the world.
(ii) At 1 hr 36 min, the flight
enters the outer extremities of a tropical storm system. Pilots didn’t avoid it but
tried to go through it. (iii) The frightening thunderstorm
made the helming copilot (Bonin)’s nerve center be damaged. (iv) Having lost proper capability, the
copilot led the plane to a stall, having ended up in the crash. cf. the
following quotation.
While Bonin's behavior is
irrational, it is not inexplicable. Intense psychological
stress tends to shut down the part of the brain responsible for innovative, creative
thought. It's not surprising, then, that amid the frightening disorientation of
the thunderstorm.
He interprets the conversations as follows:
The control-system disorder started when a senior copilot
(Robert) asked the copilot (Bonin) about sudden nose up and speed down, “What's this?” (No.1). Bonin replied, “There’s no good speed indication,” (No.
2). Having changed automatic to manual control, they coped with the problem
by descending the plane. The plane seemed to recover the speed (No. 3~7). But they realized the
indication of the plane was still saying ‘climb’. Hence, they tried to descend
the plane again and again but in vain, (No.
8~12). They thought the plane didn’t change the climbing status as it kept
nose up and the altimeter was indicating increasing altitude. As the situation
was uncontrollable, they called the Captain, (No. 13~17). They didn’t know yet if the plane is descending but
knew the engines do not get power to get speed, (No. 18 and 19). The
Captain returned the cockpit and asked the situation. They told the captain the
uncontrollable / incomprehensible situation and asked the Captain how to solve
the problem. The Captain also didn’t know how. They realized the plane was, in
fact, descending, (No. 21~25).
Having been the end of their resources, their thought was only went climb and
descent, Bonin must have really tried TOGA when it was too low to descend anymore,
(No. 26~31). The Captain bound the
story by telling the plane’s last posture, (No. 32).
Comment 1: Bonin doesn’t mean by No. 2
that the speed indicator was broken, as Bonin (Robert / the Captain as well)
is, up until the death moment, a devote believer of the flawless plane myth.
Comment 2: Bonin's statement, No. 16 is an expression of wonder about
the uncontrolled climb. It should be read with complementary words as: “(Despite
no command,) I’m in TOGA, huh (Why)?” Bonin didn’t exerted TOGA at a cruising
altitude, though hopelessly tried it when it was really needed, but the engines
didn’t generate power for it (No. 18).
Note: TOGA is an acronym for
‘Take Off, Go Around’. When a plane is taking off or aborting a landing, a plane must gain
both speed and altitude as quick
as possible. For this critical flight phase, pilots are trained to increase
engine power to the TOGA level and raise the nose to a certain pitch angle.
Comment 3: The conversations
and the data reveal that the plane had matters with (at least) seven control
systems, viz. autopilot, elevation, rudder, aileron, engine, altimeter, and
speedometer. Some sensors might have been broken and sending wrong
signals.
Comment 4: What is on earth, it’s strange to assume that
pilots, who have been excellent up to the day of the event, suddenly loss their
ability in a flawless plane under a storm. BEA’s theory is plausible only when
the three pilots had simultaneously suffered mass mental disorder. Note: Bonin
always worked with the senior copilot (Robert) and the Captain during the last
time of crisis. In fact, F-event was caused not by a broken nerve center in copilot’s
brain, but a broken nerve center in plane’s avionics bay.
The three men must be excellent
pilots with a flawless plane flying as programmed. But at the same time, they’re
ABIDS pilots who by nature haven’t the creative
thought to manage a beyond-program event. All pilots of the five events,
except L-event copilot (creative), couldn’t know the true cause. For the time
being, few pilots can know it even if given a decade long time, much less
within several seconds' to several minutes' time. If a pilot could know the
true cause, the pilot should (without useless efforts) descend the plane, and
seek an emergency landing as the L-event copilot did. In this way, there’s
still a chance to save, at least, passengers, [17] ~ [19].
F-event may have been unavoidable at that time. The matter
is, “if F-event had been properly addressed study-/practice-wise, the four
events didn’t happen.” Likewise, in the four events, “if the prior event had
been given a correct solution, the next one didn’t happen.” That is, more
events are avoidable at this time.
The best way is to follow overtly this Report. By doing so;
the matter can be solved basically. But if it’s difficult to do so, do it
covertly. It’s still better than do-not, since it can solve the matter at least
superficially.
(3) L-event
BEA has issued BPR and BFR of
L-event. The former is of a causation study. His three Reports, [17] ~ [19], are the critiques of it.
The latter explains the importance of a mental health check of pilots. He has
no objection to it, hence, no comment on it too.
His Report [19] says L-event’s Determinant is the location of the plane crash
site.
BPR identifies the site 1.1 km ahead the
plane’s last radar contact point. His is 6 km. The sectionEurope’s is 12
km. The matter is controversial. BFR says the altitude of the plane at
the last contact time isn’t 2000 m but 1885 m. Nonetheless, the
above problem remains. There must be one answer. cf. Photo 1. Note: All photos are in PHOTO COLLECTION attached at the end of this Report.
(a)
Origin: the sectionEurope (b) Blue: BEA, Red:
flightradar24, [19]
→ Photo
1 Distance between last radar contact point and
crash site
(4) E-event
Popular studies currently start with ACARS data. According to ACARS, the
sequence of emergency was: loss of cockpit’s right windows by bomb blast
occurred first, almost spontaneously, fire reached the front lavatory, 1 min. later on, the avionics bay and, 2
more min. after that, two control
systems there were destroyed. These are regarded as undisputable facts, since (i)
FDR’s data verify ACARS’, (ii) soot / heating trace are seen on
a piece of fuselage debris of the plane’s front section, and (iii)
clear voice of ‘Fire’ is recorded in CVR. Alas, this induction is the origin of
a logical quagmire in the sequent deductive reasoning.
As a source of the fire, a short circuit is also considered. No source
of fire is conceivable besides these two. But the short circuit is deleted as
no combustible material is used in a plane. They’re uninflammable or uneasy-inflammable, i.e., skin, frames and stringers (aluminum), insulation
blankets (glass fiber) and interior / floor panels (phenol resin). Hence, fire
can’t spread quickly unless otherwise helped by an incendiary
bomb. cf. a quotation below
Both the floor and interior
panels are fabricated with phenol resin because of its excellent low fire,
smoke and toxic gas emission features as well as good corrosion and impact
resistance properties. Because it is difficult to find a complete set of
material properties for insulation blankets used in the Airbus A320, the
material properties of the glass fiber blankets found in Ref. are used.
Thus, the bomb could survive an inductive step of a causation study.
Difficulty is in the next deductive step. There’s no evidence to prove it.
Reason is, what the smoke sensors detected wasn’t smoke but fog. No smoke = no
fire = no bomb. Nothing comes of nothing. If nothing comes of something, it’s
something imaginary. But the bomb hypothesis has a lot of contradictions. Some
of them are shown herein.
The bomb hypothesis
justifies ‘fire’ with a heat effect and residual soot on the fuselage-debris of
the plane’s front section. It further expands its supposition, saying “the
color of smoke detected in the front lavatory / avionics bay was dark black,
since the color of soot on the fuselage debris is dark black.” The fuselage
debris isn’t of the cockpit-lavatory section. Hence, the matters on it are
local / isolated ones that don’t represent any phenomenon in the
cockpit-lavatory section. The fuselage debris and its insulation blanket show
no clue of fire. Other more-fire-sensitive debris, passengers’ belongings such
as plastic bags, shoes, cloths etc have also no clue of fire. cf. Photo 2.
→ Photo
2 Debris (a) Fuselage segment (b) passengers’ belongings
Heat damage observed on the fuselage segment isn’t damage by ‘fire’
but is an effect of ‘heat’ generated by a cold work when it was torn off. The
soot (so observed) is a cake of the phenol-resin-made interior or floor panels,
melted by the heat and clung to the fuselage debris after cooled. The voice of
‘Fire’ is a ghost story, since cockpit’s right windows had blown outside before
the smoke (fire) broke up in the lavatory/avionics-bay. The decompression at a
cruising altitude is fatal, it means immediate human death. Hence, ‘Fire’ is a
voice of a dead human. But the ghost story can be a real one, only if the
shadowy report of pilot’s several-min.
conversation about ‘smoke’ before the plane disappearance is recognized, and
the timing (without synchronization) of the voice recording is within the
conversation period. If not, the contradiction remains.
This study’s causation
Hypothesis of E-event
Visualization
of fatigue cracks
Photo 3 shows the wreckage of the severed cockpit (a) and radome (b) at the
M-event crash site. They’re both the plane’s right side views. The posture of
the cockpit is upside down and of the radome is upside left in Photo 3.
(a) Cockpit (b)
Radome
→ Photo 3 Wreckage
of cockpit and radome of Metrojet Airbus
Rotate Photo 3 (a) clockwise at 180˚ and (b) 90˚, their postures are upright. cf.
Photo 4.
(a)
Cockpit (b)
Radome
→ Photo 4
Rotated cockpit and radome to upright posture
Insert Photo 4 (a) into a photo of the
Metrojet Airbus’ cockpit to have a montage photo, draw lines along the cut
sections, and it gives Photo 5 (a).
Remove the wreckage from it, and it gives Photo
5 (b) in which a fatigue crack at the critical stage is shown by a red
line.
(a) Montage original /
debris cockpit photos
(b) Fatigue crack in
cockpit (red) & radome separation line (yellow)
→ Photo 5 Process
to realize fatigue crack in Metrojet Airbus cockpit
As seen in Photo 5 (b), the fatigue crack was
about to reach the lower edge of cockpit’s right windows, when rupture took
place.
A yellow line is a severed
section of the radome which is not welded but pivoted by a hinge at its top and
locked around it for easy inspections. cf. Photo
8 (a).
Comment: Though the
cockpit that had weld joints in it had a crack in mid-air, the radome didn’t
but kept it jointed until the plane collided with the ground. It proves the
weld joint’s effect to bring about a fatigue crack more easily than a locked
joint. It’s also the reason why this Report recommends a friction joint in
stead of a weld joint.
In the same way as the cockpit-fatigue-crack-visualization process,
the fatigue cracks in the rear section are visualized by fixing the severed
rear section debris in the original rear section and show its edges, Photo 6 (a). Remove the debris from it, and it
yields Photo 6
(b).
(a) Rear-section
debris inserted in original place (b)
Fatigue cracks in rear section
→ Photo 6 Process
to realize fatigue cracks in Metrojet Airbus’ rear section
In Photo 6 (b), a rear line is a fatigue crack
corresponding to the position of the rear pressure bulkhead. A front one is a fatigue
crack that’s particular in M-event due to a past repair.
As per phenomenal similitude
between the five events, the cracks thus visualized in M-event can be applied
to other four events. Apply them to E-event, and it gives Photo 7.
→ Photo 7 Probable fatigue cracks of EgyptAir
Airbus
Fatigue crack / rupture
pattern vs. plane-crash feature
As per the similitude
in the five events, every (especially qualitative) pattern of M-event should be
of E-event and the other three.
(1)
Sequence
of fatigue crack / rupture vs. its consequences
A fatigue crack starts
from the bottom of the cockpit and develops upward in two prongs of left and right
side symmetrically. If it starts from either side, the crack is left/right
asymmetrical. The fatigue crack doesn’t start from the cockpit top, as the
fuselage there has no fatigue-crack promoter, frame (welded). Contrarily, at
the cockpit bottom, the fuselage has frames, stringers (welded) and electronic
devices (some welded). The fatigue crack goes strait up a frame. When it meets
a pilot-cockpit floor, it changes its direction a little backward to a lavatory.
Before reaching the lavatory, it meets a stringer and turns forward and advances
along the stringer. At the end (joint) of the stringer, it changes its
direction upward and goes up until it’s about to reach a lower edge of right
cockpit windows where it’s been critical for rupture. cf. Photo 5 (b).
If a bomb blast is the
cause, it finishes doing its works within micro-seconds’ time. But if fatigue rupture is the cause, it takes
more time as it follows the
development of rupture. In the four events, rupture began in at the bottom of an
avionics bay and broke control systems there. After several seconds' ~ several
minutes' time, it broke into the pilot cockpit. Hence, pilots’ death happens in
a last stage of the development of rupture.
In E-event, ACARS
reveals that the rupture proceeded from fatigue crack's end point and went down
to its beginning point. The consequences followed it, i.e., right cockpit
window’s anomaly and copilot’s sliding window’s brow up first. Instantly,
‘smoke’ broke into the lavatory, ‘fog’ into the cabin and, 1 min. after that, ‘smoke’ flew into the
avionics bay. Further 1 min. later, a
fault in another right cockpit window failure took place. After another 1-min., faults of an autopilot flight control unit and wing
spoilers’ control system in the avionics bay followed, [7]. This is the last entry of ACARS. 40 sec. later, the plane faded out in a Greek controllers’ radar screen
at 02:29:40.
Comment 1: The report
describes ‘smoke’ in the lavatory and ‘fog’ in the cabin. A sensor can’t
distinguish between ‘smoke’ and ‘fog’. A human did it to have let the story
meet the reality, ‘no smoke in the cabin’. No smoke was not only in the cabin
but throughout the plane.
Comment 2: Any measure
instrument (sensors) for any specified physical quantity (balance, scale,
watch, thermometer etc) regards any unspecified input as the specified one,
e.g., a thermo-sensor regards ‘force’ as ‘temperature’, a scale does ‘temperature’
as ‘length’ etc.
(2) Status of fatigue crack vs. of plane’s
wreckage
This Report shows the
concordance of fatigue crack status to cockpit wreckage reality” with M-event.
Photo 8 (a)
is a front view of the cockpit in an upright status. The wreckage was
upside-down at the crash site. To see the situation above the cockpit windows,
it was overturned. It’s Photo 8 (b).
Photo 8 (c) is a right-side view of Photo 8 (b).
(a) Upright cockpit (b) Rotated
cockpit wreckage (c) ditto, view
from right
→ Photo 8 M-event’s upside-down cockpit at crash site overturned for investigations
As seen in Photo 8 (c), the cockpit under the cockpit windows remains, as it
was isolated from the main body by the fatigue crack. But the one above the
windows isn’t. It shared destruction with the main body, as it wasn’t separated
from the main body by the fatigue crack.
REVIEW OF AIRBUS CRASHES
REFERRING TO D-EVENT
General
In D-event, the plane
didn’t crash but managed an emergency landing, as the fatigue rupture didn’t happen
in a cockpit but in a cabin. But if it’s seen from a causation point of view,
it pertains to the same category of the five events, i.e., ‘bulkhead fatigue
rupture’. As usual, its cause is
attributed to a suicide bomber. In this context, D-event is a
full-scale/in-situ model test of the five events. D-event study, needn’t
CVR/FDR data, as it’s caught red-handed in the event. It’s why this Report
reviews the Airbus crashes with D-event, [21].
Incident
Flight DAO 159/D3 159 took off from the Mogadishu airport at
11:00 local time on Feb. 2 2016 en route to Djibouti
City. A big sound was
heard 20 minutes after it took off at an altitude of about 4,300 m. The captain thought it was a sound by
a window having got out of the fuselage. The cabin was immediately hidden in
sick fog. After several seconds, the fog disappeared and visibility came back.
Then, a hole ripped in the right side fuselage was seen. The aircraft returned
to the airport safely, with one passenger unaccounted for. All other 73 passengers and 7
clues on board disembarked. Only two passengers were taken to a hospital with minor
injuries.
Investigation
Many reports of being much the same
have appeared, saying, “Somalia-based terror group, Al-Shabaab linked to Al Qaeda, is thought
to be behind the event, whose bomb ripped a hole in the side of the jet.” On Feb. 13, eleven days after the incident, Al-Shabaab, in an email statement, claimed responsibility for the
attack. Got a
good reason, subsequent investigations are comfortably going with the
suicide-bomb hypothesis. He’s never surprised
by the development, as the past hypotheses used to proceed with the similar
ways.
At
this time, the hypothetical story is depicted by media as follows:
A security camera recording from the airport
shows one of two men, seemingly airport employees, takes a laptop (computer) and hands it over
to another employee who gives it
to a passenger. The laptop
concealed TNT. The passenger had some connections to
airline or airport personnel. The passenger was able to bypass airport security and successfully
smuggled the explosive device into the plane, having hidden it in the
passenger’s wheelchair. The
passenger was transferred into a regular seat after having been brought onto
the plane. But the passenger
moved to a different seat; as the
passenger knew precisely where to sit and to place the device to maximize
damage. The passenger sat a right-window-side seat (16F) near from the root of
a right wing where a fuel tank is located. Soon after take off, the passenger blew himself up there
and the blast ripped a hole on the fuselage. ‘Fire’ erupted on the flight. The cabin was
filled by ‘smoke’. The passenger himself was also engulfed in flames and sucked
out of the plane through the ripped hole by the cabin air pressure within seconds
after the blast.
Official investigations to
verify the above hypothetical configuration is underway by Somalia's
Air Accident Investigation Authority,
the National
Intelligence and Security Agency in
cooperation with airport authority, local police, Daallo Airlines, a technical
team of Hermes Airlines (the
owner of the aircraft) and the aircraft's manufacturer (Airbus). The FBI is also contributing its efforts to the investigations.
The results of the
investigations up to now are as follows:
On Feb. 3, the missing
person's body was found in the Balcad area, about 30 km north of Mogadishu. The person was identified as Abdullahi Abdisalam
Borleh, a 55-year-old male from Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland region of Somalia, a teacher at an Islamic school. Sheikh
Mohamed Abdullah, a mosque imam in Hargeisa said, “One of
the reasons Borleh was going abroad is to have medical treatment.” A Somali federal official stated,
“Borleh was in security agent’s list, but never as a dangerous person.” A
senior Somalia immigration official said, “Borleh obtained a Turkish visa to
work in Turkey.” A letter was allegedly sent from a certain office to the
Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, having asked to facilitate a working visa for
Borleh who was expected to be an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
investment promotions.
Both airport employees
who allegedly handed over a TNT-charged laptop were arrested. Including two passengers on the
plane, one of whom was sitting in the next seat to Borleh; total 20 people have been arrested on
suspicion of being linked to the attack. Transport Minister Ali Ahmed Jamac confirmed that the explosion was caused by a bomb that
aimed at killing all on board. Two US
government sources said that initial forensic testing of the damage on Flight 159 had detected possible traces of TNT residue on the
aircraft.
The pilot, Vlatko
Vodopivec, firstly said the sound heard was by a
window having got out of the fuselage, but going with a tide of the bomb
hypothesis, has changed the previous words, saying, “What I heard was of the bomb blast.” Vodopivec also criticized the
lack of security around the aircraft at the airport, describing the facility as
chaotic. In an interview with the Associated Press,
Vodopivec explained, “the security is
zero. When we park there, some 20 to 30 people come to the tarmac, of which no
one has a badge or those yellow vests. They enter and leave the plane, and no
one knows who is who. They can put anything inside when passengers leave the
aircraft." In this way, Vodopivec suggested, “not necessarily the suicide bomber only, but there were a lot of people
who could plant a bomb,” having added, “The blast likely would have set off a
catastrophic secondary explosion in the fuel tank if the blast took place when
the aircraft reached cruising altitude. But, fortunately, the explosion
happened at a lower altitude of between 12,000 feet and 14,000 feet.”
Denial of bomb hypothesis
General
The
bomb hypothesis is bringing about needless efforts, as there’s evidence of no
bomb. To realize it, readers needn’t sophisticated / high-tech knowledge but
primary ~ high school level common sense. Let’s learn it next.
Circumstantial
evidence
The
suspect is unbecoming to a suicide bomber as per circumstantial evidence.
(1)
Social circumstantial evidence
Generally,
extreme Islamist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, IS, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda etc, do
not rely on elderly people, much less handicapped, in suicide-bomb operations.
Reasons are (i) they’re unreliable
for the purpose as can’t react to a situation quickly and (ii) they generally don’t like to shorten their remained
short lives. The suicide bombers are exclusively young people, very often
teenage boys and girls. This is historically true. Kamikaze suicide airmen in
the WW II were all youths of high teen and low twenty. Do readers know what
does Al-Shabaab mean? It means ‘Youths’.
(2)
Personal circumstantial evidence
As
reported, the deceased passenger was expected to have medical treatment in Turkey.
It doesn’t conform to the person who resolved to be a suicide bomber. The
person also had obtained a working visa to work at the ministry of foreign
affairs in Turkey as an adviser. It’s unnecessary to carry out the suicide
bombing. A tourist visa is enough for the purpose. It’s much easier to obtain
than a working visa.
Scientific
evidence
The
parties concerned have induced the existence of a bomb and a fire based on
passengers’ feeling. But it’s yet to be deduced with material evidence. It can’t
be done, as really there’s no bomb, no fire. If nothing comes of something,
it’s a baseless one. Let’s learn it in this Sub-sub sect.
(1) Chemical
evidence of no smoke / no fire
There’s no soot without smoke. There’s
no smoke without fire. There’s no fire without bomb. It’s said, ‘after the
blast, the cabin was covered by a volume of ‘smoke’. Really, if a bomb blasts,
it must be followed by ‘dark black’ smoke, since all IEDs Al-Shabaab uses are
of petrol origin, but the ‘smoke’ wasn’t black but white. Both the smoke and
fire can’t disappear within several seconds’ time but really it did. In fact,
fog appeared when warm and pressurized air inside the cabin contacted cold
atmospheric air and was decompressed after a hole was ripped. Light of emitting
sparks, when the fuselage was severing and flattering until it was finally
severed from the mother fuselage, were reflected by moving white fog. It was
seen as fire. There was no fire but heat was. It was generated while the broken
fuselage was subjected to cold works. Derleh’s charred body is the result when
having been tangled with thus heated / flattering severed fuselage. The body
hurt by heat is different from the one burnt by fire. Identify it by forensic
examinations.
The
back-side fuselage of the ripped hole is discolored to a sepia color. cf. Photo 9.
→ Photo
9 Daallo Airlines Flight 159 after
emergency landing
→ Photo 10 United Airlines
Flight 811 (Origin:
Wikipedia)
Vapor
(gas, not smoke) from melted synthetic materials by aluminum-cold-work heat
consolidated on the outside fuselage, and discolored it. The gas couldn’t flow
into the cabin as its air pressure is higher than the outside atmospheric one.
If smoke or gas enters the cabin, it badly smells and causes eye aches even
after the smoke (gas) disappears. But neither passengers on board nor
investigators who entered the cabin after the incident claimed it. It proves no
smoke in the cabin.
(2) Physical
evidence of no bomb
Suppose there’s a fluid closed up in a vessel. When pressure is applied
at one point in a fluid, it’s transmitted everywhere in the vessel. If the
fluid is a liquid, the pressure transmission occurs instantly as a liquid is
uncompressible. If the fluid is gas the above is also true. Everybody knows it
when fill a tire with air. If gas pressure is given in a short time, e.g., by
blast, the transmission takes a little moment as gas is compressible. Now let’s
come back to the case of air in the fuselage.
When blast occurs at a certain
point in the fuselage, all the people in the closed up cabin must feel the
blast of as strong as it breaks the fuselage. But nobody on board felt it or
harmed. The passengers heard a big sound only There can be seen insignificant
physical damage in the cabin as well. It proves no bomb blast was. cf. Photo 11 and 12.
→ Photo 11 A
ripped hole (view from inside plane)
→ Photo 12 Cabin feature
near the hole
(3) Directional
bomb
The
above stated realities are possible if a directional bomb is used. Directional
IEDs are popularly used in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan for Road-side bombs.
This weapon combines a conical, spherical or, most preferably, parabolic shape
bomb charge (cf. Photo 13) with a
steel cover. When a bomb explodes, explosion forms a linier blast into the
targeted object with its full energy to cause the maximum effect. To satisfy the
above stated realities in the cabin, the bomb used in Daallo Airbus must be a
directional one.
→ Photo13 Charge
for directional bomb
The
charge must be rigidly fixed with the floor panel so that it prevents the
charge from moving backward by a blast reaction. In D-event, the charge (heavier
than the bomb itself) was not used, since, if it was used, the charge must
remain in the cabin, but not found. Even if it was, it must clear a next
question, ‘Can it produce a rectangular hole?’ The answer to this question is
given in the next Sub-sub-sect.
Comprehensive
evidence of no bomb
(1) Skepticism
Why
is the shape of the ripped hole rectangular? cf. Photo 9, 10 and 11. In this regard, Mr. Rob, on Feb. 5 2016, expressed
his skepticism as follows:
“Interesting explosion caused by unknown for now - lots of straight line
on ripped parts, minimal or no damage on surrounding seats, when looking from
inside and outside (photos) opening seems reasonably square, straight lines and
'cuts'. I look forward to investigation findings.”
Since Mr. Rob expressed
this skepticism, it has passed 9 months but any answer has yet to come. He
herein gives it on behalf of a defender in the next Item (2).
(2)
Why the ripped hole is rectangular?
The answer to this question
directly gives the cause. The answer is:
(a)
The place where the hole was ripped had been the position where one of four
emergency exits was to be in the original design.
(b)
The place of the emergency exits used to be chosen on the root of wings in
conventional designs. cf. Photo 9 and
10. It’s because passengers can move
into an inflated floating lifeboat easily by using the wings as intermediate
stepping stages.
(c)
The emergency exits above the wings were moved to fore- and back-sides of the
wings. Spaces for the original emergency exits were closed.
(d) To
close each space, a plate of the same as the fuselage skin was used. It was
fixed in position by means of welding. Stringers were expanded onto it.
(e) It created a discontinuity in the fuselage,
but it wasn’t taken into account. Sure enough, fatigue cracks developed
faithfully along the weld lines, and when it developed up to a critical
condition, the fixed plate was severed from the position having let the
original shape of the emergency exit reappear as it was before the design change.
Comment: The
same failure will occur sooner or later in other three exits, since the quality
of the works for all the four is supposed to be the same.
Verbal
evidence
Jake Swearingen, one passenger, Darren Howe, speaking to the BBC, says “there was
no explosion on board. It was not an explosion but a fuselage failure at
10,000 feet."
Comment: Except the deceased passenger, Mr. Borleh, this eye witness, Mr. Howe, was sitting on the
nearest seat to the ripped hole (the
next seat to Mr. Borleh’s).
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
This Report summarizes its conclusions as follows:
(1) Making analogy between the five events, it’s
realized that there’re 10 points of similarity between them. Each point is rare
in general but practically common in all the five events. Then, one common
cause for all should be considered first. This study has found the common
cause, and induced a causation Hypothesis, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in a
cockpit’.
(2)
This study has deductively proved the existence of fatigue cracks in the
cockpit with M-event. The Hypothesis doesn’t contradict any premises of
rationality and facts of reality.
(3) Despite similarities in the five
events, popular hypotheses provide event-by-event a different cause which is
attributed to a dead human, more concretely, to a pilot if a plane was being
controlled by the pilot at a time of an event (F-, A- and L-event), else if the
plane was being controlled by autopilot (M- and E-event), to a (suicide)
bomber. A premise of the hypotheses is a ‘flawless plane’.
(4)
The premise has been denied, as the existence of ‘bulkhead fatigue crack in a
cockpit’ is confirmed with M-event cockpit debris. As per similitude of the
five events, the causation-related matters confirmed with M-event are also true
in E-event and three others. The bomb hypothesis itself of E-event has been denied together with
its consequences, fire and smoke. Hence, to deduce the bomb hypotheses is
tantamount to making grandchildren without having a child.
(5) The cause of E-event is the same as other four
events, stated in above Item (1). It knocked out the crew
and the control systems including black-box
sensors. The plane plunged into the Mediterranean as if it was a drone without
control.
This Report’s recommendations are as follows:
(1) As the control-system failure involved CVR/FDR recording,
there’s too few available data either to confirm or to deny any hypothesis.
This entity is a crucial criterion in the studies on the five events. Anybody
who enters the Airbus crash events should keep this entity in mind.
(2)
As his past Reports pointed out, this Report reiterates, “a weld joint,
regardless of its type (manual or automatic, linear or point), shouldn't exist
in a cockpit section.” It recommends again a friction joint in stead of a weld
one in general, as it is fatigue free by nature.
(3) To exit from current stalemate of the
Airbus-crash-event studies and from the repetitions of the same event, there’s
no way other than to follow this Report, overtly (best in all) or covertly
(better than do-not).
(4)
The current investigation system is 2 centuries behind the times, i.e., out of
place in the modern times. It’d be revised, e.g., the team’s functions are: (i)
Gathering data and forwarding them before the world where powerful /
professional search / select systems are. All the people interested (team
members as well) present their study results. (ii) Picking up world
rankings top ten study reports, (iii) from which editing a causation
hypothesis of oneness, again using the existing search / select machines in the
world.
(5)
In this way, the most probable cause can be defined with less time and
resources (<1/100) than the current system, without controversies that BEA
dislikes, data leakage that BEA accuses, wishful thinking, convenient discard,
act of perversity etc that are common place in the current system. Everything
is openly executed by an e-search/select system. All evils currently looming
above the investigations will go away all at once.
REFERENCES
[1] CNN, ‘Pilot response
led to AirAsia crash into Java Sea,’ ww.cnn.com/2015/12/01,
Dec 1,
2015 –
[2] Germanwings crash: ‘Co-pilot Lubitz 'practiced rapid descent',
SectionEurope, 6 May 2015
[4] Christian Roger, ‘The scandal of the Airbus A320 crash at Habsheim,
France,’ www.crashdehabsheim.net/ Jun 26, 1998
[5] Reuters, ‘Egypt says no evidence of terrorism in Russian Metrojet plane crash,’
December 14, 2015 - 9:16pm
[6] Mada Masr, ‘Rebutting Egypt report, Russia insists bomb
brought down Metrojet plane in Sinai as
inquiry continues,’ Monday,
December 14, 2015 - 21:43
[7] Scott Creighton, ‘Egyptair Flight MS804 : ACARS Data Shows Blown Out Windows in Cockpit – Shades of Flight MH17?,’ https://willyloman.wordpress.com/ May 21 2016
[8] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE,’
www.iba.ac.id, Jan. 6, 2012
[9] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘’A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE
COLLAPSE
(sequel),’ www.iba.ac.id/
[10] Sohei Matsuno, ‘UIBA'S
AND HAPPY PONTIST'S KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE THEORY,’www.iba.ac.id/documents/83
[11] Sohei Matsuno, ‘SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL
FLOODING (JAKARTA),’
[13] Sohei Matsuno, ‘JAKARTA FLOOD PREVENTION WITH A TRUE CAUSE (sequel),’ www.lba.ac.id/, 30
Apr.2013
[15] Sohei Matsuno, ‘CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,’ www.iba.ac.id/
[16]
Sohei Matsuno et al, ‘A CAUSAL STUDY ON THE AIRASIA
AIRBUS CRASH EVENT,’
www.iba.ac.id/
2015
[17] Sohei Matsuno, Asmadi,
‘A STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS
AIRBUS CRASH Event,’ www.iba.ac.id/documents/, 2015
[18] S. Matsuno, ‘STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS
AIRBUS CRASH,’
www.iba.ac.id/
[19] Dr.
Sohei Matsuno, MS. Pujiono, ‘LEARN BEA'S PRELIMINARY REPORT ON LUFTHANSA CRASH,’ www.iba.ac.id/documents/
[20] Sohei
Matsuno, ‘STUDY
ON RUSSIAN METROJET AIRBUS CRASH,’
soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/, Jan 8, 2016
[21] Sohei Matsuno, ‘REVIEW OF AIRBUS CRASH
& BUDGET SYSTEM -- given new data by Daallo event &
AirAsia –‘soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/, May 30 2016
EPILOGUE
This Report is
to unburden the parties involved in Airbus crash event studies from
resource-wasting efforts by giving a true cause. He shall wait and see its
effects.
PHOTO COLLECTION
Photo 7 Probable
fatigue cracks of EgyptAir Airbus
Photo13 Charge
for directional bomb
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