Tuesday 18 October 2016

STUDY ON EGYPTAIR AIRBUS CRASH

STUDY ON EGYPTAIR AIRBUS CRASH
--- By Analogy with the latest crashes ---

Sohei Matsuno
Prof. of freelance, Dr. without borders
Palembang, South-Sumatra, Indonesia
E-mail: sohei_matsuno@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT

This Report is of a study on EgyptAir Flight MS804 crash (19/May/2016). It’s a 4th event in a series of Airbus crashes during a 444-day period started with a 1st event, AirAsia Flight QZ8501 crash (31/Dec./2014). The four crashes have similarities. Suppose there’s a crash whose cause is not properly addressed study/practice-wise, what’ll happen? It’s repetitions of similar crashes of the same cause. Vice verse is also true. If similar crashes happen within a definite period, a common cause is to be. The writer has identified the common cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in a cockpit,’ and also found, “Air France crash (2009) had already heralded the four events.”
The writer’s Report of the 2nd event, Lufthansa crash (2015), predicted a few more crashes will be needed to reach the true cause. There've been two crashes since then. As the Report did, this Report again tries to let no more crash be. To realize it, this Report pursues the study by analogy with the latest events, mainly with the 3rd event ‘Metrojet crash (2015)’, referring to an extra event, Daallo emergency landing (2015).
This Report concludes, “To prevent more Airbus crashes from happening, there’s no way other than following this Report.”

Keywords: Airbus crashes, similarities in crashes, cockpit bulkhead fatigue crack

INTRODUCTION

Definitions and abbreviations
For definitions of technical terms, Cause, Determinant and Fatigue, cf. [11] and [16]. For the definitions of logical terms, Boolean, induction and deduction, cf. [19].
Abbreviations used in this report are to be read as follows:
US: The United States of America, UK: The United Kingdom, IS: The Islamic State, BEA: Bureau d'EnquĂȘtes Accident (Accident Enquiry Bureau) Paris, FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation, ATC: Air Traffic Control, He: The writer of this Report,
CVR: Cockpit Voice Recorder, FDR: Flight Data Recorder, ACARS: Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System, ABIDS: Acquired Basic Intelligence Deficiency Syndrome, E-event: EgyptAir Airbus crash (2016), D-event: Daallo Airline Airbus forced landing (2016), M-event, Metrojet Airbus crash (2015), L-event: Lufthansa Germanwings Airbus crash (2015), A-event: AirAsia Airbus crash (2014), F-event: Air France Airbus crash (2009),  BPR: BEA’s Preliminary Report of L-event, BFR: BEA’s Final Report of L-event.
Background of this Report
A study on a plane crash has a background against which the study is badly affected.
It’s a computer-programmed-automation system that has prevailed major societies. People in these societies needn’t (rather shouldn’t) process inputs with their thinking. They process them by hardware (computer) run by software (programs) and follow the outputs as supreme decisions. Further, people handover the outputs to robotic hardware to execute the outputs. Habit is second nature. People have been ABIDS sufferers. Against this background, if a problem of beyond programs happens, they’re unable to manage it but dart this way and that. It’s explained more in detail as follows:
First, a creative person is generally a persona non grata who disturbs a computer-program-governing society. ABIDS patients are personae grata, since they run it excellently. As major societies are going in this way for about three generations, the ABIDS power has overpowered the thinking power.
Second, as far as a thing is going as programmed, ABIDS people perform it excellently. But if something beyond the program (a plane crash is one of typical examples) happens, they’re painfully impotent to deal with it. Airbus crashes’ cause isn’t of a sophisticated / hi-tech level but of a primary / basic class that ABIDS people lack. For instance, they can’t consider a matter on a time axis. More concretely, they can’t make an analogy between a present problem and past ones, and also don’t see a matter in a long run. Both are basic devices in a causation study. Together with their general lack of ability to consider a matter by thinking, they only go hither and thither as the current investigations into crash events do.
Third, to make up for the above shortcomings, what used to be set up are: (i) a premise of flawless hardware (plane and its equipment) and software (programs to control their system) and (ii) deification of CVR/FDR. The former allows investigators to attribute the crash automatically to a human act, i.e., if the plane was being helmed by a human pilot at the time of crash then to the pilot, else if autopilot was being in position, to a suicide bomber. The latter intends to give the mediocre hypothesis a sanctuary, insisting, “Only investigators, who are expertise in the sophisticated / high-tech subject, hence, eligible to access data from CVR/FDR, can tell a truth.” As a natural consequence, they used to keep the data covert, unless otherwise leaked accidentally. It’s seen in F-, L- & E-event. F-event’s is discussed later.
Under the above background, causation studies are apt to seek a temporizing hypothesis to bring the least monetary, reputation and time losses to the parties concerned, [8] ~ [21].
Purpose of this Report
To put the current causation studies on a right track can’t be done in a short time, much less if the correct way isn’t shown. The purpose of this Report is to show it, by making an analogy between the E-event and the latest events.

E-EVENT STUDY BY ANALOGY

Preliminary knowledge
This study has been done correspondingly to the following Sub-sects. Before entering the respective discussions, readers are informed of two particular characters of the E-event study in the following two Sub-sub-sects.
In this Report, the five (Airbus crash) events includes F-event (2009) on the top of the four (Airbus crash) events (2014 ~ 2016).
CVR/FDR play a little role in studies on the four events particularly on E-event
CVR/FDR data that usually play a key role in a deductive proof of an inductively derived hypothesis. But in the four events, their role is little. In E-event, it’s further less than the other three. It’s because of the following three realties:
(1)   A fatigue crack starts at the bottom of cockpit’s avionics bay. It advances upward slowly, taking a decade long time until it reaches a rupture stage. As the fatigue crack has mere width, unlike other fuselage irregularities, to detect it during this latent period is difficult. The control-system devices in the bay are also insignificantly affected during the period.
(2)   When the fatigue crack reaches a critical extent, rupture takes place. It develops quick, taking only several-secconds’ to several-minutes’ time until it ends up in destruction. The decompression in the cockpit fuselage rupture to total control-system failure took 3 min. in E-event. En passant, if it’s caused by bomb blast, it takes only micro-seconds time. It’s to be noticed that in all the other four events, rupture advanced from an avionics bay up to a pilot-cockpit. But in E-event, the rupture advanced in an opposite way, i.e., from a pilot cockpit down to an avionics bay. As more sensors are in the pilot cockpit than in the avionics bay, CVR/FDR stopped recording in more items and shorter time in E-event than in other four events.
(3)   There’s no data (essential) after the total control-system failure. Further, from a few min. before the total failure, data (indispensable) are dubious, as CVR/FDR are possibly receiving faulty signals from sensors. Particularly in E-event, due to the above stated realities, CVR/FDR gives further less data than the other events.
Comment 1: The poor data is not only of CVR/FDR but of ACARS and Transponder. Among the data, Boolean variables may be better trusted than digital ones. Recorded absolute times (digital) are also worthy of doubt. It’d be accepted as relative times on an independent timeline. Analog data in CVR are more acceptable than digital ones.
Comment 2: In F- and L-event, CVR/FDR had been still working until the plane collided with sea or ground, because planes’ descent after the partial control-system failure retarded further control-system failures. Hence, CVR/FDR kept recording until collisions.
Comment 3: FDR data of L-event were damaged not in mid-air by the cause mentioned above. As explained in his Reports, [19], it was by the heat generated when FDR was subjected to cold works due to deformation and rupture at the time of ground collision.
Three reports needed to be verified
There’re three unconfirmed reports that could help the study, would they be verified. They’re as follows: Note: All the sentences written with Italic letters are quotations.

(1)  Did EgyptAir plane do three emergency landings within 24 hours before the crash?

Reports say “The plane did,” but EgyptAir says “Didn’t.” cf. the reports below:
Three separate warnings were transmitted from the plane to the airline's base in Cairo during take-off on 18 May, The Times reports.
Bulent KAVAKKORU from Istanbul, Turkey/Wikimedia, CC, French broadcaster France 3 reports, “The EgyptAir plane that mysteriously disappeared in the Mediterranean on May 19, with 66 people on board, did three emergency landings in the 24 hours before the crash.”
EgyptAir has denied the claims, with Chairman Safwat Musallam saying there had not been a fault with the plane. "We fully trust the aircraft and pilot." Further, "You do not investigate with preconceived technical or political ideas," the source told Le Parisien.
Egyptian investigators believe terrorism to be the most likely cause of the crash, a theory that one person within the French investigation says has led to deteriorating relations between the two teams.
According to reports, the signals based on which the emergency landings were made are from the same ACARS as the one that recorded a slew of messages of the fatal flight. The plane underwent a technical audit at each landing. But no problem was found and allowed to take off till the fatal flight. The emergency landings were prompted by signals having sent ‘smoke’ onboard that went off shortly after taking off. cf. a quotation.

EgyptAir flight MS804: “Smoke alerts sent in day before crash.” The EgyptAir plane which crashed into the Mediterranean last month sent several smoke alerts in the 24 hours before it disappeared, it has been claimed.

Comment: The ‘smoke’ was actually the ‘fog’. The ‘smoke’ that the doomed EgyptAir Airbus Flight MS804 experienced in its 6-lotation flights between Eritrea, Egypt, Tunisia and France can’t be heralds of a bomb blast. But the ‘fog’ can be the heralds of the fatigue rupture. That is, fog was caused by slow decompression due to the first stage fatigue rupture that’d been developing in the 6-rotation flights.
(2) Did a pilot have a several-min. conversation with Egypt ATC just before the crash?
Reports say, “A pilot did” but EgyptAir says “Didn’t.” cf. quotations below.

Last week officials said there had been no distress call from the plane. But a French television station reported Sunday the pilot of the EgyptAir flight spoke to air traffic control in Egypt for several minutes just before the plane crashed. M6 television said the pilot told Cairo about smoke that had engulfed parts of the aircraft and decided to make an emergency descent to try to clear the fumes. M6’s story quoted anonymous French aviation officials and was not confirmed by the French air accident investigation agency, the BEA.

EgyptAir Flight 804 Update: Pilot Spoke To EgyptAir Control before Descent — Report

By ERIN BANCO @ERINBANCO on 05/22/16 at 4:00 pm:
Now, news about discussions between the pilot and air control in the minutes before the flight crashed raise questions about the integrity of the investigation.
Although an airline spokesman said last week there had been a distress call from the Airbus 320, the statement was denied by the Egyptian military and by EgyptAir.
Comment: This matter has a relation to some of the investigators’ insertion, “A clear voice of ‘Fire’ heard in CVR.” It’s discussed later in this Report.
(3) Had the plane turned anomalously and plunged to 15,000 ft before disappearing?
The Greek radar confirmed, “The plane did” but Egyptian Authority says “It didn’t.” cf. the following quotations.
“The plane made a 90-degree turn to the left and then a full circle to the right, dropping precipitously to 15,000 feet from 37,000 ft and then plunging again to 9,000 feet before it disappeared from radar.”
Members of the Egyptian investigation committee say “the aircraft did not swerve before it disappeared from radar under a minute after entering Egyptian airspace.”
There have been differing accounts of the Airbus A320’s final moments, with the Greek defense minister’s account of “it abruptly turning to the left and then in a full circle as it plummeted,” contradicted by Egyptian officials.
Comment: If the Greek minister’s account is true, it means the E-event plane had rudder / elevation control system failures, and shares one of the 10 points of similarity, ‘anomalous swerves before disappearance’, with other (except F-) events. cf. next Sub-sect.
Among the three unconfirmed reports, Item (2) is of the communication exclusively between Egypt ATC and the plane. Hence, there’s no way of independent verification. But the other two Items of (1) and (3) must have records. If verified, it’ll help to know the plane’s conditions before and when the emergency happened.
Similarities between the five events

The 10 points of similarity between the five Airbus crash events are as follows:

  (1) Events involving Airbus,

  (2) Events at cruising altitudes,

  (3) Existence of an ominous irregularity in some flight control system,

  (4) Ending up in a total control-system failure (except F- and L-event),

  (5) Sequent steep ascent / stall / descent to crash (except L-event),

  (6) Anomalous swerve(s) in the fatal descent (except L-event),

  (7) Planes’ three-part division of cockpit, tail and main body after crash (unclear in F- event),

  (8) Cockpit’s and tail’s different destruction manners from main body’s (ditto),

  (9) No flight-balance recovery by either pilots or autopilot,

(10) No distress call from pilots, after emergency happened (except F-event).

It’s to be noticed that the similarities cover a wide range of items such as type of plane (1), altitude where trouble happened (2), behavior of events (3) ~ (6), feature of plane wreckage (7) and (8), pilots’ / autopilot’s responses to the event (9) and (10). Further, all the items are rare in general crash events but common in the five events. For instance, happening at cruising altitude is 10 % per all plane accidents. On the other hand, it’s 100 % for the five events. The other items have the same tendency. In this context, it’s highly probable that the five events have one common cause.
It’s generally true, e.g., if there’re a series of murder cases whose way is unique (rare) but common to all the cases, it’s orthodox to assume a common culprit first. It’s heterodox to assume case-by-case a different culprit throughout a series of similar cases. Jack the Ripper case (London, in 1888) is a typical example.
Comment 1: Item (4) didn’t happen in F- and L-event, because plane’s intentional (L-event) and unintentional (F-event) descent after Item (3) retarded the further fatigue rupture development. In F-event, Item (10) didn’t happen; hence, pilots were conscious as there was no decompression in the cockpit until the extreme end of the event.
Comment 2: Items (3), (5) ~ (8) of E-event have not yet been (but will be) confirmed.
Other studies’ causation hypotheses on the five events
Brief explanations of the respective events
Other hypotheses on the four events are introduced in his past Reports, [16] ~ [20]. This Sub-sub-sect. suffices to briefly explain the five events for readers’ digest.
(1)  F-event
There was a pitot-tube trouble. While coping with the trouble, a copilot who became mentally unbalanced by a facing storm reacted to the situation incorrectly by having placed the plane at a nose-up position in stead of nose-down, and ultimately caused the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall from which the plane couldn’t recover its balance again and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean.  cf. BEA's Final Report.
(2) A-event
There was a matter with a vertical rudder. While the captain coped with the trouble, the copilot ‘pulled up’ the plane nose when the captain instructed him to ‘pull down’ instead of ‘push down'. This miscommunication resulted in an aerodynamic stall and the plane crashed into the Java Sea. cf. [1].
(3) L-event
Though there’d been already elevator irregularities on the plane’s bound flight one day before the event, BPR doesn’t relate it to the event, concluding the mentally depressed copilot deliberately descended the plane until it collided with the French Alps, [2] & [3].
(4) M-event
In M-event, the plane was under autopilot’s control. Further, Airbus’ rear part broke up in mid-air. Given the conditions as the above, the pilot-centered hypothesis is inapplicable. ‘A structural failure in mid-air’ is an inevitable premise. But the cause of the mid-air failure is controversial, i.e., (i) bomb blast (Russian team, [6]), (ii) no evidence of bomb (Egyptian team, [5]) and (iii) bulkhead fatigue rupture (he, [20]).
Comment: Egyptian report is transient. Its due studies may find evidence of bomb or confirm the transient conclusion and find a cause in some technical matters other than a bomb. The Egyptian study has taken a step forward but still many steps far from truth.
(5) E-event
The studies on this event are still on the way, mainly as per ACARS data. Given the currently applicable information, its would-be hypothesis may be as follows:
A bomb was smuggled and planted in a cockpit nearby its right windows by somebody (copilot?). The blast gave its direct effects on the right windows. i.e., spoiled and pushed them out. The fire and smoke almost spontaneously spread from the cockpit to a lavatory of the next door of its back and a cabin, and 1 min. later, into an avionics bay beneath the cockpit floor through cracks caused by the blast. Further 2 min. later, two items of control-system failures in the avionics bay were recorded. This is the final entry. 40 sec. after it, the plane began abnormal swerves and plunged into the Mediterranean with an uncontrolled descent, [7].
His critiques on the hypotheses
(1) General matters
The critiques of the four events are explained in his past Reports. Points in the Reports are: (i) making analogy between A- and L-event, similarities are found, (ii) the two events had been already preceded by F-event, (iii) the Reports reveal a common cause, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in a cockpit,’ and (iv) E-event is on the extension of the past four events.
The popular hypotheses aren’t compatible with his Reports in connection with all the above study points stated in (i) ~ (iv).
First, despite the obvious similarities, popular hypotheses give a different cause for each event. But any one of the causes doesn’t characterize any one of the similarities.
Second, when the different causes are scrutinized, a common trend can be seen. That is, all the hypotheses (except Egypt’s) attribute the cause to human acts of pilot, copilot, passenger and/or collaborator. On what ground is this kind of thought bred? It’s on the ground of die-hard myth ‘flawless hardware and perfect software in the system,’ Note: They agree some control-system irregularities as local-isolated-minor matters.
Third, aviation experts’ comments on the Airbus crash used to begin with the admiration for its high safety records, [16]. It means that the flawless plane is a scientifically supported concept. If causation studies are done within a framework thus limited, a human act is a cause of course. No wonder that everybody jumps on the bandwagon en route to this destination. Hence, the confirmation or denial of the premise of the hypothesis, ‘flawless plane’ shall precede the critiques on the E-event. cf. the next quotation.
The plane involved, an Airbus A320, has one of the best safety records compared to other popular models, with 0.14 hull loss fatal accidents per million departures, according to Boeing, which analyzed safety data between 1959 and 2013.
The four events began in 2014, just next year after the end of the above statistics’ observation period. Regarding the matter, what should be emphasized is that the fatigue rupture has a latent period until it becomes active. In the five events, the latent period seems to be as long as a decade, which is an equivalent to about 15000 flight (= the number of cycle of alternating force), because a dominant alternating force to cause fuselage fatigue is an atmospheric pressure change at each flight. A primary factor that governs a fatigue time is primarily the amplitude of the alternating force that is practically the same for all commercial jet liners. But other factors, e.g., stress concentration by structural / material discontinuity / heterogeneity, secondary stress by temperature change, residual thermal stress by hot works etc, shorten the fatigue time. Take note, a weld joint in a cockpit satisfies all the above factors. In this context, the excellent safety records until 2013 can’t deny the existence of fatigue-crack flaws in Airbuses. Its existence has been confirmed with the Airbus wreckage of M-event, [20].
Now, let’s enter the respective events after his past five Reports with some new inputs.
(2) F-event
An essential part of the leaked CVR data of pilots’ conversations (spoken in French translated into English) in the last 4 min. 21 sec. are quoted bellow. Note: Records 02:03:44 ~ 02:10:07 are omitted as are irrelevant to the matter.
No.1: 02:10:07 (Robert) What is this?
   2: 02:10:15 (Bonin)  There’s nogood ... There’s no good speed indication.
 “   3: 02:10:16 (Robert) We’ve lost the, the, the speed then?
 “   4: 02:10:27 (Robert)  Pay attention to your speed. Pay attention to your speed.
 “   5: 02:10:28 (Bonin)   Okay, okay, I'm descending.
    6: 02:10:30 (Robert) Stabilize...
 “   7: 02:10:31 (Bonin) Yeah.
      8: 02:10:31 (Robert) Descend ..... It says we’re going up ... It says we’re going up, so descend.
 “   9: 02:10:35 (Bonin)  Okay
 “ 10: 02:10:36 (Robert) Descend!
   11: 02:10:37(Bonin)   Here we go, we're descending.
 “ 12: 02:10:38 (Robert) Douce! Gently!
 “ 13: 02:10:41 (Bonin)   We're ... Yeah, we're in a climb.
 “ 14: 02:10:49 (Robert)  Damn it, where is he?
 “ 15: 02:10:55 (Robert)  Damn it!
 “ 16: 02:11:03 (Bonin)   I'm in TOGA, huh?
 “ 17: 02:11:06 (Robert) Damn it, is he coming or not?
 “ 18: 02:11:21 (Robert) We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don’t understand what's happening.
“ 19: 02:11:32 (Bonin)  Damn it. I don’t have control of the plane. I don’t have control of the plane at all.plane at all
 “ 20: 02:11:37 (Robert)  Left seat taking control!
 “ 21: 02:11:43 (Captain) What the hell are you doing?
 “ 22: 02:11:45 (Bonin)   We've lost control of the plane!
  23: 02:11:47 (Robert)  We've totally lost control of the plane. We don't understand at all...  We've tried everything.
 “ 24: 02:12:14 (Robert)  What do you think? What do you think? What should we do?
 “ 25: 02:12:15 (Captain) Well, I don't know! (Captain urges Bonin to level the wings.
They discuss, plane is in fact climbing or descending, before agreeing that they are indeed descending.)
 “ 26: 02:13:40 (Robert)   Climb... Climb... climb... climb...
 “ 27: 02:13:40 (Bonin)    But I've had the stick back the whole time!
 “ 28: 02:13:42 (Captain) No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.
 “ 29: 02:13:43 (Robert)   Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!
 “ 30: 02:14:23 (Robert)  Damn it; we're going to crash... This can't be happening!
 “ 31: 02:14:25 (Bonin)   But what's happening?
   32: 02:14:27 (Captain) Ten degrees of pitch ....
1.4 sec. later, CVR stopped recording. Investigators say, “At this point, the aircraft's ground speed was 107 knots, descending at 10,912 ft per min., 108 knots of vertical speed and 16.2˚ pitch. During the descent, the aircraft had turned more than 180˚ to the right to a compass heading of 270 degrees. The aircraft remained stalled during its entire 3.5-min. descent from 38,000 ft before it hit the ocean surface.”
The BEA, in a press release, stated, "The BEA strongly condemns the disclosure of this transcription, which is a violation of Article 14 of the European Regulation of 20 October 2010 that came into effect on 2 December 2010. This transcription mentions personal conversations between the crew members that have no bearing on the event,*1 which shows a lack of respect for the memory of the late crew members*2. The BEA safety investigation has not yet been completed and any attempt at interpretation at this stage is partial and, as a result, can only fan the flames of the controversies*2 of the last few months, which is harmful to all concerned.*2"
*1 The conversations between the crew members aren’t personal but of duties that have bearing on the event.
*2 BEA is proud. There’re much more powerful fish in the ocean of the world than the fish in a well of the BEA. The leakage may be inconvenient to BEA. But the inputs from outside men of knowledge and experience must be useful to BEA. The leakage of the CVR data isn’t harmful but useful to all concerned, especially to victims’ families for their quick due preparations and for pilots to restore their honor more timely. BEA is afraid of controversies. The controversy is a mother of development.
BEA’s primary judgment from the conversations is, “everything (every control system) is working fine.” cf. a quotation (from BEA Final Report) below:
Aside (from) the loss of airspeed indication, everything is working fine.
Based on this premise, BEA depicts the F-event as follows: (i) The pilots who crashed AF447 were three highly trained pilots flying for one of the most prestigious fleets in the world. (ii) At 1 hr 36 min, the flight enters the outer extremities of a tropical storm system. Pilots didn’t avoid it but tried to go through it. (iii) The frightening thunderstorm made the helming copilot (Bonin)’s nerve center be damaged. (iv) Having lost proper capability, the copilot led the plane to a stall, having ended up in the crash. cf. the following quotation.
While Bonin's behavior is irrational, it is not inexplicable. Intense psychological stress tends to shut down the part of the brain responsible for innovative, creative thought. It's not surprising, then, that amid the frightening disorientation of the thunderstorm.
He interprets the conversations as follows:
The control-system disorder started when a senior copilot (Robert) asked the copilot (Bonin) about sudden nose up and speed down, What's this?” (No.1). Bonin replied, “There’s no good speed indication,” (No. 2). Having changed automatic to manual control, they coped with the problem by descending the plane. The plane seemed to recover the speed (No. 3~7). But they realized the indication of the plane was still saying ‘climb’. Hence, they tried to descend the plane again and again but in vain, (No. 8~12). They thought the plane didn’t change the climbing status as it kept nose up and the altimeter was indicating increasing altitude. As the situation was uncontrollable, they called the Captain, (No. 13~17). They didn’t know yet if the plane is descending but knew the engines do not get power to get speed, (No. 18 and 19). The Captain returned the cockpit and asked the situation. They told the captain the uncontrollable / incomprehensible situation and asked the Captain how to solve the problem. The Captain also didn’t know how. They realized the plane was, in fact, descending, (No. 21~25). Having been the end of their resources, their thought was only went climb and descent, Bonin must have really tried TOGA when it was too low to descend anymore, (No. 26~31). The Captain bound the story by telling the plane’s last posture, (No. 32).
Comment 1: Bonin doesn’t mean by No. 2 that the speed indicator was broken, as Bonin (Robert / the Captain as well) is, up until the death moment, a devote believer of the flawless plane myth.
Comment 2: Bonin's statement, No. 16 is an expression of wonder about the uncontrolled climb. It should be read with complementary words as: “(Despite no command,) I’m in TOGA, huh (Why)?” Bonin didn’t exerted TOGA at a cruising altitude, though hopelessly tried it when it was really needed, but the engines didn’t generate power for it (No. 18). Note: TOGA is an acronym for ‘Take Off, Go Around’. When a plane is taking off or aborting a landing, a plane must gain both speed and altitude as quick as possible. For this critical flight phase, pilots are trained to increase engine power to the TOGA level and raise the nose to a certain pitch angle.
Comment 3: The conversations and the data reveal that the plane had matters with (at least) seven control systems, viz. autopilot, elevation, rudder, aileron, engine, altimeter, and speedometer. Some sensors might have been broken and sending wrong signals. 
Comment 4: What is on earth, it’s strange to assume that pilots, who have been excellent up to the day of the event, suddenly loss their ability in a flawless plane under a storm. BEA’s theory is plausible only when the three pilots had simultaneously suffered mass mental disorder. Note: Bonin always worked with the senior copilot (Robert) and the Captain during the last time of crisis. In fact, F-event was caused not by a broken nerve center in copilot’s brain, but a broken nerve center in plane’s avionics bay.
The three men must be excellent pilots with a flawless plane flying as programmed. But at the same time, they’re ABIDS pilots who by nature haven’t the creative thought to manage a beyond-program event. All pilots of the five events, except L-event copilot (creative), couldn’t know the true cause. For the time being, few pilots can know it even if given a decade long time, much less within several seconds' to several minutes' time. If a pilot could know the true cause, the pilot should (without useless efforts) descend the plane, and seek an emergency landing as the L-event copilot did. In this way, there’s still a chance to save, at least, passengers, [17] ~ [19].
F-event may have been unavoidable at that time. The matter is, “if F-event had been properly addressed study-/practice-wise, the four events didn’t happen.” Likewise, in the four events, “if the prior event had been given a correct solution, the next one didn’t happen.” That is, more events are avoidable at this time.
The best way is to follow overtly this Report. By doing so; the matter can be solved basically. But if it’s difficult to do so, do it covertly. It’s still better than do-not, since it can solve the matter at least superficially.
(3) L-event
BEA has issued BPR and BFR of L-event. The former is of a causation study. His three Reports, [17] ~ [19], are the critiques of it. The latter explains the importance of a mental health check of pilots. He has no objection to it, hence, no comment on it too.
His Report [19] says L-event’s Determinant is the location of the plane crash site.

BPR identifies the site 1.1 km ahead the plane’s last radar contact point. His is 6 km. The sectionEurope’s is 12 km. The matter is controversial. BFR says the altitude of the plane at the last contact time isn’t 2000 m but 1885 m. Nonetheless, the above problem remains. There must be one answer. cf. Photo 1. Note: All photos are in PHOTO COLLECTION attached at the end of this Report.

(a)   Origin: the sectionEurope (b) Blue: BEA, Red: flightradar24, [19]

→         Photo 1 Distance between last radar contact point and crash site

(4) E-event
Popular studies currently start with ACARS data. According to ACARS, the sequence of emergency was: loss of cockpit’s right windows by bomb blast occurred first, almost spontaneously, fire reached the front lavatory, 1 min. later on, the avionics bay and, 2 more min. after that, two control systems there were destroyed. These are regarded as undisputable facts, since (i) FDR’s data verify ACARS’, (ii) soot / heating trace are seen on a piece of fuselage debris of the plane’s front section, and (iii) clear voice of ‘Fire’ is recorded in CVR. Alas, this induction is the origin of a logical quagmire in the sequent deductive reasoning.
As a source of the fire, a short circuit is also considered. No source of fire is conceivable besides these two. But the short circuit is deleted as no combustible material is used in a plane. They’re uninflammable or uneasy-inflammable, i.e., skin, frames and stringers (aluminum), insulation blankets (glass fiber) and interior / floor panels (phenol resin). Hence, fire can’t spread quickly unless otherwise helped by an incendiary bomb. cf. a quotation below
Both the floor and interior panels are fabricated with phenol resin because of its excellent low fire, smoke and toxic gas emission features as well as good corrosion and impact resistance properties. Because it is difficult to find a complete set of material properties for insulation blankets used in the Airbus A320, the material properties of the glass fiber blankets found in Ref. are used.
Thus, the bomb could survive an inductive step of a causation study. Difficulty is in the next deductive step. There’s no evidence to prove it. Reason is, what the smoke sensors detected wasn’t smoke but fog. No smoke = no fire = no bomb. Nothing comes of nothing. If nothing comes of something, it’s something imaginary. But the bomb hypothesis has a lot of contradictions. Some of them are shown herein.
The bomb hypothesis justifies ‘fire’ with a heat effect and residual soot on the fuselage-debris of the plane’s front section. It further expands its supposition, saying “the color of smoke detected in the front lavatory / avionics bay was dark black, since the color of soot on the fuselage debris is dark black.” The fuselage debris isn’t of the cockpit-lavatory section. Hence, the matters on it are local / isolated ones that don’t represent any phenomenon in the cockpit-lavatory section. The fuselage debris and its insulation blanket show no clue of fire. Other more-fire-sensitive debris, passengers’ belongings such as plastic bags, shoes, cloths etc have also no clue of fire. cf. Photo 2.
        Photo 2 Debris (a) Fuselage segment (b) passengers’ belongings
Heat damage observed on the fuselage segment isn’t damage by ‘fire’ but is an effect of ‘heat’ generated by a cold work when it was torn off. The soot (so observed) is a cake of the phenol-resin-made interior or floor panels, melted by the heat and clung to the fuselage debris after cooled. The voice of ‘Fire’ is a ghost story, since cockpit’s right windows had blown outside before the smoke (fire) broke up in the lavatory/avionics-bay. The decompression at a cruising altitude is fatal, it means immediate human death. Hence, ‘Fire’ is a voice of a dead human. But the ghost story can be a real one, only if the shadowy report of pilot’s several-min. conversation about ‘smoke’ before the plane disappearance is recognized, and the timing (without synchronization) of the voice recording is within the conversation period. If not, the contradiction remains.
This study’s causation Hypothesis of E-event
Visualization of fatigue cracks
Photo 3 shows the wreckage of the severed cockpit (a) and radome (b) at the M-event crash site. They’re both the plane’s right side views. The posture of the cockpit is upside down and of the radome is upside left in Photo 3.
                          (a) Cockpit                            (b) Radome    
→        Photo 3 Wreckage of cockpit and radome of Metrojet Airbus
Rotate Photo 3 (a) clockwise at 180˚ and (b) 90˚, their postures are upright. cf. Photo 4.
  (a) Cockpit                     (b) Radome
→        Photo 4 Rotated cockpit and radome to upright posture
Insert Photo 4 (a) into a photo of the Metrojet Airbus’ cockpit to have a montage photo, draw lines along the cut sections, and it gives Photo 5 (a). Remove the wreckage from it, and it gives Photo 5 (b) in which a fatigue crack at the critical stage is shown by a red line.
(a) Montage original / debris cockpit photos
(b) Fatigue crack in cockpit (red) & radome separation line (yellow)
→        Photo 5 Process to realize fatigue crack in Metrojet Airbus cockpit
As seen in Photo 5 (b), the fatigue crack was about to reach the lower edge of cockpit’s right windows, when rupture took place.
A yellow line is a severed section of the radome which is not welded but pivoted by a hinge at its top and locked around it for easy inspections. cf. Photo 8 (a).
Comment: Though the cockpit that had weld joints in it had a crack in mid-air, the radome didn’t but kept it jointed until the plane collided with the ground. It proves the weld joint’s effect to bring about a fatigue crack more easily than a locked joint. It’s also the reason why this Report recommends a friction joint in stead of a weld joint.
In the same way as the cockpit-fatigue-crack-visualization process, the fatigue cracks in the rear section are visualized by fixing the severed rear section debris in the original rear section and show its edges, Photo 6 (a). Remove the debris from it, and  it yields Photo 6 (b).
 (a) Rear-section debris inserted in original place (b) Fatigue cracks in rear section
→         Photo 6 Process to realize fatigue cracks in Metrojet Airbus’ rear section
In Photo 6 (b), a rear line is a fatigue crack corresponding to the position of the rear pressure bulkhead. A front one is a fatigue crack that’s particular in M-event due to a past repair.
As per phenomenal similitude between the five events, the cracks thus visualized in M-event can be applied to other four events. Apply them to E-event, and it gives Photo 7.
→          Photo 7 Probable fatigue cracks of EgyptAir Airbus
Fatigue crack / rupture pattern vs. plane-crash feature
As per the similitude in the five events, every (especially qualitative) pattern of M-event should be of E-event and the other three.
(1)   Sequence of fatigue crack / rupture vs. its consequences
A fatigue crack starts from the bottom of the cockpit and develops upward in two prongs of left and right side symmetrically. If it starts from either side, the crack is left/right asymmetrical. The fatigue crack doesn’t start from the cockpit top, as the fuselage there has no fatigue-crack promoter, frame (welded). Contrarily, at the cockpit bottom, the fuselage has frames, stringers (welded) and electronic devices (some welded). The fatigue crack goes strait up a frame. When it meets a pilot-cockpit floor, it changes its direction a little backward to a lavatory. Before reaching the lavatory, it meets a stringer and turns forward and advances along the stringer. At the end (joint) of the stringer, it changes its direction upward and goes up until it’s about to reach a lower edge of right cockpit windows where it’s been critical for rupture. cf. Photo 5 (b).
If a bomb blast is the cause, it finishes doing its works within micro-seconds’ time.  But if fatigue rupture is the cause, it takes more time as it follows the development of rupture. In the four events, rupture began in at the bottom of an avionics bay and broke control systems there. After several seconds' ~ several minutes' time, it broke into the pilot cockpit. Hence, pilots’ death happens in a last stage of the development of rupture.
In E-event, ACARS reveals that the rupture proceeded from fatigue crack's end point and went down to its beginning point. The consequences followed it, i.e., right cockpit window’s anomaly and copilot’s sliding window’s brow up first. Instantly, ‘smoke’ broke into the lavatory, ‘fog’ into the cabin and, 1 min. after that, ‘smoke’ flew into the avionics bay. Further 1 min. later, a fault in another right cockpit window failure took place. After another 1-min., faults of an autopilot flight control unit and wing spoilers’ control system in the avionics bay followed, [7]. This is the last entry of ACARS. 40 sec. later, the plane faded out in a Greek controllers’ radar screen at 02:29:40.
Comment 1: The report describes ‘smoke’ in the lavatory and ‘fog’ in the cabin. A sensor can’t distinguish between ‘smoke’ and ‘fog’. A human did it to have let the story meet the reality, ‘no smoke in the cabin’. No smoke was not only in the cabin but throughout the plane.
Comment 2: Any measure instrument (sensors) for any specified physical quantity (balance, scale, watch, thermometer etc) regards any unspecified input as the specified one, e.g., a thermo-sensor regards ‘force’ as ‘temperature’, a scale does ‘temperature’ as ‘length’ etc.
(2)   Status of fatigue crack vs. of plane’s wreckage
This Report shows the concordance of fatigue crack status to cockpit wreckage reality” with M-event.
Photo 8 (a) is a front view of the cockpit in an upright status. The wreckage was upside-down at the crash site. To see the situation above the cockpit windows, it was overturned. It’s Photo 8 (b). Photo 8 (c) is a right-side view of Photo 8 (b).
              (a) Upright cockpit (b) Rotated cockpit wreckage (c) ditto, view from right
→          Photo 8 M-event’s upside-down cockpit at crash site overturned for investigations
As seen in Photo 8 (c), the cockpit under the cockpit windows remains, as it was isolated from the main body by the fatigue crack. But the one above the windows isn’t. It shared destruction with the main body, as it wasn’t separated from the main body by the fatigue crack.

REVIEW OF AIRBUS CRASHES REFERRING TO D-EVENT

General
In D-event, the plane didn’t crash but managed an emergency landing, as the fatigue rupture didn’t happen in a cockpit but in a cabin. But if it’s seen from a causation point of view, it pertains to the same category of the five events, i.e., ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture’.  As usual, its cause is attributed to a suicide bomber. In this context, D-event is a full-scale/in-situ model test of the five events. D-event study, needn’t CVR/FDR data, as it’s caught red-handed in the event. It’s why this Report reviews the Airbus crashes with D-event, [21].
Incident
Flight DAO 159/D3 159 took off from the Mogadishu airport at 11:00 local time on Feb. 2 2016 en route to Djibouti City. A big sound was heard 20 minutes after it took off at an altitude of about 4,300 m. The captain thought it was a sound by a window having got out of the fuselage. The cabin was immediately hidden in sick fog. After several seconds, the fog disappeared and visibility came back. Then, a hole ripped in the right side fuselage was seen. The aircraft returned to the airport safely, with one passenger unaccounted for. All other 73 passengers and 7 clues on board disembarked. Only two passengers were taken to a hospital with minor injuries.
Investigation
Many reports of being much the same have appeared, saying, “Somalia-based terror group, Al-Shabaab linked to Al Qaeda, is thought to be behind the event, whose bomb ripped a hole in the side of the jet.” On Feb. 13, eleven days after the incident, Al-Shabaab, in an email statement, claimed responsibility for the attack. Got a good reason, subsequent investigations are comfortably going with the suicide-bomb hypothesis. He’s never surprised by the development, as the past hypotheses used to proceed with the similar ways.
At this time, the hypothetical story is depicted by media as follows:
A security camera recording from the airport shows one of two men, seemingly airport employees, takes a laptop (computer) and hands it over to another employee who gives it to a passenger. The laptop concealed TNT. The passenger had some connections to airline or airport personnel. The passenger was able to bypass airport security and successfully smuggled the explosive device into the plane, having hidden it in the passenger’s wheelchair. The passenger was transferred into a regular seat after having been brought onto the plane. But the passenger moved to a different seat; as the passenger knew precisely where to sit and to place the device to maximize damage. The passenger sat a right-window-side seat (16F) near from the root of a right wing where a fuel tank is located. Soon after take off, the passenger blew himself up there and the blast ripped a hole on the fuselage. ‘Fire’ erupted on the flight. The cabin was filled by ‘smoke’. The passenger himself was also engulfed in flames and sucked out of the plane through the ripped hole by the cabin air pressure within seconds after the blast.
Official investigations to verify the above hypothetical configuration is underway by Somalia's Air Accident Investigation Authority, the National Intelligence and Security Agency in cooperation with airport authority, local police, Daallo Airlines, a technical team of Hermes Airlines (the owner of the aircraft) and the aircraft's manufacturer (Airbus). The FBI is also contributing its efforts to the investigations.
The results of the investigations up to now are as follows:
On Feb. 3, the missing person's body was found in the Balcad area, about 30 km north of Mogadishu. The person was identified as Abdullahi Abdisalam Borleh, a 55-year-old male from Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland region of Somalia, a teacher at an Islamic school. Sheikh Mohamed Abdullah, a mosque imam in Hargeisa said, “One of the reasons Borleh was going abroad is to have medical treatment.” A Somali federal official stated, “Borleh was in security agent’s list, but never as a dangerous person.” A senior Somalia immigration official said, “Borleh obtained a Turkish visa to work in Turkey.” A letter was allegedly sent from a certain office to the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, having asked to facilitate a working visa for Borleh who was expected to be an adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and investment promotions.
Both airport employees who allegedly handed over a TNT-charged laptop were arrested. Including two passengers on the plane, one of whom was sitting in the next seat to Borleh; total 20 people have been arrested on suspicion of being linked to the attack. Transport Minister Ali Ahmed Jamac confirmed that the explosion was caused by a bomb that aimed at killing all on board. Two US government sources said that initial forensic testing of the damage on Flight 159 had detected possible traces of TNT residue on the aircraft.
The pilot, Vlatko Vodopivec, firstly said the sound heard was by a window having got out of the fuselage, but going with a tide of the bomb hypothesis, has changed the previous words, saying, “What I heard was of the bomb blast.” Vodopivec also criticized the lack of security around the aircraft at the airport, describing the facility as chaotic. In an interview with the Associated Press, Vodopivec explained, “the security is zero. When we park there, some 20 to 30 people come to the tarmac, of which no one has a badge or those yellow vests. They enter and leave the plane, and no one knows who is who. They can put anything inside when passengers leave the aircraft." In this way, Vodopivec suggested, “not necessarily the suicide bomber only, but there were a lot of people who could plant a bomb,” having added, “The blast likely would have set off a catastrophic secondary explosion in the fuel tank if the blast took place when the aircraft reached cruising altitude. But, fortunately, the explosion happened at a lower altitude of between 12,000 feet and 14,000 feet.”
Denial of bomb hypothesis
General
The bomb hypothesis is bringing about needless efforts, as there’s evidence of no bomb. To realize it, readers needn’t sophisticated / high-tech knowledge but primary ~ high school level common sense. Let’s learn it next.
Circumstantial evidence
The suspect is unbecoming to a suicide bomber as per circumstantial evidence.
(1)   Social circumstantial evidence
Generally, extreme Islamist groups, such as Al-Shabaab, IS, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda etc, do not rely on elderly people, much less handicapped, in suicide-bomb operations. Reasons are (i) they’re unreliable for the purpose as can’t react to a situation quickly and (ii) they generally don’t like to shorten their remained short lives. The suicide bombers are exclusively young people, very often teenage boys and girls. This is historically true. Kamikaze suicide airmen in the WW II were all youths of high teen and low twenty. Do readers know what does Al-Shabaab mean? It means ‘Youths’.
(2) Personal circumstantial evidence
As reported, the deceased passenger was expected to have medical treatment in Turkey. It doesn’t conform to the person who resolved to be a suicide bomber. The person also had obtained a working visa to work at the ministry of foreign affairs in Turkey as an adviser. It’s unnecessary to carry out the suicide bombing. A tourist visa is enough for the purpose. It’s much easier to obtain than a working visa.
Scientific evidence
The parties concerned have induced the existence of a bomb and a fire based on passengers’ feeling. But it’s yet to be deduced with material evidence. It can’t be done, as really there’s no bomb, no fire. If nothing comes of something, it’s a baseless one. Let’s learn it in this Sub-sub sect.
(1) Chemical evidence of no smoke / no fire
There’s no soot without smoke. There’s no smoke without fire. There’s no fire without bomb. It’s said, ‘after the blast, the cabin was covered by a volume of ‘smoke’. Really, if a bomb blasts, it must be followed by ‘dark black’ smoke, since all IEDs Al-Shabaab uses are of petrol origin, but the ‘smoke’ wasn’t black but white. Both the smoke and fire can’t disappear within several seconds’ time but really it did. In fact, fog appeared when warm and pressurized air inside the cabin contacted cold atmospheric air and was decompressed after a hole was ripped. Light of emitting sparks, when the fuselage was severing and flattering until it was finally severed from the mother fuselage, were reflected by moving white fog. It was seen as fire. There was no fire but heat was. It was generated while the broken fuselage was subjected to cold works. Derleh’s charred body is the result when having been tangled with thus heated / flattering severed fuselage. The body hurt by heat is different from the one burnt by fire. Identify it by forensic examinations.
The back-side fuselage of the ripped hole is discolored to a sepia color. cf. Photo 9.
→        Photo   9 Daallo Airlines Flight 159 after emergency landing
→        Photo 10 United Airlines Flight 811 (Origin: Wikipedia)
Vapor (gas, not smoke) from melted synthetic materials by aluminum-cold-work heat consolidated on the outside fuselage, and discolored it. The gas couldn’t flow into the cabin as its air pressure is higher than the outside atmospheric one. If smoke or gas enters the cabin, it badly smells and causes eye aches even after the smoke (gas) disappears. But neither passengers on board nor investigators who entered the cabin after the incident claimed it. It proves no smoke in the cabin.
(2) Physical evidence of no bomb
Suppose there’s a fluid closed up in a vessel. When pressure is applied at one point in a fluid, it’s transmitted everywhere in the vessel. If the fluid is a liquid, the pressure transmission occurs instantly as a liquid is uncompressible. If the fluid is gas the above is also true. Everybody knows it when fill a tire with air. If gas pressure is given in a short time, e.g., by blast, the transmission takes a little moment as gas is compressible. Now let’s come back to the case of air in the fuselage.
When blast occurs at a certain point in the fuselage, all the people in the closed up cabin must feel the blast of as strong as it breaks the fuselage. But nobody on board felt it or harmed. The passengers heard a big sound only There can be seen insignificant physical damage in the cabin as well. It proves no bomb blast was. cf. Photo 11 and 12.
        Photo 11 A ripped hole (view from inside plane)
→        Photo 12 Cabin feature near the hole
(3) Directional bomb
The above stated realities are possible if a directional bomb is used. Directional IEDs are popularly used in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan for Road-side bombs. This weapon combines a conical, spherical or, most preferably, parabolic shape bomb charge (cf. Photo 13) with a steel cover. When a bomb explodes, explosion forms a linier blast into the targeted object with its full energy to cause the maximum effect. To satisfy the above stated realities in the cabin, the bomb used in Daallo Airbus must be a directional one.
→        Photo13 Charge for directional bomb
The charge must be rigidly fixed with the floor panel so that it prevents the charge from moving backward by a blast reaction. In D-event, the charge (heavier than the bomb itself) was not used, since, if it was used, the charge must remain in the cabin, but not found. Even if it was, it must clear a next question, ‘Can it produce a rectangular hole?’ The answer to this question is given in the next Sub-sub-sect.
Comprehensive evidence of no bomb
(1) Skepticism
Why is the shape of the ripped hole rectangular? cf. Photo 9, 10 and 11. In this regard, Mr. Rob, on Feb. 5 2016, expressed his skepticism as follows:
Interesting explosion caused by unknown for now - lots of straight line on ripped parts, minimal or no damage on surrounding seats, when looking from inside and outside (photos) opening seems reasonably square, straight lines and 'cuts'. I look forward to investigation findings.
Since Mr. Rob expressed this skepticism, it has passed 9 months but any answer has yet to come. He herein gives it on behalf of a defender in the next Item (2).
(2) Why the ripped hole is rectangular?
The answer to this question directly gives the cause. The answer is:
(a) The place where the hole was ripped had been the position where one of four emergency exits was to be in the original design.
(b) The place of the emergency exits used to be chosen on the root of wings in conventional designs. cf. Photo 9 and 10. It’s because passengers can move into an inflated floating lifeboat easily by using the wings as intermediate stepping stages.
(c) The emergency exits above the wings were moved to fore- and back-sides of the wings. Spaces for the original emergency exits were closed.
(d) To close each space, a plate of the same as the fuselage skin was used. It was fixed in position by means of welding. Stringers were expanded onto it.
(e)  It created a discontinuity in the fuselage, but it wasn’t taken into account. Sure enough, fatigue cracks developed faithfully along the weld lines, and when it developed up to a critical condition, the fixed plate was severed from the position having let the original shape of the emergency exit reappear as it was before the design change.
Comment: The same failure will occur sooner or later in other three exits, since the quality of the works for all the four is supposed to be the same.
Verbal evidence
Jake Swearingen, one passenger, Darren Howe, speaking to the BBC, says “there was no explosion on board. It was not an explosion but a fuselage failure at 10,000 feet."
Comment: Except the deceased passenger, Mr. Borleh, this eye witness, Mr. Howe, was sitting on the nearest seat to the ripped hole (the next seat to Mr. Borleh’s).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Report summarizes its conclusions as follows:
(1) Making analogy between the five events, it’s realized that there’re 10 points of similarity between them. Each point is rare in general but practically common in all the five events. Then, one common cause for all should be considered first. This study has found the common cause, and induced a causation Hypothesis, ‘bulkhead fatigue rupture in a cockpit’.
(2) This study has deductively proved the existence of fatigue cracks in the cockpit with M-event. The Hypothesis doesn’t contradict any premises of rationality and facts of reality.
(3) Despite similarities in the five events, popular hypotheses provide event-by-event a different cause which is attributed to a dead human, more concretely, to a pilot if a plane was being controlled by the pilot at a time of an event (F-, A- and L-event), else if the plane was being controlled by autopilot (M- and E-event), to a (suicide) bomber. A premise of the hypotheses is a ‘flawless plane’.
(4) The premise has been denied, as the existence of ‘bulkhead fatigue crack in a cockpit’ is confirmed with M-event cockpit debris. As per similitude of the five events, the causation-related matters confirmed with M-event are also true in E-event and three others. The bomb hypothesis itself of E-event has been denied together with its consequences, fire and smoke. Hence, to deduce the bomb hypotheses is tantamount to making grandchildren without having a child.
(5) The cause of E-event is the same as other four events, stated in above Item (1). It knocked out the crew and the control systems including black-box sensors. The plane plunged into the Mediterranean as if it was a drone without control.
This Report’s recommendations are as follows:
(1) As the control-system failure involved CVR/FDR recording, there’s too few available data either to confirm or to deny any hypothesis. This entity is a crucial criterion in the studies on the five events. Anybody who enters the Airbus crash events should keep this entity in mind.
(2) As his past Reports pointed out, this Report reiterates, “a weld joint, regardless of its type (manual or automatic, linear or point), shouldn't exist in a cockpit section.” It recommends again a friction joint in stead of a weld one in general, as it is fatigue free by nature.
(3) To exit from current stalemate of the Airbus-crash-event studies and from the repetitions of the same event, there’s no way other than to follow this Report, overtly (best in all) or covertly (better than do-not).
(4) The current investigation system is 2 centuries behind the times, i.e., out of place in the modern times. It’d be revised, e.g., the team’s functions are: (i) Gathering data and forwarding them before the world where powerful / professional search / select systems are. All the people interested (team members as well) present their study results. (ii) Picking up world rankings top ten study reports, (iii) from which editing a causation hypothesis of oneness, again using the existing search / select machines in the world.
(5) In this way, the most probable cause can be defined with less time and resources (<1/100) than the current system, without controversies that BEA dislikes, data leakage that BEA accuses, wishful thinking, convenient discard, act of perversity etc that are common place in the current system. Everything is openly executed by an e-search/select system. All evils currently looming above the investigations will go away all at once.
REFERENCES

 [1] CNN, Pilot response led to AirAsia crash into Java Sea,’ ww.cnn.com/2015/12/01,

 Dec 1, 2015 –
 [2] Germanwings crash: ‘Co-pilot Lubitz 'practiced rapid descent',
 SectionEurope, 6 May 2015
 [4] Christian Roger, ‘The scandal of the Airbus A320 crash at Habsheim, France,’    www.crashdehabsheim.net/ Jun 26, 1998
 [5] Reuters,Egypt says no evidence of terrorism in Russian Metrojet plane crash,’

       December 14, 2015 - 9:16pm

  [6] Mada Masr, ‘Rebutting Egypt report, Russia insists bomb brought down Metrojet  plane in Sinai as inquiry continues, Monday, December 14, 2015 - 21:43

  [7] Scott Creighton, ‘Egyptair Flight MS804 : ACARS Data Shows Blown Out Windows in Cockpit – Shades of Flight MH17?,https://willyloman.wordpress.com/

  [8] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE,www.iba.ac.id, Jan. 6, 2012

  [9] Sohei Matsuno, Zul Hendri, ‘’A STUDY ON THE CAUSE OF KUKAR BRIDGE

COLLAPSE (sequel),’ www.iba.ac.id/

[10] Sohei Matsuno, UIBA'S AND HAPPY PONTIST'S KUKAR BRIDGE COLLAPSE THEORY,’www.iba.ac.id/documents/83

[11] Sohei Matsuno, SEA LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL FLOODING (JAKARTA),’

      www.iba.ac.id/
[12] Sohei Matsuno,JAKARTA FLOOD PREVENTION PROJECT WITH A TRUE CAUSE,www.iba.ac.id/ 8 Mar 2013
[14] Sohei Matsuno, ‘JAKARTA-FLOOD PREVENTION BY TRAINING DIKE vs. GIANT SEA WALL,’ www.iba.ac.id/
[15] Sohei Matsuno, ‘CAUSE & PREVENTION OF COASTAL FLOOFING, JAKAETA FLOODING AS A CASE,’  www.iba.ac.id/

[16] Sohei Matsuno et al,A CAUSAL STUDY ON THE AIRASIA AIRBUS CRASH EVENT,’  www.iba.ac.id/  2015

[17] Sohei Matsuno, Asmadi, ‘A STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS  CRASH Event,www.iba.ac.id/documents/, 2015

[18] S. Matsuno,STUDY ON LUFTHANSA GERMANWINGS AIRBUS CRASH,’

www.iba.ac.id/
[19] Dr. Sohei Matsuno, MS. Pujiono, ‘LEARN BEA'S PRELIMINARY REPORT ON LUFTHANSA CRASH,’ www.iba.ac.id/documents/

[20] Sohei Matsuno, ‘STUDY ON RUSSIAN METROJET AIRBUS CRASH,

        soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/, Jan 8, 2016
[21] Sohei Matsuno, ‘REVIEW OF AIRBUS CRASH & BUDGET SYSTEM -- given new data by Daallo event & AirAsia –soheimatsuno.blogspot.com/, May 30 2016

EPILOGUE


This Report is to unburden the parties involved in Airbus crash event studies from resource-wasting efforts by giving a true cause. He shall wait and see its effects.


PHOTO COLLECTION



   
    

        

   
                 


Photo 7 Probable fatigue cracks of EgyptAir Airbus


       



 

Photo13 Charge for directional bomb

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